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Abstract 
A number of previous studies have assessed whether insider trades convey information to 
the market. Whilst lots of research has been undertaken in the past three decades, the issue 
is still contentious and there is ongoing debate concerning the legality and profitability of 
insider trading. Regulators restrict insider trading before any material news 
announcements, so that insiders cannot take advantage of private information. Motivated 
by the studies in individual and aggregate insider trading, the objective of this thesis is to 
understand the role of signals that insiders send to the financial market about their 
companies when they trade, in general, and to assess the role of insider trading in the 
context of initial public offerings (IPOs), particularly under lockup restrictions and the 
high information asymmetries inherent in IPOs. 
 The first empirical chapter finds, in general, insider purchases convey information 
to the market and insider sells do not significantly affect stock prices. The market reaction 
to insider trading depends strongly on market-to-book and size of the company. However, 
the market reaction is weaker than previously documented. This thesis finds that insiders 
are net buyers in bear market and net sellers in bull market, which is consistent with the 
contrarian strategy. However, there is no difference in price reaction between the bull and 
bear markets. I also find that aggregate insider trading does not predict market returns.  
 In the second empirical chapter, I analyse insider trading within the lockup period.  
In almost all IPOs, the lockup agreement puts restrictions on insider trading before a 
certain date, which is known as the lockup expiration date. This thesis contributes to 
previous evidence by analysing insider trading under such institutional constraint. In 
particular, the insider trading before lockup expiration and the signals insiders send 
through their trades are examined. This thesis documents that insiders sell (buy) before 
lockup expiration. The characteristics of companies where insiders sell and where insiders 
buy are contrasted. While insiders sell in over-performing, large and low institutional 
xix 
 
holding IPOs, they buy in underperforming IPOs with lower under-pricing and lower 
proportion of shares locked in. Finally, I relate insiders buying and selling with the share 
price drop around lockup expirations. 
 The third chapter uses aggregate insider trading measure to address the issue of 
long run IPO performance. The study analyses insider trading within three years after an 
IPO to address the issue of IPO underperformance in the long run. In line with most of the 
existing studies, this thesis produces evidence that IPOs underperform in the long run. 
However, Net Sell IPOs over-perform, while Net Buy IPOs underperform. Moreover, the 
IPOs with insider trades perform better than the IPOs with no insider trades, which is 
consistent with the ‘price discovery’ argument of insider trading. The share price 
behaviour of Net Buy IPOs is not consistent with the ‘informed trading’ or ‘signalling’ 
hypothesis. In the case of Net Sell IPOs the results are consistent with the ‘timing’ as the 
insiders sell when the IPO reaches its optimum value. The trading behaviour is also 
consistent with the disposition effect in behavioural finance as insiders exhibit a tendency 
to sell winners and hold on to losers for too long. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Insider trading has gained considerable attention in academic research and from the 
media. For instance, the cover page news in Financial Times reports “Insider 
Trading Crackdown …billionaire investor charged….and former executives of 
Bear Stearns, IBM, Intel and McKinsey were charged yesterday in an alleged 
insider scheme that US prosecutors called the biggest ever.”1 In most of the 
developed countries laws regarding insider trades exist,2 and insider trading is 
illegal based on the proposition that insiders have superior ‘inside’ information. If 
they are allowed to trade based on such information, they are going to harm outside 
investors. The issue whether insider trading should be allowed or not is still 
controversial, as there are arguments in favour of and against insider trading (see, 
Bainbridge (2000) for a review). Regulators and the financial community are 
interested in insider transactions to measure insider gains and any distortion in 
prices that result from insider trades (Leland (1992)). Some argue that current rules 
                                                 
1 Financial Times, October 18, 2009. 
2 Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) provide a comprehensive survey. They find that 103 countries had 
stock markets at the end of 1998. Insider trading laws existed in 87 countries. 
2 
 
against insider trading prevent prices from reflecting the correct value of the firm 
and, thus, damaging market efficiency (Manne, 1966, and Meulbroek, 1992). On 
the other hand, if non-informed investors are aware of the wealth transfer induced 
by insider trading, they refrain from trading, resulting in illiquidity, and therefore 
inefficiency in the markets (Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991)). Thus, regulators 
advocate the need to impose a set of rules to enhance investors’ confidence in the 
fairness of trading in financial markets.3 In line with this argument, Bhattacharya 
and Daouk (2002) find that the successful prosecutions affect market liquidity, 
rather than the introduction per se of insider trading rules.   
The issue of legalisation of insider trading was first raised by Manne 
(1966), who argue that it offers an incentive for managers to release information 
that leads to more precise security valuation. However, Manne’s work does not 
answer how the information is incorporated into market prices, and how insider 
trading affects other market participants. More recently, this question has been 
investigated in a series of theoretical papers based on asymmetric information 
paradigm. For example, Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), 
Kyle (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987), and Admati and Pfleinderer (1988, 1989), 
model the reaction of observable market parameters at the onset of informed, or 
insider, trading. Cespa (2008) questions whether trading by an insider allows the 
information to be incorporated into stock prices in the most effective way.  He 
                                                 
3 Financial Times report on 6th April 2010 that Facebook has banned employees from selling stock 
on the secondary market outside specific trading windows opened by the company, in a move that 
comes as demand for shares of the private company continues to surge. 
 
3 
 
asserts that insiders trade on long-lived information and they control the flow of 
information. Hence, legislation that effectively curb insider trading may therefore 
facilitate the fundamental information to be incorporated in stock prices. Motivated 
by the ‘private information’ proposition a vast literature addresses the question as 
to whether insider trades convey information to the market. The overall results are 
mixed.      
A number of previous studies show that insider trades are informative (e.g. 
Jaffe (1974) and Finnerty (1976a), Rozeff and Zaman (1988) Pope, Morris and 
Peel (1990) Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis (1994)). Jaffe, (1974) and 
Finnerty, (1976a) in the US show that insiders are able to earn significant abnormal 
returns, around 5% and 7% respectively during the first five months after trading. 
Using UK data, Pope, Morris and Peel (1990) find significant abnormal returns 
following directors’ sells while Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis (1994) 
identify significant excess gains after directors’ purchases. More recently, Fidrmuc, 
Goergen and Renneboog (2006) find that insider purchases and sells trigger 
significant immediate market reactions of 1.16% and -0.26% respectively. 
However, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insider trades in most firms do not 
convey any immediate information4 and on an average, outsiders are not able to 
obtain any abnormal returns after taking into account transactions costs (Seyhun 
(1986), Pope, Morrison and Peel (1990), Gregory, Matatko, Tonks (1997), Jeng, 
                                                 
4 There is some predictability of excess returns left using equity purchases in small firms, but no 
predictability of excess returns at all is found on the sell side, or for medium-sized and large firms 
on both the buy and sell side. 
4 
 
Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) and Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks 
(2002)). 5  
A number of empirical studies provide evidence that corporate insiders use 
private information to strategically trade their own shares around corporate events 
and gain significant abnormal returns. For example, Seyhun and Bradley (1997) 
report that insiders of companies that file for bankruptcy protection sell their 
holdings before a decrease in stock prices and buy after prices have fallen. Karpoff 
and Lee (1991) show that insiders sell before firm’s announcement of new stock 
offering. Lee, Mikkelson and Partch (1992) report that insiders trade around the 
announcement of stock repurchases. Other studies focus on earnings forecasts 
(Penman (1982)), takeovers (Seyhun (1990)), and dividend announcements (John 
and Lang (1991)). These studies provide support for the hypothesis that insiders are 
able to trade profitably around major corporate event announcements. 
Marin and Oliver (2008) analyse insider trading and large movements in 
market prices. They document that insider sells peak many months before a large 
drop in stock prices, while insider purchases peak only the month before a large 
jump. They provide several explanations for such selling behaviour which is 
consistent with the market timing theories. Their results could imply that insiders 
                                                 
5 Seyhun (1986) found that outsiders earn a gross return of only 1.2% per annum in the 100 days 
following receipt of official summary, a level of return that is certainly unprofitable after deducting 
transactions costs. However, over the 100 days following the transactions date, insiders earn only a 
gross return of 2.3% per annum, indicating virtually no insider trading profit after deducting 
transactions costs. Moreover, Seyhun (1986) also reports that gross insider trading profits are 3.1% 
per annum in the 300 days following the date of trading, substantially less than the 7.4% profit 
reported by Jaffe (1974).  
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trade avoiding lawsuits.6 However, the selling behaviour challenges the 
conventional view that insider sells are mostly driven by the needs for 
diversification and liquidity.      
Rozeff and Zaman (1998) find that insider transactions are not random 
across growth and value stocks. They find that insider buying increases as stocks 
change from growth to value categories and their purchases are higher after low 
stock returns, and lower after high stock returns. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) obtain 
similar findings—insiders tend to buy value stocks and sell glamour stocks. Jenter 
(2005) provides further evidence on market timing and managerial portfolio 
decisions. He finds that managers’ perceptions of fundamental values diverge 
systematically from market valuations, and perceived mispricing is an important 
determinant of manager’s decision making. Insider trading patterns show that low 
valuation firms are regarded as undervalued by their own managers relative to high 
valuation firms. Further evidence by Jenter (2005) links manager’s private portfolio 
decisions to changes in corporate capital structures, suggesting that managers try to 
actively time the market both in their private trades and in corporate level 
decisions.  
Two recent studies challenge the conventional wisdom that insider trades 
are informative. The first one is Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who use a 
comprehensive data of 1.028 million transactions over the period of 1975-95 and 
show that the market basically ignores inside information when it is reported. The 
                                                 
6 In the US, most companies prohibit insiders from trading prior to earnings announcement and 
short-swing rule prohibits profit taking by insiders for offsetting trades within 6 months. In contrast, 
in the UK, insiders are not allowed to trade 2 months prior to earnings announcements.  
6 
 
observed magnitude of reporting period returns7 is less than 0.5%. However, they 
find that insider trades are informative in the long term, suggesting that the market 
under-reacts to this information. In line with these arguments, Jenter (2005) 
provides further evidence that managers use little inside information in their trades. 
The excess returns to insider trades, after controlling for size and book-to-market 
effects, are not different from zero. He argues that these economically insignificant 
returns suggest that managers may not use much valid inside information in their 
decisions above and beyond the information contained in observable firm 
characteristics such as size and book-to-market.8  
Previous studies are subject to numerous criticisms. Firstly, most of the 
studies in insider trading are undertaken in the US market where insiders are 
defined as board members, officers and large shareholders. Large shareholders are 
likely to have less ‘private’ information compared to officers and board members. 
Secondly, US studies are also subject to data problems. For example, until 
recently,9 US companies are not required to report the insider trades to SEC 
immediately. There is a significant delay between the trade date and reporting date 
as trades need to be disclosed within 10 days after the end of the month in which 
they took place. A number of studies use the quarterly changes of insider 
ownership to infer insider trading in that company. However, there are some 
studies in the UK market, where the reporting and disclosure is much faster 
                                                 
7 Reporting period is measured as -2 to +2 days. 
8 However, the results in Jenter (2005) do not suggest that managers never use valid inside 
information when they trade.  
9 In the US, during the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) period, insiders have to report their trades on the 
10th of the month following the transaction, resulting in a maximum delay of between 10 and 42 
days, depending on the trading date. Even recent studies (e.g., Jiang and Zaman (2010)) use pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley data. 
7 
 
compared to the US. Finally, previous studies analyse insider trading under the 
legislative constraints in that particular country. For example, in the US, insiders 
are not allowed to trade before material news announcements. Insiders’ strategic 
trading behaviour might be very different in other countries where the legislation is 
different.   
Insiders face additional constrains while making decisions to trade. For 
example, Bettis, Coles and Lemmon (2000) find that insider trading is regulated by 
the company policy. Most of the firms in their sample have a blackout period when 
insider trading is not allowed. Particularly, in IPOs insiders are not allowed to sell 
during the lockup period agreed with the underwriters. Previous studies have not 
fully addressed whether insider trading occurs under these additional constraints 
and in IPOs where the information asymmetry is high.   
While fully acknowledging the previous work relating to insider trading, I 
consider the shortcomings and unresolved puzzles in the insider trading literature to 
explore further the information provided by the corporate insiders and relate it to 
the alternative information environment in which they trade. Insiders in the UK are 
more likely to possess superior information because they are limited to executive 
and non-executive directors. In contrast, in the US, the definition is much broader 
as officers, key employees and large shareholders are all considered as insiders. 
Moreover, the differences in insider trading regulations and in reporting periods 
between the UK and the US can provide additional insights and may answer some 
anomalies addressed in the corporate finance literature.  
The main objective of this thesis, therefore, is to examine the information 
content of insider trading and use this information to address some dilemmas in 
8 
 
corporate finance literature. The corporate finance event that is used in this thesis is 
initial public offerings (IPOs). To address some of the puzzles in the IPO 
literature,10 this thesis uses the information provided by the individual insider 
trades as well as that provided by the aggregate insider trades. Net purchase ratio 
(NPR) is used as the aggregate insider trading measure, following Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001). Specifically, this study uses individual insider trades to address the 
issue of the drop in share price around the IPO lockup expiry dates and uses 
aggregate insider trading measure to address the long run performance of IPOs. 
This study divides the sample of IPOs where insiders trade and where insiders do 
not trade and relates it to the impact of insider trading on performance.  
The purpose of this research is not meant to solve the puzzles in corporate 
finance (IPO) literature. This thesis intends to explore further and to shed 
additional light on these issues, which might help in closing the gap between where 
we stand in corporate finance and the empirical anomalies documented in the 
literature. Specifically, this research empirically investigates why insiders actively 
buy (sell) in other IPOs, while they don’t trade in some IPOs. What are the 
implications of insider trades for such companies who floated shares in the market?  
There are three main issues underlying insider trading: (i) legalisation 
constraints and (ii) information asymmetries (iii) agency problems. The former 
differs across countries and raises the issue of enforcements. The second and third 
one differs across firms and information regimes. This thesis expands these three 
factors by introducing an additional constraint on insider trading that is specific to 
                                                 
10 The puzzles reported in the IPO literature are underpricing, lock-up expiration effects, long run 
underperformance and cyclicality in IPO volume.  
9 
 
newly quoted firms, which is known as lockup agreements. This study also 
expands the link between insider trading and information asymmetry by (i) 
analysing the information content of insider trading and the ability of insiders to 
predict future returns within the UK context where any trades undertaken by 
insiders are disclosed within 5 days and (ii) focusing more specifically on the 
ability of insiders to affect the short and long-term returns of IPOs, firms that are 
usually considered to have high information asymmetries.     
The issue of insider trading is still contentious and this study contributes to 
the literature by paying attention to the empirical debate of whether insider trades 
are informative by using more recent UK data. The purpose of this thesis, first, is to 
examine insider trading in existing companies, analyse the information content and 
timing of their trades. Second, do insiders trade under institutional constraints, such 
as lockup agreements, in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)? Third, can insider trading 
predict the long run performance of IPOs? The research questions in this study are 
motivated by the gaps and controversies in the literature, the specific characteristics 
of the UK market relative to the US where insider trading literature is 
predominantly undertaken and possible changes in the recent time periods when the 
financial regulator in the UK (FSA) is considering stricter rules.11 Following this 
short summary of the purpose and objective of this thesis, I will now describe in 
more detail the background and motivation of this thesis.    
 
 
                                                 
11 Evening Standard on 26 March 2010 reports that: as the Financial Services watchdog gets tough 
with insider traders, why corrupt bankers should be very afraid of its law enforcer. 
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1.1 Research Background and Motivation 
 
The thesis examines the information provided by insider trades and then analyses 
insider information in the context of IPOs where insiders face lockup constraints 
and newly quoted companies are subject to high information asymmetries. As the 
information asymmetries are high these firms are subject to high moral hazard 
problem (agency problem). This section addresses why insider trades are important 
in the firms using asymmetric information paradigm, agency theory framework and 
legal constraints faced by the firms. Then, the research links insider information in 
the context of IPOs, and shows that insider trades can provide more information in 
the case of recently quoted firms. 
Asymmetric information provides a potential explanation as to why insiders 
are able to earn excess returns. Given little uncertainty in the marketplace regarding 
the firm’s value, there is little scope for the insiders to profit, even if insiders have 
perfect information about the fundamental value of the firm. Conversely, if there is 
great uncertainty about the value of the firm, then perfect information held by the 
insiders would be quite profitable. These arguments form the basis of why UK 
insiders are not allowed to trade for two months prior to earnings announcements. 
Insiders might have information regarding earnings, and, if they are allowed, they 
can profitably trade based on this information.  
  A basic prediction about information asymmetry and insider trading is that 
when an insider’s information advantage is higher, the abnormal return following a 
purchase should be higher, and the abnormal return following a sell should be 
lower, all else is equal. Whether insiders buy (sell) more shares when the firm is 
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undervalued (overvalued) depends on the assumptions about the expected price 
adjustment associated with a trade of a given size. In price-taking models, such as 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), individuals believe they can trade any amount 
without altering the prevailing stock price. In this set-up, factors such as risk 
aversion, wealth constraints, or trading rules limit the quantity traded by informed 
insiders. In contrast, in models of imperfect competition, the size of a transaction 
does influence prices, as illustrated by Kyle (1985) and Spiegel and 
Subrahmanyam (1992). In such models, insiders choose the quantities they trade 
anticipating consequent price adjustments.  
These models predict that as the quality or importance of the information 
possessed by insiders improve, the bid-ask spread tends to widen. Because the 
spread compensates the market maker for the cost of trading with informed agents, 
the greater the informational advantage the insiders have over the market maker, 
the greater the adverse selection problem, and the wider the spread. Similarly, the 
adverse selection model predicts that the market liquidity, i.e., the number of shares 
that can be traded in the market for a given change in the stock price, will drop as 
the intensity of informed trading rises. The intuition is similar to that expressed for 
the widening of the bid-ask spread. When informed agents are trading, the market 
maker attaches more importance to the arrival of an order in computing the 
conditional price of the security. Thus, when a buy order is issued, the market 
maker elevates his or her posterior assessment of the securities value, and, therefore 
raises the price because it could have come from an informed trader with positive 
information. On the other hand, the price is lowered for sell orders. Therefore, 
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when informed traders are perceived to be present in the market, a trade of a given 
quantity will move prices further, ceteris paribus.  
After establishing the link between information asymmetry, insider trading 
and price discovery, it is reasonable to assume that information asymmetry is even 
more crucial in the context of IPOs, as they are new companies. Therefore, it will 
be interesting to focus on the information content of insider trading of the newly 
listed firms. These firms are likely to subject to larger information asymmetries 
than existing firms. In addition, they are subject to lockup agreement with their 
underwriters, which restricts insiders to sell before the lockup expiry. Lockup 
contracts reduce the information asymmetry and mitigate agency problems between 
the insider-managers and the outside shareholders (Brau et. al. (2004)). Ibbotson 
and Ritter (1995) state that investors are ready to pay more for a firm with a lockup 
agreement because any negative information being withheld is likely to be revealed 
before the locked-up shares can be sold, reducing the benefit of withholding 
information. Thus, the lockup expiration will shed additional light on the level of 
asymmetric information between the insiders and outside shareholders. This thesis 
chooses lockup contracts to further analyse information asymmetry documented in 
the context of insider trading literature and to examine whether insider trading can 
explain the anomalous behaviour of the drop in share price around lockup 
expiration dates.  
Further, the information asymmetry and price discovery arguments of 
insider trading can provide a potential explanation for the long run 
underperformance of IPOs. After first being documented by Ritter (1991), the long 
run underperformance of IPOs has been a puzzle. As insider trading fosters 
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efficient capital markets by improving the price discovery procedures in financial 
markets, it can shed some light on the underperformance of IPOs. Using data on 
illegal insider trading from SEC, Meulbroek (1992) finds that the stock market 
perceives the possibility of informed trading and impounds this information on 
stock prices. Similarly, Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and Mcconnell 
(1997) advocate that insider trading increases stock price accuracy by moving stock 
prices significantly. This research looks for a potential explanation of IPO 
underperformance in the long run, conditional on insider trading.  
Another influential proposition—agency theory—could establish a link 
between insider trading and long run IPO performance. Agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)) predicts that ownership will be more concentrated when 
controlling insiders find it easier to take advantage of outside or minority 
shareholders. As insiders’ ownership increases, their actions become better aligned 
with the interests of minority shareholders but they also bear more risk. There is a 
large literature on agency costs and governance, with an intense controversy 
evolving over time whether firms in which managers own more shares perform 
better and have higher valuations or not (see Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 
(1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2005), 
Lasfer (2006)). Insider buying (selling) can shed additional light on the 
performance of IPOs if there is a link between insider ownership and performance.  
Leland and Pyle (1977) model the retention of shares by insiders as a signal 
of the quality of a firm when information asymmetries are high. As Myers and 
Majluf (1984) show, if insiders maximize the wealth of existing shareholders, they 
will choose to sell equity only if they can do so at an advantageous price. This 
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adverse selection makes it expensive to sell shares when information asymmetries 
are important. Maug (2002) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) point out that it 
becomes advantageous for firms to have outside shareholders, and hence to have 
more dispersed ownership, when information from outside the firm becomes more 
important in managerial decision making. Thus, in the context of these models, 
more dispersed ownership becomes more advantageous when the informational 
advantage of insiders becomes less important. As, in the case of IPOs, insiders can 
take advantage of the outside shareholders in the presence of the moral hazard 
problems. This is an interesting avenue for research which is addressed in this 
thesis when I analyse insider trading within the lockup period.  
In signalling models of lockup insiders play an important role by retaining 
the IPO allocations. Insiders of a good firm have to send a signal that insiders of a 
bad firm could not afford to mimic. Brau et al. (2005) extend Courteau (1995) 
model by endogenizing and allowing for a band of lockup lengths. In words of 
Brau et al. (2005) “Thus, insiders cannot just put their money where their mouth is; 
rather, they must commit to keep it there if the signal is to be credible” (p. 520). In 
Brau et al. (2005) model the lockup period performs this keeping function, as in 
Courteau (1995). Longer lockups hurt mimickers more than they hurt insiders of 
good firms. A longer lockup imposes two penalties on mimickers. In a mean-
variance framework, longer lockups decrease the mean, and they can increase the 
information variance of the post-lockup payoff. Increasing transparency increases 
the probability that mimickers will get caught, and higher levels of idiosyncratic 
risk impose mimickers a cost in terms of lack of diversification, both resulting in a 
separating equilibrium with shorter lockups. Insider trading within the lockup 
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period can be an interesting ground to gain insights about the signals send by the 
insiders. 
Another line of research argues that insiders trade to take advantage of 
mispricing (for example, see Rozeff and Zaman (1998) and Jenter (2005)).  At the 
same time, there are also studies which suggest that managers are successful in 
identifying mispricing around stock repurchases (see Chan, Ikenberry and Lee 
(2007)). If corporate decisions, in fact, reflect manager’s perception of mispricing, 
then this perception should also be reflected in their trading decisions. There is a 
large amount of literature examining the extent to which managers use private 
information to make trades in their companies’ stocks and the resulting insider 
profits. Karpoff and Lee (1991), Lee (1997), and Kahle (2000) find that insider 
sells increase relative to insider purchases before seasoned equity offerings. In 
addition, a recognized literature on insider trading also suggests that managers may 
have some timing skill (Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jenter (2005), Marin and 
Oliver (2008)). In this thesis, I further explore insider timing skills in the specific 
case of IPOs, where information asymmetries are high and insider trading is 
expected to have a higher impact on share prices.  
Yet, in another theoretical paper, John and Narayanan (1997) convincingly 
show that the disclosure rules generate incentives for an informed trader to 
manipulate the stock market from time to time by trading in the wrong direction 
i.e., buying and selling when insiders have bad and good news about the firm but 
the net effect is consistent with the direction of net buy (sell). This contrarian 
trading lessens the informativeness of insiders’ subsequent trade disclosure because 
the market is no longer certain whether an insider buy (sell) indicates good (bad) 
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news. Consequently, the insider maintains information superiority over the market 
for a longer period of time and uses it to reap large profits in later periods by 
trading in the right direction. Huddart et al. (2001) show the extent to which 
insiders can profit from long-lived information even though they need to disclose 
the trades. They also show that to maximise his expected profits, the insider 
dissimulates his information by adding a random component to his trade.  
Dissimulation is costly, since it causes the insider at times to trade in a manner 
inconsistent with his private information.  As IPOs are new companies, they 
provide an interesting venue to explore informational advantage and dissimulation 
by the insiders.  
Bainbridge (2000) notes that serious empirical research on insider trading is 
hindered by the fact that it is illegal to trade on the basis of insider information. The 
sources of data regarding legal trades are the disclosure made by corporate insiders, 
and it is not very likely that managers will report these violations. The exclusive 
source of data concerning illegal trades is confidential as it comes from court 
filings. To my knowledge, only one study uses illegal insider trading data is 
Meulbroek (1992). Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) further point out that, because 
of the availability of data, and the long time taken to make laws on insider trading, 
practically all empirical research on insider trading has been concentrated in the 
US. Although some studies are based on the UK institutional setting, previous 
studies find it difficult to obtain data for a large sample of companies in UK. This 
thesis analyses unique data set on corporate insiders in the UK and addresses 
several research questions.  
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This research is also motivated by the institutional differences between the 
US and the UK.12 Within the context of insider trading, the differences pertain to 
the definition of an insider, the fundamental nature of the regulation, the 
enforcement and the delay within which trades have to be reported. It is expected 
that UK insider trades are likely to be more informative than US trades for the 
following reasons. A trade must be made public within at most 6 business days in 
the UK, compared to up to 40 days in the US (Fidrmuc et al. (2006)). Both 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and McConnell, Servaes and Lins (2005) report that 
the information on insiders’ trades enters the public domain in the US only several 
days after it is released by the SEC.13 Fidrmuc et al. (2006) show that no such delay 
occurs in the UK. In the UK, mandatory reporting by insiders is limited to top 
management and to the non-executive directors only. In contrast, US insiders 
(legally) comprise a much larger group: insiders are large shareholders, directors 
(non-executive) and managers (officers). These reasons suggest that director trades 
in the UK are likely to be more informative.14  
 This thesis first assesses whether insider trading is informative under the UK 
institutional setting where insiders are limited to board members and their trade is 
disseminated in the market very quickly. I also expand the past literature by 
focusing on trading by insiders under the lockup constraints. This thesis 
                                                 
12 A detail discussion on differences in the US and the UK regulations are in Appendix I. 
13 In Contrast, using illegal insider trading data, Meulbroek (1992) shows that prices compound 
insider trading information on the day when the trade is made. 
14 However, since insiders can manipulate/dissimulate public reporting before they exploit their full 
informational advantage, the information the market gathers as a regulatory prescription is 
exogenous, may be misleading. The analysis of possible effects the settings of reporting insider 
trades imply for the insiders to manipulate/dissimulate information is an interesting avenue to 
pursue. I do not address these issues fully in my dissertation, but they remain ways of further 
research. 
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empirically examines the information provided by insider trades and the influence 
of such trading on IPOs. Motivated from the information provided by insider 
trading and timing skills of corporate insiders in their personal and corporate 
decisions, this research asks the following questions: Do insiders trade within 
lockup constraints? What information is provided by sell and buy trades within the 
lockup period?  Are the documented lockup expiry returns related to the selling 
activity around the lockup expiry dates? Do insiders buy stocks in their own IPOs 
before the lockup expiry dates, if so what are the characteristics of such IPOs? 
Previous studies have not addressed directly these questions, particularly within the 
UK institutional environment.15 The buy and sell trades within the lockup period 
are interesting to analyse. While the sell trades may highlight early releases from 
the lockups, the buy trades are likely to indicate price support if the IPOs are 
underperforming. This research, therefore, assesses fully why insiders trade before 
the lockup expiry date. Finally, the impact of insider trading on the long term 
performance of IPOs has been analysed. The main research question addressed is 
whether insiders buy (sell) in over-performing (under-performing) IPOs to 
maximise their returns. This thesis assesses whether the trading activity of insiders 
reduces the information asymmetries and the differences of opinions across 
investors and leads to a more efficient long-term valuation of IPOs. I argue that 
since insiders, defined as board members, are closer to their firm, they are likely to 
know its true value, as they are able to make a better forecast of the future cash 
                                                 
15 Espenlaub et al. (2002) analyse the trading by directors around the lockup expiry date and report statistically 
insignificant abnormal returns around the lockup expiry dates. 
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flows than the market. This information is expected to be conveyed through their 
personal trades in their own company.      
1.2 Main Findings and Contribution 
 
Empirical evidence in this thesis shows that insider trades convey information in 
general, and, they convey more information in the case of IPOs. However, the role 
of insider information is slightly different in IPOs than in non-IPOs. This is due to 
the fact that as IPOs are new companies and as little is known about these 
companies, the information asymmetry and the agency problems are higher. 
Moreover, IPOs are subject to lockup agreements where insiders sells is almost 
prohibited during lockup period. This makes the insider information superior in 
IPOs compared to non-IPOs.   
The findings of this thesis are as follows. The first empirical paper (chapter 
four) finds that, in general, insider purchases are informative while the sell trades 
of insiders are not. However, the abnormal returns vary to a great extent with M/B 
and size. I then analyse the connections between company fundamentals and the 
timing of their trades. I follow Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) and Jenter (2005) methodology. Insiders tend to buy stocks with poor past 
performance and those that are cheap measured by market-to-book. I find that they 
tend to purchase value stocks which underperformed in the past, and, conversely 
sell glamour stocks which performed well in the past. This study finds evidence 
that there are connections between company fundamentals as measured by market-
to-book and the timing of trades undertaken by the insiders. The results suggest 
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that insiders tend to have contrarian views with regard to their own company stock. 
Their disagreements with the market are not randomly distributed across firms. 
They seem instead to be described by insiders in low valuation firms evaluating 
their stocks as undervalued and insiders in high valuation firms evaluating their 
stocks as overvalued. Therefore, it appears that the perception of mispricing is an 
important factor behind the market timing behaviour of the corporate insiders. 
While, previous literature on insider trading almost unanimously finds that insiders 
are contrarians, this study provides further evidence that insiders use market 
sentiment as a platform to act like contrarians. Using aggregate insider activity 
measures, this study finds strong relationship between market timing by insiders 
and market sentiment as measured by bull (bear) periods. However, the difference 
in the price response to insider trades across the two periods is not statistically 
significant, suggesting that the market values homogenously the information 
content of insider trading independent of market conditions. 
The second empirical paper (chapter five) focuses on the market timing 
ability of insiders in initial public offerings (IPOs). Insiders are likely to sell before 
the lockup expiration if the IPO performs exceptionally well. This study finds that, 
compared to the US, lockups are relatively longer in the UK, but significant insider 
buy and sell trades occur before the expiry date. The results highlight the 
underwriter involvement in the lockup enforcement. They suggest that the early 
trades are likely to be pre-arranged with the underwriters rather than decided 
unilaterally by insiders. This study finds strong evidence that IPOs with early 
buy/sell trades are more likely to have prestigious underwriters. In addition, since 
the buy (sell) trades occur in under- (over-) performing IPOs, the results indicate 
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that the underwriters appear to release insiders of over-performing IPOs from the 
lockup constraints but force those of under-performing ones to increase their 
holdings. This asymmetric impact on the lockup suggests that although lockups are 
relatively longer in the UK compared to the US, underwriters appear to have a 
power to enforce them, and the ability to amend them when necessary.  
Third empirical paper (Chapter six) reports that IPOs underperform in the 
long run (three years) by using event studies and the Fama-French calendar time 
approach. The finding that IPOs underperform in the long run are analysed by 
using the information extracted from insider trading. This study divides all sample 
IPOs in firms with insider trading and firms without insider trading. The results 
from the univariate analysis show that IPOs with insider trades underperform less 
than IPOs without insider trades. Interestingly, IPOs with net sell trades 
overperform relative to the various benchmarks. In multivariate settings, after 
controlling for standard explanatory factors, this study finds insider trading activity 
can explain IPO performance in the long run. All the insider trading measures are 
highly significant and negatively related to long-run IPO performance.      
In summary, this research contributes to the current literature in five ways. 
First, it increases our understanding of the information content of insider trades. In 
this study, perceived mispricing is shown to be an important determinant of insider 
trading. The market reaction to insider trades is not similar across market-to-book 
quintiles and size quintiles. This research is an effort to analyse the ‘value’ and 
‘glamour’ strategy adopted by the corporate insiders. This thesis also produces 
evidence which is consistent with the notion that insiders mechanistically react to 
the valuation level of the company (see Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and 
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Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005)). Compared to these studies, instead of using 
quarterly data on insiders’ holdings changes, my research uses daily data to 
examine the market reaction and link it with valuation ratios. This research also 
finds evidence consistent with recent insider study using data from the UK, that 
insider trading in the UK provides more information compared to the US and 
attributes this to the information environment of the UK.  
Second, the results help understand the role of lockups in the context of 
going public process. Previous research suggests that lockup mitigates the 
information assymetry and agency problems (Brav and Gompers (2003) and Brau 
et al. (2005)). This reserach produces similar findings and extends the previous 
findings by utilising a unique UK data set. However, while earlier research only 
analyses the sell trades of insiders before the lockup expiration, I also analyse the 
buy trades, along with sell trades before  lockup expirations. I show that, the major 
drivers of insider purchase trades are share price performance and prestigous 
underwriters. In particular, this study reports that share prices decline significantly 
before the buy trades. Although share prices increase substantially on the 
announcement date, they revert into being negative in the post trade period. These 
results suggest that insiders buy trades are not information driven, but they are 
undertaken to support the price of falling IPOs. These results also suggest that 
insiders do not take advantage of the outside shareholders as they do not appear 
trade on private infromation. This study contributes to windows of opportunity 
hypothesis tested in context of secondary equity issues (Clarke, Dunbar and Kahle 
(2004)). 
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Third, this research sheds some additional light on the on the drivers of  the 
long run performance of IPOs. Most previous studies show that IPOs underperform 
in the long run. This negative performance is considered to be a puzzle in empirical 
finance (see Ritter and Welch (2002)). This study contributes to the literature by 
analysing long run IPO performance and linking it to the informed trading by 
corporate insiders.This study shows that the IPOs in which insiders are active 
perform better compared to IPOs where insiders do not trade. This is consistent 
with the notion that insider trading mitigates information assymmetry and provides 
price discovery in IPOs. This study also contributes to the agency theory litarature, 
which examines how ownership explains performance (Mikkelson, Partch, and 
Shah (1997)) and considers ownership dynamics after IPO (Helwege, Pirinsky and 
Stulz (2007)). 
Fourth, the study contributes to the timing skills of insiders when they 
undertake their trades. While the timing skill emanates from the contrarian trading 
adopted by insiders (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)), this thesis produces further 
evidence that insiders can time their trades well in the context of  IPOs. I find that 
insiders wait for the IPO to reach its optimal value before selling their shares. 
However, the selling by corporate insiders does not hurt outside shareholders as the 
share price does not decline after insider sell trades.  
Finally, by constructing unique data set on the lockup characteristics, this 
research provides further empirical evidence on the puzzles reported in the 
previous corporate finance literature. The lockup data set is unique as it is hand 
collected from company prospectuses issued at the time of the IPO.  In addition, 
the insider trading data used in this study is one of the largest in the corresponding 
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literature and for the last two empirical chapter I collect data on all IPOs issued in 
the UK over the period 1999 to 2006. The findings from this  research are therefore 
stronger, genralisable and updated.  As far as I know, the full analysis of insider 
trading in IPOs has not been covered in the past literature. As such, my results 
provide new insights into various puzzles documnted in the past IPO literature. 
Whilst some previous literature address them, most are based on US data. 
Empirical results based on UK data further complements early documented 
findings.   
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
related literature for this research. Chapter 3 describes the data and empirical 
methodology used throughout this thesis. Chapter 4 examines the information 
content of insider trading in existing companies, and analyses market conditions, 
market timing and information content of individual and aggregate insider trading. 
Chapter 5 focuses on insider trading around IPO lockup expirations. In Chapter 6, 
this thesis examines the impact of insider trading on long run performance of IPOs. 
Chapter 7 summarises the findings, concludes the study, and discusses the 
limitations of this study and suggests some future research directions.  
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Chapter 2 
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a brief review of the literature relating to this thesis. Since 
this study explores the information content of insider trades in existing companies, 
and explains the IPO lockup expiration effects, and any impact of insider trading 
on long run performance of IPOs, several areas of research in finance are covered, 
especially empirical issues in insider trading and IPOs. First, studies in the insider 
trading literature are reviewed.  Second, this thesis explains studies relating to 
effect of IPO lockup expiry as it examines insider trading under institutional 
constraints, namely IPO lockups. Finally, I summarise previous studies that analyse 
the long run performance of IPOs, and various explanations provided for the 
underperformance.  
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 The literature in these three areas is relatively dense,16 and a comprehensive 
coverage is unlikely without a book-length literature review. I will therefore 
concentrate only on the area, which is the focus of this thesis. The literature review 
in this chapter can be broadly categorised into three parts. The first part deals with 
the general insider trading literature. For describing insider trading studies, the 
information content of individual insider trades are reviewed, and then studies 
related to aggregate insider trading are described. This is followed by studies that 
analyse market timing behaviour of insider trades, the legal issues surrounding 
insider trades, insider trading around corporate events. Second part reviews the 
literature on lockup expiry and the relatively limited number of studies which relate 
lockup expirations to insider trading. Finally, the long-run IPO performance 
literature is covered. As there has been lots of debate surrounding this issue the 
main focus is on reasons for underperformance and how insider trading can shed 
additional light on this issue rather than giving a full coverage on different 
controversies.    
2.2 Review of Insider Trading Literature 
2.2.1 Information Content of Insider Trades 
 
Starting with the pioneering work by Manne (1966), numerous empirical studies 
address the extent to which it conveys information to the market. A number of 
studies argue that insider trades convey special information, and, as a result should 
influence stock prices. One of the ground-breaking works done in this area is by 
                                                 
16 Insider trading literature starts with Mannes (1966) work. Although the first study on the long run 
IPO performance was by Ibbotson (1975), it was not really noticed until Ritter (1991). 
Comparatively, IPO lockup studies are new, as the first published paper was by Field and Hanka 
(2001) and only very few papers covered this topic to date. 
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Jaffe (1974), who tests profitability of insider trading. Using data from the US 
market between 1962-68, he finds that insiders possess special information. He 
shows that after adjusting for transaction costs only the intensive samples with an 
8-month holding period earn statistically large returns. He also reports that 
outsiders following insiders in this holding period can earn abnormal return of 
2.5%. Other US studies show similar finding— insiders are better informed and 
earn significant abnormal returns (Finnerty (1976a), Seyhun (1986, 1988), Lin and 
Howe (1990), Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003)). In contrast, some studies 
show that the post-event returns are random. For example, Rozeff and Zaman 
(1988) re-examine the profitability of insider trading over 1973-82, using a method 
to measure abnormal returns that takes into account the known tendency of stock 
returns to depend on market value of equity and earnings-to-price ratio. Their 
empirical findings do not support the view that corporate insiders have information 
that the market does not have as insiders do not earn substantial profits on a routine 
basis in stock trading. 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) improve the understanding of the specific 
nature of private information that insiders possess, and the use of this information 
in trading. They analyse 1.028 million insider transactions in all traded companies 
on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ during the 1975-1995 period. In general, 
they find stock price do not move significantly when insiders trade, and when they 
report their trades to the SEC. They also explore the informativeness of strong buy 
and sell signals. A strong signal occurs when at least three different insiders are 
trading sizable amounts. Their results show that strong buy signals produce high 
returns. However, they find that for large companies even strong buy signals do not 
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convey any information.  The strong sells signal do not convey any information for 
all companies.   
Similar studies have been undertaken in the UK market. King and Roell 
(1988) find that the beta adjusted CARs for the post-trade period of 1, 3 and 12 –
months are 2.38%, 6.62% and 56.22% respectively for buy trades and they are 
statistically significant.  The post event window returns for sell trades are positive 
as expected and not statistically significant. The analysis shows that insider buys 
are profitable but insider sells are not. In contrast, Pope, Morris, Peel (1990) find 
that post-trading behaviour of CARs for months +1 to +6 for the buy trades are 
generally positive but statistically insignificant. While for sell trades, they are 
negative and statistically significant. In the pre-trading period, they find that none 
of the CARs (for months -1 to -6) are statistically significant for both the buy and 
sell trades. In general, they find no market reaction from the buy trades but some 
market reaction from the sell trades.  
Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (1997) investigate whether the signal 
definition explains the different conclusions drawn by earlier studies (King and 
Roell (1988), Pope et al. (1990), and Gregory et al. (1994)). They find puzzling 
results as market model CARs are negative for buy. Furthermore, these returns are 
substantial, between -8.52% and -19.08% over 12 months after the trade. The 
results change dramatically when they adjust for size as the CAR’s become 
positive for buys and negative for sells in the post event window. In another paper, 
Friedrich et al. (2002), investigate short-run returns around the trades of corporate 
insiders on the London Stock Exchange. Their main focus is on smaller firms, since 
previous work by Gregory et al. (1997) report a highly disproportionate amount of 
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directors’ trading activity in less liquid stocks. They report evidence on market 
timing: directors buy shares after a decline in their company’s share price, and sell 
after a stock price run-up. More recently, Fidrmuc, Goergen, Renneboog (2006) 
analyze the immediate market reaction to directors’ transactions, excluding sells 
after the exercise of options, for companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
during the 1990s. Their results support the findings from previous studies that 
directors’ trades convey new information on the firm’s future prospects, as the 
returns to post buy (sell) trades are positive (negative) and significant.   
The studies cited so far use data from the legal insiders’ trade.17 There are 
also studies on the illegal insider trading.18 For example, Cornell and Sirri (1992) 
analyse trading by corporate insiders and their tepees in Anheuser-Busch’s 1982 
tender offer for Campbell Taggart. They use the Court records, which identify 
insider transactions, to sort out each individual insider trades from liquidity trades. 
In line with earlier studies, they find that insider trading have a significant impact 
on the price of Campbell Taggart. Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) analyse Ivan 
Boesky’s trades during the three month period prior to the acquisition of Carnation 
by Nestle in 1984. At that time Ivan Boesky purchased 1.7 million shares of 
Carnation’s stock on the basis of illegally obtained inside information. They find a 
positive and significant relationship between Boesky trades and stock price 
changes. Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) use the same Ivan Boesky data, and 
find that the tests they employed are unable to differentiate the price effect of 
                                                 
17 Legal insider trades represent the trades done by following the rules and regulations of SEC. The 
data is from the Security and Exchange Commission Ownership reporting System data file. The 
ORS data starts in 1975 and contain all transactions by insiders that are subject to disclosure 
according to section 16 (a) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934.  
18 The data comes from different court cases filed by the US Justice Department.  
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Boesky’s purchases of Carnation’s stock from the effect of non-insider purchases. 
The methodological message of Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) study is that 
the effect of insider trading on market price should identify the effect of non-
insider trading on market price and then determine whether the effects of insider 
trading differs from non-insider trading.  
2.2.2 Aggregate Insider Trading and Stock Market Returns  
 
Other studies focus on insider trading over several months and assess whether 
insiders are net sellers or net buyers. For example, Seyhun (1988) was the first to 
investigate the relationship between market movements and aggregate insider 
trading. He shows that net aggregate insider trading activity in a given month is 
significantly positively correlated with the market return during the subsequent 2 
months. In general, insiders increase (decrease) their stock purchases (sells) prior to 
increase (decrease) in the stock market. Insiders in high market risk firms are more 
likely to trade on the basis of mispricing caused by economy wide factors. Also, 
insiders in small firms who are more successful predictors of their firms’ 
performance tend to trade mostly on firm specific information.  The evidence 
suggests that insiders cannot always distinguish between the effects of firm-
specific and economy-wide factors. Seyhun (1988) also presents evidence that 
future market returns stay predictable, to some extent even after the publication of 
the insider trading information. 
In another study, Seyhun (1992) documents that for the period from 1975 to 
1989, the aggregate net number of open market purchases and sells by corporate 
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insiders in their own firms predict up to 60 percent of the variation in one year 
ahead aggregate stock returns.  Changes both in the business condition as well as 
movements away from fundamentals contribute to the information content of 
aggregate insider trading. This finding surpasses considerably the previously 
documented degree of predictability of short horizon stock returns using past stock 
returns to dividend yields. Interestingly, aggregate insider trading in small firms 
predicts future stock returns to a larger group of firms. The predictability of stock 
return rises with the length of forecasting horizon, the number of months of past 
insider trading, and the market sensitivity of stocks. They provide evidence which 
indicates that current aggregate insider trading is positively related to future real 
activity as measured by the growth rates of after tax corporate profits, the index of 
industrial production, and the gross national product.   
Choudhury, Howe and Lin (1993) use weekly data to examine the 
relationship between aggregate insider transactions and stock market returns in 
vector autoregressive (VAR) framework. They find that stock market returns 
Granger cause insider transactions. A positive shock in returns causes a strong 
increase in insider sells and decrease in insider purchases. There is strong serial 
correlation in the data, that is, insider purchases tend to follow insider purchases 
and insider sells tend to follow insider sells. Consistent with previous studies, there 
is some predictive content associated with aggregate insider transactions, but the 
magnitude is low. It is argued that the degree of mispricing observed by insiders is 
relatively small and very little of the mispricing is associated with unanticipated 
macroeconomic factors. Furthermore, investors cannot use aggregate insider 
transactions to profitably predict future market returns over the next eight weeks. 
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Contrary to Choudhury, Howe and Lin (1993), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) use 
comprehensive data and show that aggregate insider trading appears to predict 
market movements.  They also find that insider trading activity can predict cross-
sectional stock returns.  
2.2.3 Controversies on Insider Trading Regulation 
 
Regulators and the financial community are interested in insider transactions to 
measure insider gains and any distortion in prices that result from insider trades 
(Fidrmuc and Renneboog (2002)). However, one can still question whether insider 
trading practice affects the liquidity and efficiency of financial markets (Bainbridge 
(2000)). Some argue that current rules against insider trading prevent stock prices 
from reflecting the correct value of the firm and, thus, damage market efficiency 
(Manne (1966) and Meulbroek (1992)). On the other hand, if non-informed 
investors are conscious of the wealth transfer bring about by insider trading, they 
abstain from trading, resulting in illiquidity, and thus inefficiency, in the markets 
(Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991)). Thus, regulators advocate the need to impose a 
set of rules to enhance investors’ confidence on the fairness of trading in the 
financial markets.  
Cespa (2008) develop a model which predicts that insiders should base their 
trading on long-lived information and insiders can control the flow of information. 
His model suggests that insider trading should be based on information that can be 
repeatedly exploited before it is revealed in the market. The model also strengthen 
the case against insider trading, showing that actually insider trading can slow 
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down the information to be incorporated into prices and thus resulting a thinner 
market. Thus rules that limits insider trading may help to transmit the fundamental 
information into prices.  
Whether insider trading affects stock prices is central to both current debate 
as to insider trading is beneficial or harmful. Opponents of insider trading argue 
that it decreases market liquidity, produces abusive managerial practices, and is 
unfair to uninformed investors. On the other hand, proponents of insider trading 
assert that it fosters efficient capital markets by improving the price discovery 
procedure in financial markets. Jaffe (1974) find evidence that inside information is 
extensive, and implies that insiders in fact do violate security regulations. The 
verification of information in the intensive trading samples makes it easier for the 
law enforcers to detect the violators. Rozeff and Zaman (1988) find that insiders do 
not earn significant return after deducting transaction costs, suggesting that the  
Security and Exchange Commission Regulations are effective.  
Another group of researchers investigate the effects of insider trading in 
terms of market efficiency. Firstly, insider gains imply that there is a wealth 
transfer from uninformed investors to individuals with privileged information and 
that financial markets do not reveal private information19 (Jaffe (1974), Finnerty 
(1976a, b), Seyhun (1986), Gregory, Matatko, Tonks (1997) and Friederich, 
Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (2002)). Secondly, if insiders profit from their private 
                                                 
19 Insider trading has been viewed in the literature with the theoretical framework of market 
efficiency. The existence of insider profit has been deemed evidence inconsistent with the strong 
form of efficient market hypothesis. Profitable insider trading has not been viewed as a surprising 
phenomenon because the widespread belief that corporate insiders possess some inside information. 
On the other hand, profits to outsiders by following insiders are a serious exception to efficient 
market hypothesis, because they violate semi strong form of market efficiency. Earning profits by 
imitating insiders is known as “insider trading anomaly”. 
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information, their transactions can lead to trading strategies by non-informed 
investors. Since an insiders’ purchase (sell) would be followed by subsequent 
outsiders’ purchases (sells), insiders can automatically benefit from price run-ups 
(falls) even though they trade without information (Jaffe (1974)). This argument 
imply that the markets are semi-strong form of inefficient, but studies in general 
show that, on average, outsiders are not able to obtain abnormal returns after 
accounting for transactions costs20 (Seyhun (1986), Pope, Morrison and Peel 
(1990), Gregory, Matatko, Tonks (1997), Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) and 
Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks  (2002)). However, this proposition is 
based on the assumption that all insider transactions are driven by privileged 
information. Seyhun (1986) assert that the insiders profit vanishes if the expected 
loss to informed traders is taken into account by incorporating the bid-ask spread as 
an added cost of trade. This evidence suggests that the markets are efficient as 
outside investors cannot use publicly available information about insiders’ 
transactions to earn abnormal profits. Similar results are obtained by Rozeff and 
Zaman (1988) who show that insiders do not earn substantial abnormal returns 
after transactions cost.    
King and Roell (1988) highlight the benefits and costs of insider trades. The 
empirical evidence from the US and the UK suggest that information is more 
quickly disseminated in the markets, improving the choice of decision makers. The 
                                                 
20 Seyhun (1986) found that outsiders earn a gross return of only 1.2% per annum in the 100 days 
following receipt of official summary, a level of return that is certainly unprofitable after deducting 
transaction costs. However, over the 100 days following the transaction date, insiders earn only a 
gross return of 2.3% per annum, indicating virtually no insider trading profit after deducting 
transaction costs. Moreover, Seyhun (1986) also reports that gross insider trading profits are 3.1% 
per annum in the 300 days following the date of trading, substantially less than 7.4% profit reported 
by Jaffe (1974).  
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costs are increase in bid-ask spreads. They also assert that since all other traders are 
potential losers, there are many victims but no realistic plaintiffs, thus the need for 
regulations. Using previously unexplored data on illegal insider trading from SEC, 
Meulbroek (1992) finds that the stock market perceives the possibility of informed 
trading and impounds this information into the stock price. The study advocates 
that insider trading increases stock price accuracy by moving stock prices 
significantly. These results have direct public policy implications for both 
supporters and opponents of insider trading regulation. There are price discovery 
benefits of insider trading that should be considered when evaluating future 
legislation concerning insider trading penalties.   
Prior studies report a positive correlation between insider trading and stock 
price changes implying that insider trades affect price discovery differently than 
non-insider trades (Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and Sirri (1992)). Based on these 
results, various studies have argued for the legalization of insider trading to 
facilitate rapid price discovery. Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) analyse the 
trading activity of a confessed inside trader, Ivan Boesky, in Carnation’s  stock just 
prior to Nestlé’s  acquisition of Carnation in 1984, and find that the tests they 
employ are unable to differentiate the price effect of Boesky’s purchases of 
Carnation’s stock from the effect of non-insider purchases. Chakravarty and 
McConnell (1999) raise questions on the methods used by previous studies. The 
effect of insider trading on market price should identify the effect of non-insider 
trading on market price and then determine whether the effects of insider trading 
differs from non-insider trading. The public policy message is that earlier studies 
such as Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and Sirri (1992) cannot be used as a basis for 
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legalization of insider trades. Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) use a 
performance evaluation methodology but their policy message was very similar to 
the earlier literature. They assert that the US system is sufficiently effective so that 
outsiders are only slightly disadvantaged when selling stock in the open market, 
and they are not at all disadvantaged when buying stocks. Insider purchases 
comprise just 0.03% of all purchases on the open market. On average, outsiders 
lose just 10 cents on a $10,000 sell trade because an insider may be on the other 
side. For small stocks, these expected losses are still only 33 cents on a $10,000 
transaction.    
The current disclosure rules on insider trades made corporate managers 
adopt strategies to profit from trading on insider information and avoid 
prosecution.  In a theoretical model, John and Narayanan (1997) show that the 
disclosure rule creates incentives for an informed trader to manipulate the stock 
market from time to time trading in the wrong direction (i.e. buying when she has 
bad news and selling when she has good news about the firm). This contrarian 
trading lessens the informativeness of her subsequent trade disclosure because the 
market is no longer certain whether an insider buy (sell) indicates good (bad) news. 
Consequently, the insider maintains her information superiority over the market for 
a longer period of time and uses it to reap large profits in later periods by trading in 
the right directions. 
Though the debate about the pros and cons of allowing insider trading in the 
stock markets has been quite controversial in the law and finance literature, it needs 
to be examined from the point of view of actual practice. Before considering 
whether insider trading regulations are effective it is essential to assess whether 
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insider regulations are in place. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) show that the 
existence and enforcement of insider trading laws in stock markets is a 
phenomenon of the 1990s. They study 103 countries which have stock markets and 
find that insider trading laws exist in 87 of them. However, the enforcement as 
evidenced by prosecutions, has taken place in only 38 countries. Before 1990, the 
respective numbers were 34 and 9. They find that the cost of equity in a country, 
after controlling other variables, does not change after the introduction of insider 
trading laws, but decreases significantly after the first prosecution.   
2.2.4 Signalling Firms’ Mispricing 
 
A number of other studies suggest that insiders trade because they consider that 
their firm is mispriced in the market. Rozeff and Zaman (1998) find that insider 
transactions are not random across growth and value stocks. They find that insider 
buy trades are high when stocks change from growth to value categories and after 
low stock returns. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) obtain similar findings. They show 
that insiders tend to buy value stocks and sell glamour stocks.  Such trading 
behaviour is consistent with insiders purchasing (selling) securities with high (low) 
expected returns or the greatest amount of undervaluation (overvaluation) (e.g., 
Fama and French (1992), Lakonishok et al. (1994)). Past research, however, does 
not separate the source of insiders’ superior trading performance. Rozeff and 
Zaman’s (1998) pattern of trading across book-to-market portfolios could reflect 
insiders trading on market pricing errors (e.g., overreaction to past performance, 
Lakonishok et al. (1994)), but it could also reflect insiders’ superior knowledge of 
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future earnings performance. For instance, LaPorta et al. (1997) show that, on 
average, value (growth) firms tend to have positive (negative) future earnings 
announcement period returns. Because earnings announcement returns tend to be 
correlated with actual changes in performance, Rozeff and Zaman’s findings do not 
differentiate trading on the basis of contrarian beliefs from trading on the basis of 
superior information about future cash flows. Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) 
provide evidence that insiders are contrarians and at the same time possessors of 
superior information. They find that insider trades are positively associated to the 
firm’s future earnings performance (proxy for superior cash flow information), 
positively related to the firm’s book-to-market ratio and inversely related to the 
firm’s recent returns (proxies for trading against misvaluation). Each variable has 
incremental explanatory power, yet information about future cash flow changes 
explains a smaller portion of insider purchases than do proxies for security 
misvaluation.  
Jenter (2005) provides further evidence on market timing and managerial 
portfolio decisions. He finds that managers’ perceptions of fundamental value 
diverge systematically from market valuations, and perceived mispricing is an 
important determinant of manager’s decision making. Insider trading pattern show 
that low valuation firms are regarded as undervalued by their own managers 
relative to high valuation firms. Further evidence by Jenter (2005) links manager’s 
private portfolio decisions to change in corporate capital structures, suggesting that 
managers try to actively time the market both in their private trades and in 
corporate level decisions.  
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2.2.5  Contrarian Strategy and/or Market Timing 
 
Recent research on aggregate insider trading has established that insiders are able 
to predict future market movements and to time the market (Seyhun (1988), 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). Seyhun (1986, 1992) shows that insiders are more 
likely to sell (purchase) shares following periods of significant price appreciation 
(declines), consistent with insiders trading in anticipation of subsequent price 
reversals. However, it is not clear from the evidence whether this predictability of 
market returns is due to insiders acting as contrarian investors (Rozeff and Zaman 
(1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001)), or whether managers are better informed 
about their firm’s future prospects and it is ‘information’ that explains their market 
timing ability (Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003)), or whether it is a function of both 
(Piotroski and Roulstone (2005)). There is substantial evidence that corporate 
officers and directors are able to distinguish the apparent mispricing in their firm’s 
securities based on firm’s related information, resulting in profitable trades (Rozeff 
and Zaman (1998) and Jenter (2005)). If this information is linked to future 
economy wide activity, then the aggregate insider trading should predict future 
market movements and the market timing ability of insiders will be based on 
information unanticipated by the market (see Seyhun (1988)). If insiders are 
motivated to trade because of perceived mispricing, it is also conceivable that they 
may react to market returns. 
It is possible that noise traders may drive market prices way from intrinsic 
values, even in the absence of new information. Hence, a stock that was trading 
roughly at its intrinsic value could decline (rise) significantly because of such noise 
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trading.  Corporate insiders may then perceive the stock to be undervalued 
(overvalued) and buy (sell) it.  To the extent that noise trading is a market wide 
phenomenon, I expect market returns to ‘predict’ aggregate insider transactions in 
line with Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Chowdhury, Howe and Lin (1993) and 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001).  Such a relationship would be viewed as insiders 
following a contrarian investment strategy. Even though under both strategies 
insider trading is related to market returns, the key distinction is that managerial 
timing implies insider trading will predict future market returns while contrarian 
strategy implies insider trading is a reaction to market returns (Jiang and Zaman 
(2010)). 
Other related studies on managerial decisions also suggest that insiders are 
better informed about their companies’ future prospects. For example, Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) find positive abnormal returns earned by 
shareholders of companies that have announced open market share repurchases. 
These abnormal returns persist up to 5 ears after the announcement.  One of the 
main motivations for repurchases seems to be that insiders perceive their 
company’s to be undervalued in the market.  Loughran and Ritter (1995), on the 
other hand, observe a prolonged underperformance of companies following 
seasoned equity offerings. This is in line with the hypothesis that companies tend to 
issue seasoned equity when they perceive the market is too optimistic about the 
prospects of their company. Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that the share of equity 
issues in total new equity and debt issues is a stable predictor of US stock market 
returns between 1928 and 1997 (see Baker, Taliaferro and Wurgler ( 2006)) among 
others). 
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A related line of research on insider trading focused on whether aggregate 
insider trading can predict market movements, and could be used as a tool to time 
the market.  Seyhun (1988, 1992) provides evidence suggesting that some of the 
mispricing observed by insiders in their own firms’ securities is caused by 
unanticipated changes in economy wide activity.  He finds that aggregate insider 
transactions are correlated with the return on the market during the subsequent two 
months.  Chowdhury, Howe and Lin (1993) find that stock market returns Granger-
causes insider transactions while the predictive content of aggregate insider 
transactions for subsequent market returns is slight.  Lakonishok and Lee (2001) 
also provide evidence in support of the predictive ability of aggregate insider 
trading and market movement.  They conclude that insiders’ market timing ability 
is partially explained by the fact that insiders act as contrarian investors. They also 
conclude that after adjusting for the predictive power of simple contrarian 
strategies, the information conveyed through insider trading is still beneficial. 
Friedrich et. al. (2002), find patterns in abnormal returns in the days around a 
director’s trade that are consistent with short-term market timing by directors in the 
UK market. All the studies are summarised in Table 2-1. 
Another recent paper by Marin and Oliver (2008) investigate the insider 
trading prior to crashes. They show that, on an aggregate basis, insiders sell peak 
10 months before the drop and then decline sharply before the drop occurs. In 
contrast, aggregate purchases by insiders show a very different pattern. Insider 
purchases remain low all year long but increases only 1 month prior to jump. These 
results also demonstrate the market timing ability of the corporate insiders.      
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Table 2-1 Summary of Previous Studies 
Issues Author Market Data  Long/ 
short 
term 
Finding 
Panel A. Information content 
 
Jaffe (1974)  US 1962-1968 
(952 trades) 
 
M, 1,2,8  Insiders earn profit on their 
own account  Imply that insiders trade 
contain information 
 
 Seyhun (1986) US 1975-81 
24,371 buys 
34,777 sells 
D 
-100, 
+100 
 CAR increases (decreases) 
after insider purchases (sells)   Diamond shaped graph 
reported. 
 Damodaran and Liu 
(1993) 
US 1982-
1989,small 
sample 
D,  
-10,+10 
 No market response to the 
public announcement of this 
information 
 Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) 
US 1975-95, 
1.028 
million 
trades 
M 3,12  Market basically ignores the 
information when it is reported  Insiders tend to buy value 
stocks and sell glamour stocks  Insiders extensive buying is in 
small cap stocks. 
 Cornell and Sirri 
(1992) 
US 1982 
acquisition 
of Campbell 
Taggart 
D  Insider trading have a 
significant impact on price of 
Campbell Taggart 
 
 Chakravarty and 
McConnell (1997) 
US 1984 Ivan 
Boesky 
D  Positive and significant 
relationship between Boeskey’s 
trade and stock price changes. 
 Chakravarty and 
McConnell (1999) 
US 1984 Ivan 
Boesky 
D  Authors are unable to 
distinguish the price effect of 
Boesky’s (informed) purchases 
of Carnation stocks from the 
effect of non-insider 
(uninformed) purchases. 
 Pope, Morris and 
Peel (1990) 
UK 1977-84, 
564 trades 
M, 
-6,+6 
 The study doesn’t find any 
market reaction from the buy 
trades but some market 
reactions from the sell trades. 
 Gregory, Matatko, 
Tonks, Purkis 
(1994) 
UK 1984-86, 
1,653 trades 
M,3,12,
24 
 Abnormal returns tend to be 
concentrated in smaller firms.  When an appropriate 
benchmark portfolio is used, 
the significance of abnormal 
return is substantially reduced. 
 Gregory, Matatko 
and Tonks (1997) 
UK 1986-90, 
3,722 
Purchases 
3,034 Sells 
M 
(3,6,12,
24) 
 The puzzling results they got is 
that the market model CARs 
are negative for buy, and 
furthermore, these returns are 
substantial, between -8.52% 
and -19.08% over 12 months. 
The results changed 
dramatically when they have 
made adjustments for size.  The variable “size” can be of 
fundamental importance in an 
event study where a large 
number of smaller companies 
are included in the sample. 
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 Friederich, Gregory, 
Matatko, Tonks 
(2002) 
UK 1986-1994 
2558 
purchases 
1841 
Sells 
 
D 
-20,+20 
 Abnormal returns in the days 
around directors’ trade are 
consistent with the short term 
market timing.  Medium sized trades are more 
informative than large trades 
consistent with Barclay and 
Warner’s ‘stealth trading’ 
hypothesis  After adjusting for the 
transaction costs the abnormal 
returns disappear.  Use of monthly data can be 
misleading as the market reacts 
immediately to the insider 
trades. 
 Fidrmuc, Goergen, 
Renneboog (2006) 
UK 1991-98,  
10,140 buy 
5,523 sell 
D,  
(-20,-1; 
0,1; 0,4) 
 Insider purchases and sells 
trigger significant immediate 
market reactions of 1.16% and 
-0.26% respectively.  When several directors trade on 
the same day the announcement 
reaction is stronger  They do not find support for 
information hierarchy 
 Ravina and 
Sapienza (2006) 
US 1986-2003 
527,999 
trades 
D 
-20, 
+180 
 Independent directors earn 
positive and substantial 
abnormal returns when they 
purchase their company stocks, 
and that the difference with the 
same firm’s officers is 
relatively small at most 
horizons.  Executive officers and 
independent directors make 
higher returns in firms with 
weaker governance and the gap 
between these two groups 
widens in such firms. 
Panel B. Controversies on  insider trading regulation
 
Jaffe (1974)  US 1962-1968 
(952 trades) 
Intensive 
trading 
sample 
1950’s 
M, 1,2,8  Insiders do violate security 
regulations  The law enforcers should 
search for the violators   
 Finnerty (1976) US 1969-72 
9,602 buy 
21,487 sells 
M, 0-11  Insiders are able to outperform 
the market.  This finding tends to refute the 
strong-form of efficient market 
hypothesis. 
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 Seyhun (1986)     Insiders’ profit disappear if the 
expected loss to informed 
traders is taken into account by 
including the bid-ask spread as 
an additional cost of trade.  This evidence is consistent with 
market efficiency: Outside 
investors cannot use publicly 
available information about 
insider’s transactions to earn 
abnormal profits.  
 Rozeff and Zaman 
(1988) 
US 1973-1982, 
365 P, 333 
S. 
M, 
1,3,6,12 
 Evidence does not support 
insiders have information that 
market doesn’t have  Insiders does not earn 
substantial return after 
transactions cost, suggesting 
market efficiency  SEC regulation is effective 
 King and Roell 
(1988) 
UK 1986-1987, 
121 cases. 
M,1,3,1
2 
 Information is more quickly 
disseminated in the markets, 
improving the choices of 
decision makers.   Costs are the increase in bid-
ask spreads  Because all other traders are 
potential losers, there are many 
victims but no realistic 
plaintiffs, thus the need for 
regulation. 
 Meulbroek (1992) US 1980-89, 
320 cases  
 
D  Insider trading increases stock 
price accuracy by moving stock 
prices significantly.  Price discovery benefits of 
insider trading should be 
considered when evaluating 
future legislation concerning 
insider trading penalties.  
 John and Narayanan 
(1997) 
Theoreti
cal 
   The disclosure rule creates 
incentives for an informed 
insider to manipulate the stock 
market by sometimes trade in 
the wrong directions.  This contrarian trading reduces 
the informativeness of her 
subsequent trade disclosures. 
 Chakravarty and 
McConnell (1999) 
US 1984 Ivan 
Boesky 
D  The public policy message is 
that the studies of Melbroek 
(1992), Cornell and Sirri 
(1992) and Chakravarty and 
McConnell (1997) cannot be 
used as a basis for legalization 
of insider trading because they 
assert that insider trading 
facilitate rapid price discovery. 
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 Jeng, Metrick, 
Zeckhauser (2003) 
US  Not an 
event 
study 
 The system is sufficiently 
effective so that outsiders are 
only slightly disadvantaged 
when selling stock on the open 
market, and they are not 
disadvantaged at all when 
buying. 
Panel C. Signalling firms’ mispricing 
 
Seyhun (1986) US 1975-81, 
24,371 buy 
34,777 sell 
  Insiders purchase stock prior to 
an abnormal rise in stock prices 
and sell stock prior to an 
abnormal decrease in stock 
price.  
 
Rozeff and Zaman 
(1998) 
US 1978-1991 
12,162 firm-
year 
M, 
12,36, 
not 
event 
study 
 Insider transactions are not 
random across growth and 
value stocks  Insider buying climbs as stock 
change from growth to value 
categories  Insider buying also is greater 
after low stock returns, and 
lower after high stock returns.  These findings are consistent 
with a version of overreaction. 
 Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) 
 1.028 mil D, M  Insiders tend to buy value 
stocks and sell glamour stocks 
 Ke, Huddart and 
Petroni (2003) 
    Insider stock sells are greater 
for growth firm 
 Pitroski and 
Roulstone (2005) 
US 1992-99,  
25,893 
observations 
Y, not 
event 
study 
 Insider purchases are positively 
related to future earnings 
performance, positively related 
to book-to-market ratios and 
inversely related  to past 
returns  Superior information about 
future cash flow changes 
explains a small portion of 
insider purchase activities than 
do proxies for securities 
misvaluation 
Panel D. Market Timing 
 
Jenter (2005) US  Not 
event 
study 
 Insiders react mechanistically 
to growth and value strategies 
while they trade.  Insiders time their trades in 
their own trades and in 
corporate decisions.  
 
Marin and Oliver 
(2008) 
US 1986-2002 
1.18 mil 
Not 
event 
study 
 Insiders sells peak 10 months 
before the crash.  Insiders purchases pick up only 
one month before the jump in 
stock price.  Insiders time their trades to 
evade prosecution. 
Panel E. Insider trading and news releases
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Givoly and Palmon 
(1985) 
US 1973-75, 
Amex,  
1151 buys 
426 sells 
M, 
1,3,8,12 
 The major part of the observed 
abnormal performance of 
insiders is likely to be due to 
price changes arising from the 
information revealed through 
the trades.  There is a low incidence of 
insider trading in anticipation 
of an impending new 
disclosure.  
 Fidrmuc, Goergen, 
Renneboog (2006) 
UK 1991-98,  
10,140 buy 
5,523 sell 
D,  
(-20,-1; 
0,1; 0,4) 
 There is a strong relation 
between the presence of 
specific categories of block 
holders and price reaction to 
director’s trade.   The share price reactions 
remain valid when the 
transactions are preceded by 
news. It is crucial to adjust 
news regarding M&A’s (to a 
lesser extent CEO replacement) 
as these news items cancel out 
the significant share price 
reactions to directors trades. 
 Korczak and Lasfer 
(2007) 
UK 1999-2003 
10,414 buy 
2,953 sells 
D  They find strong evidence that 
insider’s trade before news 
announcements in both 
domestically listed and cross-
listed firms.  The type of news on which 
insiders trade do not 
necessarily have a higher value 
as measured by the 
announcement abnormal 
returns, than news on which 
they don’t trade upon. 
 Korczak,  Korczak  
and Lasfer (2010) 
UK 8086 trades   The study show that insider 
purchases before positive  news 
announcements  Sell trades are primarily 
affected by the reputational and 
legal risk.   
 Ke, Huddart and 
Petroni (2003) 
US 1989-1997,  
309,190 
trades 
Q, not 
event 
study 
 Insiders possess and trade upon 
significant knowledge of 
specifically and economically 
significant forthcoming 
accounting disclosures 
 Ravina and 
Sapienza(2006) 
    Independent directors earn 
significantly higher returns 
than the market when they sell 
the company stock in a window 
before bad news and around a 
restatement announcement.  
Panel F. Market microstructure  
 
Lin and Howe 
(1990) 
US 
(OTC) 
1975-83 
3,449 buy 
4,176 sells 
M 
-6 to+12 
 Transactions of insiders have 
predictive content.  Bid-ask spreads are too high to 
preclude insiders from realising 
positive abnormal returns from 
an active trading strategy. 
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 Cornell and Sirri 
(1992) 
US 1982 
acquisition 
of Campbell 
Taggart 
D  The impact of informed trading 
on the market is complicated  Contrary to the broad 
implications of adverse 
selection models, Campbell 
Taggart’s liquidity improved 
when insiders were active in 
the market. 
 Chakravarty and 
McConnell (1997) 
US 1984 Ivan 
Boesky 
D  Bid-ask spread appear to be 
unaffected  Depths appear to be unaffected 
or improved by Boeskey’s 
trades. 
Panel G. Aggregate insider trading and stock market returns
 
Seyhun (1988) US 1975-81 
24,371 buy 
34,777 sell 
M, 
 -24 to 
+24. 
 Insiders increase (decrease) 
their stock purchases (sells) 
prior to increase (decrease) in 
stock market.  Insiders in high market risk 
firms are more likely to 
observe and trade on the basis 
of mispricing caused by 
economy wide factors.  Also, insiders in the small firms 
who tend to be more successful 
predictors of their firms’ 
performance tend to trade 
mostly on firm specific 
information.  Net aggregate insider trading 
activity can be a useful 
component of leading 
indicators of future economic 
activity.  
 Seyhun (1992) US 1975-1989, 
426,804 buy 
417,603 
sells 
M, 
1,3,6,12 
 The aggregate net no. of 
purchases and sells by insiders 
predicts upto 60% variation in 
1-year ahead aggregate stock 
returns.  Changes in the business 
condition as well as movements 
away from fundamentals 
contribute to the information 
content of aggregate insider 
trading. 
 Chowdhury, Howe 
and Lin 
(1993) 
US 1975-86 
46,327 buys 
95,558 sells 
 
W 
(VAR) 
 Stock market returns Granger 
cause insider transactions  Predictive content of aggregate 
insider transactions for 
subsequent market returns 
appears to be slight.  The findings imply that: 1) the 
degree of mispricing observed 
by insiders is relatively small 
2) very little of the mispricing 
is associated with unanticipated 
macroeconomic factors. 
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D=Daily, W=Weekly, M=Monthly, Q=quarterly, Y=Yearly.  
 Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) 
    Aggregate insider trading 
appears to predict market 
movements  Insider trading activity can 
predict cross-sectional stock 
returns. 
Panel H. Insiders trading: Performance evaluation 
 
Eckbo and Smith 
(1998) 
Norway 1985-92, 
11,896 buy 
6,405 sells 
M  Performance analysis rejects 
the hypothesis of positive 
abnormal performance by 
insiders.  When classical event study 
technique is used they find 
some evidence of  abnormal 
returns of insider sells trades.  Insiders on average do not 
outperform the average mutual 
fund in their sample.   
 Jeng, Metrick, 
Zeckhauser (2003) 
US 1975-96 
208,055 
buys 
350,174 
sells 
D 
-100, 
+100 
 Insider purchases can earn 
abnormal returns more than 6% 
per year and insider sells do not 
earn significant abnormal 
returns.  Insiders disproportionately 
purchases shares in small firms, 
value firms, and those that have 
recently underperformed.  
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2.2.6 Insider Trading Around Corporate Events 
 
A number of empirical studies provide evidence that corporate insiders use private 
information to strategically trade their own shares around corporate events and gain 
significant abnormal returns. For example, Seyhun and Bradley (1997) report that 
insiders of companies that file for bankruptcy protection sell their holdings before a 
decrease in stock price and buy after prices have fallen. Karpoff and Lee (1991) 
show that insiders sell before firm’s announcement of new stock offering. Lee, 
Mikkelson and Partch (1992) report that insiders trade around the announcement of 
stock repurchases. Other studies focus on earnings forecasts (Penman (1982)), 
takeovers (Seyhun (1990)) and dividend announcements (John and Lang (1991)). 
All these studies provide support for the hypothesis that insiders are able to trade 
profitably around major corporate events. 
If managers can time the market with their own trades they should be able 
to opportunistically time the market in their corporate finance decisions. Both 
Karpoff and Lee (1991) and Kahle (2000) show that the number of insider sells 
significantly increases before SEOs and convertible bond issues, but not before 
straight bond issues. The evidence associated with insider trading pattern around 
various security issues is consistent with the proposition that managers take 
advantage of informational asymmetry between insiders and outside investors 
(Myers and Majluf (1984)). Lee (1997) finds that secondary issuers with top 
executives who sell their shares before the issue significantly underperform their 
matching firms. On average, secondary issuers do not underperform their 
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benchmarks.  These results indicate that those top executives who sell their shares 
before the SEO seem to knowingly sell overvalued security, and they have superior 
timing ability. Also, there is evidence of timing by the managers in context of share 
repurchases. For instance, Lee, Mikkelson and Partch (1992) find that on average 
managers of repurchasing firms increase their frequency of buying and decrease 
their frequency of selling shares prior to repurchase announcements. The unusual 
frequency of trading is pronounced in the six months that immediately precede the 
repurchase announcement. Managers generally do not undertake unusual trading of 
their firms shares following repurchases. 
Givoly and Palmon (1985) reasoned that insiders earn excess return because 
they possess and use superior information for their trading. They analyse the degree 
to which abnormal returns achieved by insiders is earned through price changes 
arising from the disclosure of the trade itself or from the subsequent disclosure of 
specific news about the company which insiders know.  The results suggests that a 
major part of the observed abnormal performance of insiders is likely to be due to 
price changes arising from the information revealed through the trades themselves. 
Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003) provide evidence that insiders own, and trade 
upon, information of definite and economically significant forthcoming accounting 
disclosures as long as 2 years prior to the disclosure. Stock sells by insiders 
increase in three to nine quarters prior to announcements of a series of consecutive 
increases in quarterly earnings. Insider stock sells are greater for growth firms, 
before a longer period of declining earnings, and when the earnings decline at the 
break is greater. In addition, the finding that insider purchases are more informative 
than insider sells (e.g., Seyhun (1998)) may be related to the finding that insider 
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sells prompted by earnings breaks precede the break by 9 months to 2 years. If 
insider purchases take place closer to the time that good news is disclosed, the 
difference in the informativeness of purchases and sells may be related to the 
window over which trades are examined. In another paper, Ravina and Sapienza 
(2006) analysed the trades of independent directors and find that independent 
directors earn significantly higher returns than the market when they sell the 
company stock in a window before the bad news and around restatement 
announcement.  
Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) assert that it may be essential to 
account for news releases preceding trades as this may be one of the reasons why 
the CARs they find are larger than those reported by studies based on US data. 
Certainly, the announcement effect may not be due to the directors’ transactions 
but to the release of news. The CARs may still be significantly influenced by 
specific types of price-sensitive information. Furthermore, they demonstrate that 
most news releases, prior to directors’ transactions, do not have any impact on the 
value of the signal, not even the frequent announcements about a firm’s prospects. 
There is only one type of news releases which has a significant impact on the 
CARs which is the trades that occur before the earnings announcements. The other 
news announcements do not have an impact on market prices. If news about a 
merger or acquisition is released within 7 or 30 days prior to a purchase, the market 
reaction is close to zero. This suggests that directors’ purchases do not contain 
much additional information after an M&A announcement. They also find weak 
evidence that the value of information of directors’ trades is reduced, when the 
trade follows within a month after news concerning the replacement of the CEO. 
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These two types of news reduce or even cancel out the otherwise positive market 
reaction to purchases.  
Yet, in another study on the UK market, Korczak and Lasfer (2009a) find 
that insiders do trade before material news is announced. Although this frequency 
is limited to about 5% for the buy trades and 20% for the sell trades, the propensity 
of trading is usually independent of the type of news announcements, which is in 
contrast with Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006). However, they find that 
directors are less likely to buy before news on earnings, other results and dividends 
and restructuring. Given the fact that directors are knowledgeable about these types 
of forthcoming announcements, the results suggest that insiders are likely to pick 
the news they are willing to trade upon. It is also interesting to note that, even in 
the case of earnings announcements where the regulation is tighter, they still find 
that insiders buy in 3%, and sell in 26% of total positive and negative earnings 
announcements, respectively. In addition, for the buy trades before good news, they 
find that the difference in the abnormal returns between “News preceded by 
directors’ trades” vs. “News not preceded by directors’ trades” is not statistically 
significant. In particular, consistent with the earnings trading ban, they show that 
the higher the earnings impact, the lower the probability of trading. For the 
restructuring category they also observe decreased probability of buying before 
news with high market reaction. However, they find strong evidence that insiders 
are more likely to sell when the announcement abnormal returns are significantly 
lower, i.e., before bad news releases. This propensity to trade occurs mainly before 
the announcements of earnings, other results and dividends, and board changes, but 
less before news on restructuring. 
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2.3 IPO Lockup  
2.3.1 Motivations for examining Insider trading under IPO 
lockups  
 
Lockups are voluntary agreements between the underwriter and corporate insiders 
not to sell shares without the written consent of the underwriter during a specified 
post-IPO period. The lockup agreement clearly specifies that insiders are not 
allowed to sell shares without the written consent of the underwriters. For example, 
the lockup contract of ARC International (UK Main Market) is as follows: 
“The Company, the Directors, the Selling Shareholders and the 
Underwriters have entered into an underwriting agreement relating to the 
Global Offer (the "Underwriting Agreement"). Pursuant to the 
Underwriting Agreement, the Company has agreed to certain restrictions on 
the issue or offer of Ordinary Shares for six months after the date of 
Admission without the prior written consent of Goldman Sachs 
International. Such restrictions will not apply to the granting or exercise of 
options or other rights under the Share Option Schemes or the payment of 
scrip dividends or capitalisation of issues associated with dividends.” 
 
Previous studies show that lockup contracts may emanate from (i) agency 
costs, (ii) information asymmetries between managers and shareholders, (iii) 
signalling of firm’s quality, (iv) rent seeking by underwriters, and, (v) commitment 
hypothesis (Brav and Gompers (2003)). Lockup contracts are designed to reduce 
the information asymmetry and mitigate agency problems between the insider-
managers and the outside shareholders (Brau et al. (2004)). Ibbotson and Ritter 
(1995) argue that investors are willing to pay higher price for a company with a 
lockup agreement primarily for two reasons. Firstly, any negative information 
being withheld is likely to be revealed before the locked-up shares can be sold, 
reducing the benefit of withholding information. Secondly, as long as insiders 
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retain large holdings, their incentives are aligned with outsiders’ incentives 
(Ibbotson and Ritter (1995)). Lockup agreements do not, however, completely 
mitigate informational asymmetries that exist between insiders and outsiders. 
The restrictions on insider sells for a pre-specified  time period is often 
claimed to be an important commitment mechanism to make the investors buy 
shares at the public offering. In absence of any such restrictions, if insiders have 
better information regarding the firm’s future prospects, they may try to take 
advantage of that information at or soon after the floatation of the shares. Insiders 
might wish to cash in at a high price if they knew that the price immediately after 
the offering was excessively high. The lockups act as a commitment device, which 
might mitigate moral hazard problem. In this case, the level of information 
asymmetries regarding the actions of the managers is important. A firm with higher 
moral hazard problem would have to accept a longer lockup in order to convince 
the investors to purchase stock in the offering (Brav and Gompers (2003)). During 
the lockup period, when insiders are prohibited to sell shares, information 
regarding firm’s future prospects will be made known to general investors and will 
reduce the chance that insiders can act opportunistically. That is why, the lockup 
agreement would be a commitment device.   
In a signalling model ((Welch, 1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Allen 
and Faulhaber (1989)), underwriter lock-ups might be used as a means to signal the 
quality of a company. In Welch’s (1989) model, firms want to underprice their 
offering to signal their quality. High quality firms are willing to bear the cost of 
underpricing because they are willing to issue additional equity in a future seasoned 
equity offering (SEO). However, insiders care about the price at which they can 
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sell the rest of their shares. Therefore, rather than only considering an SEO, they 
consider the price that they will be able to sell their shares after the expiration of 
the lock-up. Insiders can essentially signal their quality using three variables: 
underpricing, percentage of shares locked, and the length of the lock-up contract. In 
a separating equilibrium high quality issuers will either underprice more, lock for a 
longer period of time, or lock a larger percentage of shares outstanding and 
subsequently sell at a more favourable price when lock up expires (Brav and 
Gompers (2003)). 
While the previous literature examines the selling behaviour of the insiders, 
the buy trades under the lockup period remain unexplored and can be an interesting 
area to explore. The insider purchases are fascinating, as insiders’ cannot sell their 
IPO allocations in the lock-up period, why would insiders buy. One possibility is 
that the company is good and the insiders have information that market does not 
have. Insider purchases are strongly motivated by ‘inside’ information. Another 
possibility is that insiders purchases stocks of their own companies to support 
prices. What information is conveyed by insiders’ buying activities is an interesting 
avenue for research and addressed in this thesis.  
 
2.3.2 Role of IPO Lockups 
 
A limited number of empirical studies examine the role of lockups in the going-
public process.  Brav and Gompers (2003) use 2794 initial public offerings to 
assess whether lockups serve as (i) a signal of firm quality (ii) a commitment 
device to mitigate moral hazard problems (iii) a device for underwriters to extract 
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additional compensation from the issuing firm. Their results support the 
commitment hypothesis refuting the other two. Insiders of firms that are associated 
with greater potential for moral hazard lockup their shares for a longer period of 
time. Insiders of firms that have experienced larger excess returns, are backed by 
venture capitalists, or go public with high quality underwriters are more likely to be 
released from the lockup restrictions. 
Brau, Lambson and McQueen (2005) use a sample of 4,013 IPOs and 3,279 
SEOs. They show how Brav and Gompers (2003) empirical analysis about firm 
transparency provides support to the insider signalling explanation. They find that 
Brav and Gompers (2003) evidence of an inverse relationship between 
transparency and lockup length supports the signalling model at least as much as 
the commitment explanation. Also, they find empirical support for the signalling 
model's prediction that the lockup will be longer when the degree of asymmetric 
information is larger and the level of idiosyncratic risk is lower. Their extensions 
suggest that signalling remains a valid explanation for lockups. 
2.3.3 Lockup Expiration 
 
As lockup expiration is publicly available information mentioned in the IPO 
prospectus, the price reaction at the expiration of lockup should be zero. However, 
previous studies have documented a negative price reaction around the expiry of 
the lockup (Field and Hanka (2001), Brav and Gompers (2003)). Field and Hanka 
(2001) consider several hypotheses, whether the abnormal return (i) is an illusion 
caused by an increase in the percentage of trades carried out at the bid price; (ii) is 
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a temporary decline caused by price pressure; (iii) corresponds to a loss in value 
owing to increased trading costs; (iv) is caused by downward sloping demand 
curves; and (v) is caused by insider sells that consistently exceed investors’ 
expectations. The hypothesis that lockup expiration leads to an increase in the 
proportion of trades at the bid is consistent with market efficiency. The temporary 
price pressure hypothesis may be consistent with some forms of market efficiency, 
for example the liquidity equilibrium modelled in Grossman and Miller (1988). 
The remaining three hypotheses which imply that the market consistently fails to 
anticipate the predictable events on the unlock day are not consistent with market 
efficiency. 
If transaction prices usually represent a combination of trades at the bid and 
the ask, but transactions around the unlock day tend to be insider sell orders that 
are executed at the bid, then transaction prices around the lockup expiration day 
will imply a spurious, temporary negative return, even if there is no change in the 
bid or ask prices (Field and Hanka (2001)). Prior research finds that this bid-ask 
effect may contribute to abnormal returns around the execution days of seasoned 
equity offers (Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991)). 
On the lockup expiration day, a large number of insider sell orders may 
temporarily depress the share price due to ‘price pressure’. In particular, a 
temporary price drop may be necessary in equilibrium in order to attract liquidity 
providers (Field and Hanka (2001)). The previous literature finds mixed evidence 
for price pressure. For example, Kadlec, Loderer and Sheehan (1997) examine 
price changes around the execution days of seasoned equity offers, and find that 
price drops largely reversed within a few days. A crucial feature of price pressure is 
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that its effect is temporary. When the effect is permanent, it is interpreted as a 
downward sloping demand curve.  
If insiders sell their shares, the public has to take up a greater number of 
shares. The demand curve hypothesis predicts that as the public’s demand curve 
slopes downward, so the share price will drop permanently (Field and Hanka 
(2001)). Practitioners occasionally refer to this effect as a ‘scarcity premium’ for 
IPOs with a small public float. The distinction between the demand curve 
hypothesis and the price pressure hypothesis is the difference between a permanent 
stock effect and a temporary flow effect (Field and Hanka (2001)). A demand curve 
effect is caused by a permanent increase in the stock of shares that must be owned 
by the public, while a price pressure effect is caused by a temporary flow of sell 
orders (Field and Hanka (2001)). 
Insider sells tend to convey bad news, as they suggest a reduction of 
insider’s incentives, a lack of insider confidence, and an increase in the supply of 
shares that may drive the price down (Field and Hanka (2001)). If current insider 
sells are a predictor of future insider sells, then even modest insider sells could 
have a large effect on stock price. If this effect causes the abnormal return, then it 
should be limited only to the firms with insider sells. If there are no insider sells 
around the lockup expiry day, then the abnormal return around the unlock day 
should be zero or even positive (Field and Hanka (2001)). 
Share prices tend to decline around the expiry day independently of whether 
insiders do actually trade (e.g., Brau et al. (2004), Brav and Gompers (1999, 2003), 
Bradley et al. (2001), Ofek and Richardson (2000), Field and Hanka (2001)). 
Several explanations have been offered in the literature to account for this impact. 
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Ofek and Richardson (2000) examine several plausible explanations, including bid-
ask bounce, liquidity effects and biased expectations of supply shocks, but find 
little support for any of these. However, it is not possible to make a profit by 
exploiting the drop in share price around the lockup expiry, which confirms that 
arbitrage is not violated.  Brau et al. (2004) find a significantly positive relationship 
between the percentage of management ownership after the IPO, their proxy for 
agency costs and the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns.  
Field and Hanka (2001) provide alternative hypotheses that may explain the 
observed pattern in the returns around the lockup expiration. Consistent with the 
downward-sloping demand curve hypothesis, they find that the abnormal return is 
more negative when the trading volume is abnormally high. They find that 17% of 
their sample firms report at least one insider trade around the week before lockup 
expiration. They also find that the abnormal returns are significantly more negative 
when insiders sell shares around the expiry of the lock-in. In particular, the mean 
(median) 3-day abnormal returns of the firms which report insider trade around the 
lockup expiration day are -4.5% (-5.1%). By contrast, the corresponding abnormal 
returns for firms which do not report any insider trading are -2.5% (-2%). These 
results suggest that the abnormal returns are more negative when insiders report a 
sell around the lockup expiration day. This suggests that the abnormal returns are 
partly caused by the worse than expected insider sells. However, since the 
abnormal returns are also negative for firms which do not report any sells, the price 
drop is not solely driven by worse-than-expected insider selling.  
Brav and Gompers (2003) find that in 15% of their sample firms insiders 
sell shares before lockup expiration. They find insiders sell prior to lockup 
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expiration in firms that are associated with less moral hazard, that is, larger firms, 
firms with high turnover, firms backed by venture capitalists, and firms with higher 
abnormal returns in the preceding 30-day period. Insiders are likely to be very 
concerned with insider selling activity at low liquidity firms, firms not backed by 
venture capitalists and firms with low returns because of the higher level of 
asymmetric information. They conclude that, as predicted by commitment 
hypothesis, firms that have reduced information asymmetry problems are likely to 
be released from the lockup early. 
Bradley, Jordan, Yi and Roten (2001) find that negative lockup expiration is 
mostly due to the 45% of the firms in their sample which are venture capital 
backed. Such firms lose, on average, 3-4% of their value around the lockup 
expiration period, and the high tech companies with VC backing are the ones 
which are mostly affected. Non-VC backed firms lose relatively little value 
regardless of the industry. In a multivariate analysis, they find little or no reaction 
in the non-VC backed sample. For the VC-backed sample, the post-IPO price 
performance and the trading volume are the most significant factors. Firms 
associated with high-quality underwriters also appear to sustain larger losses 
around the expiration of the lockup. 
While the US studies report a price drop around lockup expiration, UK 
studies did not find any price reaction. To my knowledge, there are only two 
studies and their evidence is not strong partly because of the relatively smaller 
sample size and data unavailability. For example, Espenlaub et al. (2001) studied 
188 IPOs from the London stock market over 1992 to 1998. They focus on the 
characteristics of the lock-in agreements. However, they were unable to determine 
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the actual date where the lockup is a relative lockup date as the sample was small 
and there was absolute lockup dates (calendar dates) and relative lockup dates 
(dates relative to other corporate events like publication of annual reports), it 
posses a serious challenge for them.  Espenlaub et. al. (2001) find that 54 out of 
188 IPOs (29%) in their sample set lockup in terms of calendar date. In another 
study by Espenlaub et al. (2002) using the same IPO data analysed the trading by 
directors around the lockup expiry date. Both studies report statistically 
insignificant abnormal returns around the lockup expiry. 
2.4 Long-run Performance of IPOs  
2.4.1 Evidence on Long run IPO Performance  
 
 
Although Ibbotson (1975) was first to report the underperformance of IPOs, the 
controversy gained more attention after Ritter’s (1991) work. Using a sample of 
1,526 firms that went public in the US in the 1975-1984 period, Ritter (1991) find 
that in 3 years after going public, these firms perform poorly compared to a set of 
benchmark firms matched by size and industry. The 3-year average cumulative 
abnormal return on a matching firm basis is -29.13%.  Ritter (1991) also report that 
there is substantial variation in the underperformance year to year and across 
industries. The companies that went public in high volume years are the worst 
performers. Ritter (1991) conjectured that the results are consistent with the market 
where investors are periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of 
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young growth companies, suggesting that companies take advantage of these 
‘windows of opportunity’.  
In a related study Loughran and Ritter (1995) examine the long run 
performance of 4,753 firms that went public in the US between 1970-1990. They 
find that those firms underperform compared to non-issuing firms up to five years 
after they issue equity. Particularly, the average annual return during the five years 
after equity issuance is 5% per annum whereas for non-issuing firms it is 12% per 
annum. They also find that, the firms which issue equity in high volume period 
underperform badly, whereas the firms issue equity in the low volume period do 
not underperform. 
The US evidence of the long run underperformance seems to extend to 
other countries. For example, Levis (1993) use 712 IPOs from London Stock 
Exchange over the period 1980-88. He shows that IPOs underperform in 3 year 
period following IPO. Depending on the benchmark used he finds a 3-year 
underperformance ranging between -8.31% to -22.96%. For Latin American 
countries (Brazil, Chile, Mexico), Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993) report that 
IPOs underperform in the long run by -47.0%. Keloharju (1993) documents that 79 
Finnish IPOs also underperform during the 36 months after IPO by -21.1%. Cai 
and Wei (1997) provide evidence of long run underperformance for 180 IPOs listed 
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period of 1971-1992 by -26.0%. Table 2-2 
summarises international evidence on long-run IPO performance.  
More recently, Ritter and Welch (2002) show that the 3-year abnormal 
underperformance of US IPOs listed in 1980-2001 is -23%, with -34.3% in the later 
period of 1999-2000.  They also show that the results are highly sensitive to the 
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method used to compute the abnormal returns. For example, Ritter and Welch 
(2002) document that the style adjusted returns methodology results in an average 
underperformance of only -5.1%, but over the 1999-2000 period it amounts to -
61.2%. Using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, they show that the 
sign and significance of alpha, which measures the excess performance, are not 
consistent across sample periods and when they use lagged values of the factors. 
Table 2-2 Cross country evidence on long run IPO performance 
Country Study Sample 
Period  
Sample 
size 
Window 
(years)1 
Return 
(%)2 
Australia Lee et al.(1996) 1976-89 266 3 -51.0 
Brazil Aggarwal et al. (1993) 1980-90 62 3 -47.0 
Canada Shaw (1971) 1956-63 105 5 -32.3 
Chile Aggarwal et al. (1993) 1982-90 28 3 -23.7 
Finland Keloharju (1993) 1984-89 79 3 -21.1 
Germany Ljungqvist (1997) 1970-90 145 3 -12.1 
HongKong McGuiness (1993) 1980-90 72 2 -18.3 
Italy Giudici and Paleari(1999) 1985-95 84 3 -2.6 
Japan Cai and Wei (1997) 1971-92 180 5 -26.0 
Korea Kim et al. (1995) 1985-88 99 3 +91.6 
Malaysia Paudyal et al. (1998) 1984-94 62 3 +9.0 
New Zealand Firth (1997) 1979-87 143 5 -17.9 
Singapore Lee et al (1996) 1973-92 132 3 +9.0 
Sweden Loughran et al. (1994) 1980-90 162 3 +1.2 
Switzerland Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) 1983-89 34 3 -6.1 
Turkey Kiymaz (1998) 1990-95 138 3 +44.1 
UK Levis (1993) 1980-88 712 3 -8.1 
UK Espenlaub et al. (2000) 1985-92 588 5 -42.77 
US Ritter (1991) 1975-84 1526 3 -29.1 
US Loughran (1993) 1967-87 3656 6 -33.3 
US Loughran and Ritter (1995) 1970-90 4753 5 -30.0 
1 Window is the number of years over which IPO performance is calculated.  
2 Returns are calculated over the investment window and are not annualized, excluding the first day 
return. Generally the returns are market-adjusted but not risk adjusted. Some authors use a range of 
benchmarks and obtain different results; I present only the representative results. Computation 
methodologies vary. 
 
 
 Similarly, in the context of UK, Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks (2000) 
show that the long run returns vary with the choice of methodology. They find that, 
using event studies, there is substantial amount of underperformance in the first 
three years of listing irrespective of the benchmark used. For example, they report -
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15.90%, -16.24%, -8.12% and -28.15% cumulative abnormal returns for CAPM, 
size adjusted, Hoare-Govett, and Fama-French model adjusted returns respectively. 
However, when the abnormal returns are measured for five years, the choice of 
methodology shows higher amount of variation. While Hoare-Govett index 
adjusted return finds performance of -4.30%, Fama-French adjusted returns show -
42.77%. Fama-French calendar time regressions find an alpha of -0.00673 only, 
which is equivalent to -40.38%. 
 
2.4.2 Reasons for Underperformance 
 
On theoretical grounds, there are some rationales which assert that IPOs are 
expected to generate positive long-term returns. Firstly, the newly floated 
companies are typically more risky than the average market, demonstrating a high 
exposure to market risk.21 Secondly, the asymmetric models, particularly the 
signalling theories suggest that IPOs are underpriced to signal the quality of the 
firm and thus subsequently be able to sell further shares at a higher price, and as a 
result, the long-run returns should be high. If firms underprice to signal their 
quality, high quality firms should perform better than low quality firms (Jenkinson 
and Ljungqvist (2001)). Likewise, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) develop a book 
building model under which underpricing pay offs better-informed investors for 
truthfully revealing their information before the issue price is confirmed, therefore 
reducing the expected money left on the table. These investors may reveal a noisy 
signal, which indicates the direction and extent of the revision in the offer price 
                                                 
21 For example, Ritter and Welch (2002) find that the average beta of their sample IPOs over 1980 
to 2001 is 1.73. We find an average beta of 1.60 which is closer to Ritter and Welch (2002). 
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relative to the price range, and may result in subsequent performance to correlate 
positively with the initial price revision.  
The long-run underperformance emanates from a combination of extreme 
differences of opinion amongst investors, costly short selling, and small public 
floats on many IPOs (Ritter and Welch (2002) for a review). In an early study 
Miller (1977) and Morris (1996) investigate the effect on asset pricing by relaxing 
the standard assumption of homogenous expectations. Allowing investors to have 
diverse opinions about the future cash flows and growth potential of an enterprise 
introduces an element of realism which can explain long run underperformance. As 
the divergence in opinion gets smaller, the marginal investor’s assessment of the 
IPOs and consequently the trading price are lowered. These arguments are based on 
the proposition that the heterogeneity is maximum at floatation but declines 
through time with the arrival of new information. As a result, a number of once 
optimistic investors adjust their beliefs about the value of the company, and drive 
the price down, even though the average belief might never have changed. It is 
worth pointing out that the new information does not have to be negative: any 
information that reduces the spread of opinion about a firm will lead to a lower 
price.   
Researchers argue that there are crazes in the IPO market, with over-
optimistic investor’s presence about the prospects of newly listed companies and 
bidding up initial trading prices away from fair value (Aggarwal and Rivioli 
(1990)). The arguments of behavioural timing theories are similar. Firms go public 
at the time when investors are over-optimistic about the growth prospects of IPOs 
(Loughran and Ritter (1995)). As a result, investors initially pay too much but 
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prices come down as more information becomes available. Hence, the expected 
long-run return declines with the change in initial investor sentiment. Another line 
of argument put forward by Ljungqvist (1996) is that the greater the fraction of 
equity initial owners retain at floatation, the lower their incentive to take advantage 
of over-optimistic investors, since the value of their retained shares would fall as 
and when new investors become less optimistic. Therefore, expected long run 
returns increase with the retention rate.    
Ritter (1991), Lerner (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1995, 2000), Baker and 
Wurgler (2000) and Hirshleifer (2001) extend these behavioural explanations and 
advocate that stock prices intermittently deviate from fundamental values and 
managers and investment bankers take advantage of overvaluation by selling stock 
to excessively optimistic investors. Largely, under these arguments, the long-term 
returns originate from high divergence of opinion, pushing up the initial market 
price, this disagreement declines over time and the valuation by the marginal 
investor comes closer to that of the average investor.  
Schultz (2003) asserts that even if there is no ex ante abnormal performance 
expected, any research involving event studies is likely to find negative abnormal 
performance ex post. If IPOs under- (over-) perform in an earlier period, there will 
be fewer (more) IPOs in the future and so the average performance will be 
weighted heavily towards the early IPOs that under- (over-) performed. This 
tendency, referred to as pseudo market timing, results in negative expected 
performance when all IPOs are weighted equally, even if ex ante there is no 
expected underperformance. But, time series regressions, such as Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model, mitigate this problem. On top of that, Eckbo et.al., 
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(2007) report that, pseudo market timing is true for small samples, but in large 
samples it is unlikely to be a problem.  
Previous studies also focus on IPO fundamentals to explain the observed 
long-term returns. For example, Eckbo et al. (2000) assert that leverage is 
significantly reduced following equity offerings, while liquidity is increased, 
resulting in a reduction in risk. As a result, IPOs are less sensitive to interest and 
inflation shocks and require a lower liquidity premium than benchmark firms, and 
thus, should have lower returns. Other studies find that large IPOs (Brav et al. 
(2000)), backed by venture capitalists (Brav and Gompers (1997) and Levis 
(2008)), and underwritten by prestigious underwriters (Carter et al. (1998)) 
underperform less, while those with wide initial spread, a late opening trade, and a 
high proportion of institutional flipping, have lower returns (Houge et al. (2001)). 
Studies based on agency costs theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), which 
stipulates that the long-term returns should be negative when insiders decrease their 
holdings, as agency costs worsen, are mixed. For example, Mikkelson et al. (1997) 
show that the long-run returns are unrelated to ownership structure, but Jain and 
Kini (1994) find a positive relationship between post-IPO operating performance 
and equity retention by original shareholders.  
2.4.3 Measurement Problems 
 
A growing literature questions the methodology used in many of the earlier studies. 
These relate mainly to the measurement of the abnormal returns over the long event 
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windows.22 The three main methodological building blocks used in these studies is 
(i) the choice of benchmark return, (ii) the measurement of investor returns over 
long horizons, and, (iii) the test statistics for accepting or rejecting null.  Fama 
(1998) calls benchmark related issues as bad model problem. Any long run 
performance is a joint test of the validity of the chosen benchmark and of sample 
performance relative to that benchmark. Since, there is no benchmark model that 
correctly prices all securities all of the time,23 the bad model problem is 
unavoidable. Several long run performance studies have acknowledged this 
problem clearly.  
Beginning with Ritter (1991), long run studies of US IPOs have estimated 
abnormal return by matching issuing and non-issuing firms. Ritter (1991) used size 
and industry matched firms to evaluate IPO performance in the long run. Later 
studies used size and book-to-market matching instead of size and industry 
(Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav and Gompers (1997)). Ritter (2003)24 
showed that when size and book-to-market matching is used the 3–year 
underperformance is 3.1% per year. As an alternative to the matching firm 
approach some studies use the Fama-French (1992) three factor model to assess the 
long run performance. In an attempt to better understand the underlying economic 
rationale for the book-to-market effect, Eckbo and Norli (2000) add two further 
factors to this: leverage and liquidity. They document that IPOs in the US are less 
                                                 
22 See the methodology section for a comparison of short-run and long-run event studies. 
23 See Fama and French (1992) for a critique of capital asset pricing model. 
24 Ritter (2003) measured underperformance using 7437 IPOs in the US market from 1970-2000 
during the first five years after issuing. He finds compared to size matching non-issuing firms IPOs 
underperform 4.7% on a 3-year holding period.    
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risky and more liquid than non-issuing firms. Failure to control this will tend to 
lead spurious estimates of the IPO underperformance.  
Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that IPOs underperform size matched 
control firms in 1970-1990 period in US. However, Fama and French (1993) show 
that the average returns during the same period were subject to book-to-market 
effects, in the sense that small growth stocks performed poorly. Not controlling this 
fact in IPOs—where most of the IPO stocks fall into this a category—might 
therefore produce biased results. Consistent with prediction, Brav and Gompers 
(1997) document that Loughran and Ritter’s (1995) IPO underperformance 
anomaly disappears entirely when control firms are selected on the basis of book-
to-market25 in addition to size. Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) document the 
same effect with respect to the apparent long run underperformance following 
SEOs. This suggests that there is no new issues puzzle26. Later, Ritter (2003) 
showed that when size and book-to-market matching is used the underperformance 
is 3.1% per year after 3 years of IPO. Also, Kang, Kim and Stultz (1999) use 
Japanese SEOs to find significant underperformance, even after controlling for size 
and market-to-book. 
Where do we stand today regarding long run event studies? Fama (1998) 
concluded that ‘the apparent (long run performance) anomalies are methodological 
illusions’ (p 285). He argues that even little change to the methodology can change 
the empirical results. Loughran and Ritter (2000), in contrast, argue that abnormal 
performance should be sensitive to methodology because different methodologies 
                                                 
25 Loughran and Ritter (1995) used size and industry matching when assessing the performance of 
IPOs. 
26 The title of Loughran and Ritter (1995) paper was ‘The new issues puzzle’. 
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have different power. Overall, most previous studies agree that IPOs do not 
generate positive returns despite their high risk, as, on average their beta is 
relatively high. For example, Ritter and Welch (2002) report an average beta of 
1.73 for IPOs. In this thesis, I focus on the impact of insider trading on long run 
performance of IPOs.      
2.4.4 Insider trading in explaining long run IPO performance 
 
The long run IPO performance is a long standing puzzle in the empirical corporate 
finance literature. Corporate insiders are the owners of the company who bring it to 
the market and their trading activity can provide a plausible explanation as to why 
IPOs perform badly in the long run. This thesis examines whether corporate 
insiders act opportunistically in the first few years of their IPOs. Since they have 
more knowledge of their firm’s operations, their actions on their own stock 
positions should reflect their beliefs regarding the future prospects of the firm. 
Previous studies (e.g., Ritter (1991), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1995)) explain significant underperformance of new issues in 
the aftermarket by suggesting that issuers act opportunistically and time their 
offering in order to cash in on temporary misvaluations in the IPO market 
(‘windows of opportunity’ hypothesis). In this study, I test whether insiders 
knowingly issue overvalued equity (in IPOs) by following their personal trades in 
company stock and whether this contributes to the poor performance in IPOs. 
 Failing IPOs provide a natural setting to analyze the motivation behind an 
entrepreneur’s decision to take a firm public. Following the high IPO volume in the 
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hot-issue market and its subsequent bust, there are many IPO which performed 
poorly. This raises concerns regarding the motivation of insiders in taking these 
firms public in the first place. Did they take these firms public to exploit the 
irrational sentiment present in the market during this period, or did they truly 
believe that their firm was of good quality? This study is an attempt to shed some 
light on this issue by analyzing the insider trading behaviour in IPOs. 
Although the literature on insider trading is vast and well-developed, most 
of the studies have focused mainly on insider trading activities around specific 
events such as earnings announcements, takeovers or bankruptcies. It is possible 
that looking at insider behaviour at just one point in time may not be entirely 
indicative of the private information of insiders since insiders may have incentives 
to hide their private information when they believe that there is a high level of 
scrutiny on their trading activities. Instead, analyzing insider activities from the 
time of the offer, until some time has passed should give us useful insight regarding 
the information that insiders possess and when they choose to act on it. 
I test the hypothesis whether insiders signal in IPOs through their trades. 
Insiders convey negative signal when selling shares. However, in case of a 
seasoned company insider sell may convey less information if they sell for liquidity 
reasons (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). For IPOs, Leland and Pyle (1977) develop a 
model where insiders signal there quality through share retentions. Brau and 
Fawcett (2006) survey evidence shows that selling insider shares in IPOs is a 
strong negative signal to the market. If this is the case insider selling will have 
some predictive power for the long run performance of IPOs. Conversely, by 
purchasing shares in a company insiders communicate a positive signal about the 
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future value of their firm. The signal is costly as insiders are committing more of 
their wealth to the company and remain undiversified. 
The relationships between insider ownership and corporate performance 
have gained much attention in theoretical and empirical investigation. Theoretical 
works have shown that there is a irrefutable case for the proposition that insider 
ownership can have an important influence on the way the firm is managed and, 
therefore, on the firm’s observed market value (Baumol (1959), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Demsetz (1983), Stulz (1988)).  Empirical works by Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991), Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) and others document a 
statistically significant correlation between share ownership by corporate insiders 
and corporate performance. The case of insider ownership changes and corporate 
performance has been extended in this paper in context of IPOs. The idea is simple, 
if insiders are buying, there interests will be aligned with the general investors thus 
mitigating agency problems, and the share price performance will be better. In 
contrast, when insiders sell which exacerbates agency problems and thus 
companies underperform. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the individual and aggregate insider 
trading measures and the empirical methodologies used in this thesis. Since, insider 
trading data is used throughout the remaining chapters, it is better to have a detailed 
discussion here.27 Specifically, this chapter discusses the insider trading and IPO 
data collection and screening procedure, aggregate measures for insider trading and 
event studies methodology. I also present my sample firms used in each chapter. 
 When this thesis assesses the information content of insider trading, 
individual insider trades are treated as separate events. However, when a firm is 
categorised based on insider trading measure, the firm may have multiple 
transactions some of which may be buy and some of which are sell trades. To avoid 
                                                 
27 In the following chapters, a brief and relevant description of data and methodology will appear. 
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this problem, the study uses the aggregate insider trading measure for that firm and 
determines whether that firm is a Net Buyer or Net Seller. This thesis follows 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and develops net purchase ratio for each individual 
firm.  
 The major empirical method used in this study is event studies, which is 
one of the pioneering methodologies to analyse any corporate events. Most of the 
research questions addressed in this thesis are in the form of an event. Specifically, 
while analysing the information content of insider trades, individual trades are the 
events. When addressing the empirical puzzles in the IPO literature, several events 
are considered: the IPO date, the lockup expiration date and insider trading around 
(within) the lockup period28. The assessment of the stock market reaction to a 
particular announcement requires a measure of stock returns around those events.29 
This study uses event studies methodology, which is extensively used in previous 
studies.30  
3.2 Insider Trading Data 
3.2.1 Definition of Insider and Insider trading 
 
The UK definition of insiders is confined to a small group. They include the 
members of the board of directors (both executive and non-executive), but exclude 
                                                 
28 If there are multiple lockups this thesis focuses on the first lockup period, which is the strict 
lockup period where insiders are not allowed to sell their shares. 
29 Here I discuss event studies relating to measuring the effect on stock return only. Though I have 
used an event studies relating to trading volume in Chapter 5, the methodology is described in the 
relevant chapter.  
30 Kothari and Warner (2007) did a census of event studies published in 5 leading journal: Journal 
of Business, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis and the Review of Financial Studies from 1974-2000 and they identify 565 
papers  used event studies.   
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other key employees and large shareholders. In the US, insiders are defined as 
officers, directors, other key employees and shareholders holding more than 10% 
of any equity class (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). The term ‘officer’ covers the 
Company President, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, Vice 
President and any other employees, who perform policy making functions in the 
company (Bettis et al. (2000)). All of the above are prohibited from trading in 
undisclosed ‘material’ information. Insider trading occurs when a person trades in 
his or her company’s shares using material, current, reliable, not available to the 
market and qualified as new, fresh and price-sensitive information according to UK 
law. 
The definitions of insider trading (in the US) and directors’ share dealings 
(in the UK) often cause confusion. According to the UK Misuse of Information 
Act, insider information is defined as ‘material, current, reliable and not available 
to the market’ and is legally qualified as ‘new and fresh’. The Criminal Justice Act 
makes trading on insider information (information not regularly available and 
obtained through insiders) a legal offence. This study does not deal with illegal 
insider trading, but focuses on legal trading by directors as defined in the listing 
rules of the London Stock Exchange (Source Book, August 2002, Chapter 16). 
Whereas in the UK there is a distinction between (illegal) insider trading and 
(legal) directors’ dealings, the US regulation does not make such a distinction. 
However, many insider trades are legal. When an insider trades in his or her own 
firm for liquidity reasons, without using any private and price sensitive 
information, and reports the trade, then such a trade is not considered illegal. In this 
study, I use the term directors’ dealings to refer to the (legal) insider trading or 
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share transactions by directors in the UK. As usual, I adopt the UK definition of a 
director. In the UK, the term director covers both non-executive and executive 
board members. On the other hand, in the US, executives are normally referred to 
as officers and non-executives as directors. 
3.2.2 Regulations relating to Insider Trading31 
 
Insider trading is regulated in the UK as specified mainly in the 1985 Companies’ 
Act. These regulations concentrate primarily on unlawful use of non-publicly 
disclosed price sensitive information. In the UK the law imposes trading ban 
periods on insiders before any price sensitive information is released. For example, 
insiders are prevented from trading two months before preliminary, interim or final 
earnings announcements and a month before quarterly earnings announcements 
(Hillier and Marshall, 1998). Outside this ban period, insiders need permission 
from the chairman of the board before trading. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) argue that US 
regulations favour more frequent news disclosure to avoid misuse of any 
significant information, whereas UK law directly prohibits insiders from trading 
before price sensitive news announcement. 
Under the 1985 Companies’ Act and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
Listing Rules, companies listed on the LSE are required to report any directors’ 
trades in their own firms’ securities. UK disclosure requirements specify that 
directors must inform their companies without delay of any transaction carried out 
personally, no later than the fifth business day after the trading date. Subsequently 
the company must inform the Stock Exchange by the end of the following business 
                                                 
31 The details are in Appendix I. 
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day and also enter this transaction in the Company Register. The information on 
insider trading is disseminated immediately to the Stock Exchange via the online 
Regulatory News Service (RNS).  According to the most recent UK law, violation 
of insider trading regulations would result in civil and/or criminal law procedures. 
Potential penalties and sanctions include up to seven years in jail and an unlimited 
fine.  
 
3.2.3 Individual Insider Trading Sample 
 
This study uses Directors Deals, a large database of all UK firms’ directors’ trades 
spanning from January 1999 to December 2007, to collect data on trades 
undertaken by insiders. The database includes news items on directors’ trades 
disclosed by all UK firms to the Regulatory News Service (RNS). A number of 
observations that are not likely to be driven by private information, such as exercise 
of options or derivatives, script dividends, bonus shares, rights issues, awards made 
to directors under incentive plans or reinvestment plans, are excluded. Also 
excluded are all directors’ transactions in investment companies.32 After this 
screening, there were 36,943 insiders’ trades from the UK market. The data was 
checked for errors and exclude 2,952 (8%) trades as the difference in 
                                                 
32 Similar sample selection is adopted in previous studies (e.g., Jaffe (1974), Finnerty (1976), Pope 
et al. (1990), Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis (1994), Gregory et al. (1997), Friederich et al. 
(2002), Hillier and Marshall (2002), Fidrmuc et al. (2006), Korczak and Lasfer (2009)). My sample 
size is more comprehensive than the studies that examine directors’ share trading studies in the UK. 
For example, Gregory et al. (1997) use 6,756 transactions for 1,683 companies between January 
1986 and December 1990, Friederich et al. (2002) use 4,399 transaction for 196 companies between 
October 1986 and December 1994, Hillier and Marshall (2002) use 7,796 transaction for 1,350 
companies between September 1991 and March 1997 and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) use 10,140 buys 
and 5,523 sells between 1991-1998, Korczak and Lasfer (2009) use 10,414 buys and 2, 953 sells 
from 1999 to 2003. 
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announcement and transaction date is more than 5 days. The final sample includes 
33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268 (77%) 
purchases and 7,723 (23%) sell trades. This insider-trading database includes: 
transaction price, amount, and value, the post-transaction holding, change in 
holding, name and position of the insider; and announcement and transaction dates, 
as UK insiders can delay up to five days the announcement of their trade, but most 
report their trades on the RNS on the transaction date (Korczak and Lasfer (2009)). 
Table 3-1 shows the summary statistics for sample insider trading activities. 
The variables include number of trades, number of shares, value of shares, 
percentage holding, trade size as a percentage of market capitalization, and market 
capitalization at the time of trade. While the average number of trades per company 
is much higher for buy compared to sell trades, the results indicate that insiders 
sold much more in terms of value. The number (value) of shares is very low for 
buy trades compared to sell trades, suggesting that, in terms of values, insiders are 
net sellers. The results also imply that the shares they buy have to be cheap in 
monetary value and they sold when the shares attain high value.  
 The value of shares can be misleading because for large companies the 
figure will naturally be higher than small companies. When the value of trades are 
scaled by market capitalization, this study also finds that the sell trades are higher 
than the buy trades. The average buy trades as a percentage of market capitalization 
is 0.15% while for sell trades the number is 0.79%. The market capitalization is 
also higher for sell trades compared to buy trades.  
Insiders send numerous signals through their trading activities. They do 
more small purchases compared to sells. When they buy, they put their own money 
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at stake, they seem to be careful not to take too much risk. In contrast, when 
insiders sell, they diversify to a great extent by selling large amount of shares.  
Table 3-1 Summary statistics 
I obtain insider holdings data for the period January 1999 to December 2007 from the Directors 
Deals. Percentage Holding is the percentage of total shares traded which is owned by the director. 
Market capitalization is at the time of trade. 
  
 Table 3-2 reports year-by-year summary statistics for insider trading. Both 
buy and sell trades show a steady increase from 1999 to 2007. The only exception 
is 2002, as the amount of buy is quite high which might be due to the lower 
valuation level in 2002. The percentage of buy, which is calculated as dividing the 
value of all buy trades by the total trades in that particular year, shows considerable 
increase between 2001 and 2003 periods, in which the market was in bearish state. 
Apart from these three years, the buy trades ranges from 11% to 20% of the total 
traded amount by insiders. Also, the numbers of buy trades are higher compared to 
sell trades, but the value of sell trades outweigh the buy trades. As well as 2006 and 
2007 show a higher amount of insider trading both for the buy and sell trades. 
10th 
percentile Median Mean 
90th 
percentile 
 Panel A: Buy Trades         
Number of trades 1 6 10.46 25 
Number of Shares 1,408 12,000 128,829 160,000 
Value of shares(£) 2,967 14,250 90,376 100,000 
Percentage Holding (%) 0.002 0.094 2.904 8.19 
Trade as % of market cap  0.0004 0.016 0.15 0.23 
Market capitalization (£ mil) 7.64 105.29 2536.72 3705.59 
Panel B: Sell Trades 
Number  of trades 1 3 5.22 12 
Number  of Shares 2,949 49,471 783,681 1000,000 
Value of shares (£) 9,948 119,750 1,334,806 1,860,605 
Percentage Holding (%) 0.002 0.347 4.034 11.66 
Trade as % of market cap  0.0017% 0.0618% 0.7887% 1.4846% 
Market capitalization (£ mil) 15.80 202.96 3191.82 4560.36 
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 The structure of executive compensation has changed over the years. More 
emphasis is being placed on aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. It 
is expected that over time a higher percentage of managers’ wealth will be in their 
own company’s stock (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Since the buys are small the 
insiders must have got these shares from IPO allocations, or from the company in 
the form of options33.  Therefore, insiders would have incentive to diversify their 
portfolios, which will result in an increase of sell over time. This is the overall 
picture that we see in Table 3-2. Managers’ sell trades increase from 503 million to 
2.20 billion over the nine year study period.  
Table 3-2 Year-by-year Summary Statistics 
  Buy   Sell    
  
£Value 
(Percent) 
No. of 
shares 
No. of 
trades 
No. of 
companies 
£Value 
(Percent) 
No. of 
shares 
No. of 
trades 
No. of 
companies 
1999 122.96 
(0.20) 141.07 2775 801 
503.01 
(0.80) 241.37 886 
 
379 
2000 171.90 
(0.15) 176.22 2820 772 
994.50 
(0.85) 316.57 867 
 
383 
2001 112.69 
(0.37) 181.74 2120 750 
192.93 
(0.63) 89.03 476 
 
254 
2002 247.37 
(0.33) 758.42 3408 1045 
507.76 
(0.67) 471.73 531 
 
285 
2003 190.20 
(0.28) 460.78 2723 926 
487.02 
(0.72) 1031.17 787 
 
363 
2004 139.86 
(0.18) 250.98 2659 925 
627.56 
(0.82) 1021.98 777 
 
409 
2005 167.37 
(0.11) 356.38 2710 951 
1322.41 
(0.89) 1133.78 945 
 
429 
2006 613.50 
(0.19) 419.29 3078 1067 
2550.87 
(0.81) 949.59 1284 
 
496 
2007 375.42 
(0.15) 639.45 3974 1191 
2204.17 
(0.85) 797.93 1171 
 
500 
This table reports year-by-year summary statistics of insider trading for all London Stock Exchange 
during 1999-2007 periods. The value is the shares traded in millions Pound Sterling in 2008 
constant terms. Percentage is the amount of buy (sell) divided by the total share trades by insiders. 
The number of shares is reported in millions. The number of companies for buy (sell) are not 
mutually exclusive, meaning a company can be simultaneously buying and selling shares. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 I have excluded options from insider trading data.  
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3.2.4 Aggregate Measure of Insider Trading 
 
 
This thesis uses net purchase ratio (NPR) which is the ratio of net purchases to total 
insider transactions, as an aggregate measure of insider trading activities. In line 
with Lakonishok and Lee (2001)34 I define NPR as follows. Each month starting 
from January 1999 to December 2007, I calculate the total number (and the total 
Pound Sterling volume) of insider purchases and sells. I then calculate the NPR by 
dividing the net aggregate number of insider purchases by the total aggregate 
number of insider transactions. 
TradesTotal
SellsPurchasesNPR 
 
If the NPR is positive (negative) it means insiders in that particular month are Net 
Buyers (sellers). 
For analysing the long run performance of IPOs I use the NPR for each 
company over the three year post-IPO period. During this period, there may be 
multiple buy and sells for a single firm. John and Narayanan (1997) show that the 
disclosure rules generate incentives for an informed trader to manipulate the stock 
market from time to time by trading in the wrong direction (i.e. buying when she 
has bad news and selling when she has good news about the firm). Trading in the 
wrong direction may lessen the informativeness of her subsequent trade disclosure 
because the market is no longer convinced whether an insider buy (sell) indicates 
                                                 
34 Seyhun (1992) uses another measure of aggregate insider trading based on the number of 
transactions. I think that the number of transactions may be misleading if insiders trade in the wrong 
directions. For example, if an insider has bad news about the company and she did a series of small 
buys and a huge amount of sell, the number of transaction measure will classify her as a Net Buyer, 
which is wrong. 
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good (bad) news. Consequently, the insider maintains her information superiority 
over the market for a longer period of time and uses it to reap large profits in later 
periods by trading in the right direction. Therefore, in order to categorise firms and 
avoid the wrong signals sent by insiders, I use NPR to determine the insider trading 
activity in a firm. If NPR is positive, the firm is categorised as Net Buyer and if the 
NPR is negative, the firm is categorised as net seller. 
Figure 3-1 shows that insiders are contrarians as there is a negative 
relationship between aggregate insider trading and market return. When market 
goes down (up) insiders buy (sell) shares as the NPR is positive. Interestingly, 
when market movements are large, insiders increase or decrease their holdings by 
huge amounts as the NPRs are larger when market moves are larger. 
Figure 3-1 Aggregate Insider Trading and Market Return 
 
This figure represents a time series of net purchase ratio and FTSE All Share index return for each 
moth from January 1999 to December 2007. Each month starting from January 1999 to December 
2007, I calculate the total number (and the total Pound sterling volume) insider purchases and sells. 
I then calculate the NPR by dividing the net aggregate number of insider purchases by the total 
aggregate number of insider transactions.  
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3.3 IPO Sample 
 
This study starts with all the 1,117 IPOs that went public on AIM and London main 
market between January 1999 and 2006. The following filters were used to 
construct final sample. 76 companies were excluded for which the prospectuses 
cannot be found in Perfect Filings database. Further 15 companies were excluded 
with missing share price data on DataStream, and 195 firms with missing lockup 
date or ownership data from the prospectuses. Final sample includes 831 (74%) 
IPOs with complete data.  
The LSE database is used to collect data on the quotation market (AIM or 
Main market), admission date, country of incorporation, issue price, market value, 
money raised, name of the broker, and for AIM IPOs, the advisor. I download all 
prospectuses from Perfect Filings database and hand-collect all information 
relating to lockup arrangements, including lockup dates, percentage of shares 
locked-up, fraction of insider shares locked up, directors’ ownership before and 
after IPO, percentage sold in the IPO, institutional ownership, and venture capital 
backing. I further use DataStream to collect any delisting dates, and accounting 
and market data, which includes daily stock prices and indices, to compute the 
stock returns, market capitalization and turnover, which is used as proxy for size, 
accounting return on assets to measure profitability, and price-to-book ratio to 
proxy for growth. 
Figure 3-2 shows the trend in IPO volume and amount raised in London 
Stock Exchange. It shows that in 2000 there is sudden jump in number of IPOs 
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mostly driven by technology IPOs. The total amount raised is highest in 2005 
followed by 2006.  
 
Figure 3-2 Trends in IPOs and Amount Raised 
 
The above figure shows the number of IPOs over 1999-2006 periods which issued equity in LSE. 
Total money raised in the right scale. Final sample includes 831 IPOs with complete data.  
 
 
 
3.4 Event Study methodology 
3.4.1 Background and Structure of Event Studies  
 
Event studies examine the market reaction to the announcement of corporate 
events.35  For example, the announcement of a merger between two business 
entities/firms can be analyzed to see whether investors believe the merger will 
create or destroy value. The basic idea is to find the abnormal return attributable to 
                                                 
35 In this section I focus on the effects on stock prices. Other types of event studies includes event 
studies on return variances (Beaver (1968) and  Patell (1976)), trading volume (Beaver (1968), 
Cambell and Wasley (1996), Field and Hanka (2001)), Operating  performance (Barber  and Lyon 
(1996) and earnings management via discretionary accruals (e.g. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny (1995) 
and Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005)). 
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the event being studied by adjusting for the expected return. Event studies have 
been used in a large variety of studies, including insider trading, initial public 
offerings, seasoned equity offerings, mergers and acquisitions, earnings 
announcements, corporate reorganizations, investment decisions and corporate 
social responsibility (MacKinlay (1997) McWilliams and Siegel (1997)). 
 Over the last few years, particularly since the mid 1980’s, following the 
publication of Brown and Warner (1985), the event study methodology has become 
very popular.  Prior to that, “there was little evidence on the central issues of 
corporate finance. Now we are overwhelmed with results, mostly from event 
studies” (Fama, 1991, p.1600). The number of published articles in the top 5 
business journals36 exceeds 500 and the literature continues to grow (Kothari and 
Warner (2007)). 
 
A.  Event Window   
The event window is when the event of interest took place. In other words, it is the 
period over which the security prices of the firms involved, around a specific event, 
will be examined.  For example, if an insider purchases shares, the announcement 
date is the event. It is common to define the event window as larger than the 
specific date of interest. In particular, the period of interest is often expanded to 2 
or 3 days around the event date. 
It is also likely to include days before and after the event into the period of 
interest, which may capture the price effects of the announcement around the event 
date. For example, in the case of insider trading announcement, the information 
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may leak and be known to the market before the announcement is made. 
Furthermore, if the announcement is made after the stock market closes on the 
recorded announcement day, which is quite common for SEOs, the event window 
including the day of and the day after the announcement can capture the price 
effects.  
Figure 3-3 Timeline for an event study 
This figure represents timing sequence for an event study. Defining t=0 as event date, (T1, T2) 
represents the event window.  (T0, T1) is the estimation (pre-event window). (T2, T3) is defined as 
the post-event window.  
  
 
 
The estimation window, sometimes referred to as the clean period, is the period 
prior to the event window for estimating the market model parameters that will be 
used to define the expected returns. As a matter of principle, the event period itself 
is not included in the estimation period, to prevent the event from influencing the 
normal estimation of the parameters. With the parameters estimated in the 
estimation window (T0, T1), the abnormal returns can be calculated for the event 
window (T1, T2). 
 
B.   Modelling Abnormal Return 
 
 
An event study examines the share price behaviour for a group of firms which had 
undergone the same corporate events (e.g., IPOs). The event might take place at 
different point in calendar time, or they might be clustered at a particular date (e.g., 
Estimation 
Window 
Event 
Window 
Post-Event 
Window 
T0   T1        t=0       T2           
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a regulatory event affecting an industry or a subset of a population of firms). Let 
t=0 represent the time of the event.  For each sample security i, the return on 
security for time period t, Rit is: ܴ௜௧ ൌ ܧሺܴ௜௧ሻ ൅ ݁௜௧, 
Where ܧሺܴ௜௧ሻ is the normal (i.e., expected or predicted return given a particular 
model of expected returns), and eit is the return which is abnormal or unexpected, 
which is attributed to that event.37 Given this return decomposition, the abnormal 
return, eit, is the difference between observed return and the predicted return. ݁௜௧ ൌ ܴ௜௧ െ ܧሺܴ௜௧ሻ 
 
Equivalently, eit is the difference between the return conditional on the event, and 
the expected return unconditional on the event. Thus, the abnormal return is a 
direct measure of the (unexpected) change in security holder’s wealth associated 
with the event. The security is typically a common stock, although some event 
studies looked at wealth changes for debt or preferred equity claims.  
 A model of normal returns (i.e., expected returns unconditional on the event 
but conditional on the information) must be specified before the model for 
abnormal return can be defined. A variety of expected return models (e.g., market 
model, constant expected return model, capital asset pricing model, Fama-French 
three factor model, Carhart four factor model) have been used in event studies.38 
The most common ones for short term event studies are market model, market 
                                                 
37 This framework is from Brown and Warner (1980) and Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997). 
38 For descriptions on market model, constant expected return model, capital asset pricing model see 
Brown and Warner (1985) or Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997). The gains from using 
multifactor models like Fama-French or Carhart model are very limited; so they are not heavily used 
in the literature. See MacKinlay (1997) for treatments of such models. 
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adjusted model, mean adjusted model and return on control firms. Across 
alternative models, both the bias and precision of the expected return measure can 
differ, affecting the properties of the abnormal return measures. Properties of the 
different methods have been studied extensively and discussed in Kothari and 
Warner (2007). 
 However, in the literature, the constant expected return model is not widely 
used as a market model or market adjusted model. I will now briefly explain the 
two models that are used in this thesis: market model and market adjusted model. 
These two are the most common methods used in the corporate finance literature. 
Sometimes, market adjusted model can be used, when the researcher does not have 
data on the pre-event period, where the parameters can be estimated. This is the 
case for my IPO sample. 
3.4.2 Market Model 
 
The market model is frequently used in empirical studies to measure the reaction of 
security returns to new information, which represents the event-specific 
information. The model arises as an implication of the assumption that the joint 
distribution of returns on the securities is multivariate normal. To investigate the 
announcement effect of events, the market model is constructed by the following 
steps. First, the rate of return on a security over a particular holding period 
(estimation window T0 to T1) is measured as: ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ܴ௠௧ ൅ ߳௜௧      (3) 
Where, 
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ܴ௜௧ ൌ ݎܽݐ݁ ݋݂ ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊  ݅݊ ݏ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐݕ ݅ ݂݋ݎ ݌݁ݎ݅݋݀ ݐ ܴ௠௧ ൌ ݎܽݐ݁ ݋݂ ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݋݊ ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ݂݋ݎ ݌݁ݎ݅݋݀ ݐ. ߙ௜ , ߚ௜ ൌ  ݎ݁݃ݎ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ ܿ݋݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ݐݏ ݂݋ݎ ݏ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐݕ ݅  ߝ௜௧ ൌ ݏݐ݋݄ܿܽݏݐ݅ܿ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ݐ݁ݎ݉ 
Model (3) is estimated on a set of data relative to the event date, which is 
normally referred to as estimation window. It is common practice that pre-event 
window is used as estimation window. Under standard assumptions, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is a consistent estimation procedure for market model parameters. 
Thus OLS is used to estimate ߙ௜ and ߚ௜. They are calculated by regressing daily 
returns of security i on market index over the estimation window period. Given the 
estimated market model parameters, the abnormal return of the firm i for period t 
(event window T1 to T2) is calculated as follows: ܣܴ௜௧ ൌ ܴ௜௧ െ ሺߙො௜+ߚመ௜ܴ௠௧ሻ 
Where, ܣܴ௜௧ ൌ ܾܽ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ݏ ݋݂ ݏ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐݕ ݅ ݂݋ݎ ݌݁ݎ݅݋݀ ݐ   ܴ௠௧ ൌ ݎܽݐ݁ ݋݂ ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݋݊ ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ݂݋ݎ ݌݁ݎ݅݋݀ ݐ. ߙො௜ , ߚመ௜ ൌ  ݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁݀ ܱܮܵ  ܿ݋݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ݐݏ ݂݋ݎ ݏ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐݕ ݅  
The abnormal returns are then aggregated over the event window and across 
observations of the event to examine the event announcement effects. The 
aggregation can especially be done along two dimensions: through time and across 
securities.   
The average abnormal return (AAR) for a particular time t relative to the 
zero event date is calculated as the sum of the abnormal returns at time t in the 
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event window, divided by the number of securities in the sample. In particular, for 
the event time, t=T1, T2, and N firms, the average abnormal return for time t is: ܣܣܴ௜௧ ൌ ଵே ∑ ܣܴ௜௧ே௜ୀଵ   (4) 
The average abnormal returns can then be aggregated over the event 
window. The cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) is measured as the sum of 
the average abnormal returns over a specific time period (event window) relative to 
the event date: ܥܣܴሺ భ், మ்ሻ ൌ ∑ ܣܣܴ௧మ்௧ୀ భ்       (5) 
 
Equivalently, the CAR can also be calculated by cumulating through time 
for each security, over event window. The average abnormal returns are then 
aggregated through the securities in the sample. Define ܥܣ෣ܴ௜ሺ భ், మ்ሻ as the sample 
CAR from T1 to T2 for firm i. The CAR from T1 to T2 is the sum of the abnormal 
returns in the event window for security i, ܥܣ෣ܴ௜ሺ భ், మ்ሻ ൌ ∑ ܣܴ௜௧మ்௧ୀ భ்     (6)  
  
 For all the events, then CAR(T1, T2)  is the sum of ܥܣ෣ܴ௜ሺ భ், మ்ሻfor the event window 
divided by the number of securities in the sample, ܥܣܴሺ భ், మ்ሻ ൌ ଵே ∑ ܥܣ෣ܴ௜ሺ భ், మ்ሻ ൌே௜ୀଵ ଵே ∑ ∑ ܣܴ௜௧మ்௧ୀ భ்ே௜ୀଵ     (7) 
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3.4.3 Market Adjusted Model 
 
Another popular model is the market adjusted return where it is assumed that the 
alpha is zero and beta is one. The use of the market adjusted return is mostly driven 
by the availability of data. When the pre-event estimation period for an event does 
not exist, the market model cannot be used. This is particularly the case of IPOs as 
the event date is the IPO date. Also, for some event announcement samples, such as 
takeovers and seasoned equity offerings, there are repeated event announcements 
over time. Multiple events can be carried out by the same firm within a short period 
of time. Therefore, it is difficult to find a clean period where the market model 
parameters can be estimated.  Moreover, Brown and Werner (1980) show that, for 
short-window event studies, weighing the firms return by beta does not 
significantly improve the estimated results.   
The abnormal returns by using market adjusted model can be calculated by 
deducting the return of the market index from the stock return: ܣܴ௜௧ ൌ ܴ௜௧ െ ܴ௠௧   (8) 
 
Where, ܣܴ௜௧ ൌ ܾܽ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ݏ ݋݂ ݏ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐݕ ݅ ݂݋ݎ ݌݁ݎ݅݋݀ ݐ   ܴ௜௧ ൌ ݎܽݐ݁ ݋݂ ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݋݊ ݏ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐݕ ݅ ݂݋ݎ ݌݁ݎ݅݋݀ ݐ. ܴ௠௧ ൌ ݎܽݐ݁ ݋݂ ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݋݊ ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ݂݋ݎ ݌݁ݎ݅݋݀ ݐ. 
Again the AARs and CARs can be calculated similarly as described above for the 
market model. The CARs can be calculated based on time series aggregation or 
cross-sectional aggregation. It is important to note that, both market model and 
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market adjusted model assume that return on market is a good proxy for expected 
return.  
3.4.4 Hypothesis Tests and Test statistics 
 
For a given model, a test statistic is computed for CAR and compared to its 
assumed distribution under the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal 
performance is equal to zero. The null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistics 
exceeds a critical value, typically corresponding to the 5% and 1% tail region. The 
test statistic is a random variable because the abnormal returns are measured with 
error. According to Kothari and Werner (2007) two factors contribute to this error: 
first, predictions about securities unconditional expected returns are imprecise. 
Second, individual firms’ realised returns at the time of an event are affected for 
reasons unrelated to that event, and this component of the abnormal return does not 
average to zero in cross-section.  
 Based on the discussion on aggregate abnormal returns, two methods can be 
employed to cumulate ARit into CAR(T1, T2). Although it is obvious that the CARs 
generated under both methods are the same, the test statistic results are different. 
When the CAR is calculated by first aggregating ARit across securities then 
cumulating through time, the time series standard deviation test is used. When the 
CAR is calculated by first cumulating ARit through time then aggregating across 
securities, cross sectional standard deviation test is used. 
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A. Time series Standard Deviation Test 
The test statistics for any event time t is the ratio of AAR in the event time t to its 
estimated standard deviation, where the standard deviation is estimated from the 
series of the portfolio’s AAR over the estimation period (usually the pre-event 
period). The time-series standard deviation test uses a single variance estimate for 
the entire portfolio. Therefore, the time series standard deviation test does not take 
account of unequal return variances across securities. Additionally, it avoids the 
potential problem of the correlation of security returns.  
 The test statistics for any event time t AARt is:  ݐ஺஺ோ೟ ൌ ஺஺ோതതതതതത೟ఙෝಲಲೃ     (9) 
where,  ܣܣܴതതതതതത௧ ൌ ଵே ∑ ܣܴ௜௧ே௜ୀଵ   (10) 
    ߪො஺஺ோ is the estimated variance of AARt.39 N is the number of securities that are 
available in the sample. M is the estimation period defined as M=T1-T0+1. T0 and 
T1 are the beginning and ending time of the estimation period respectively.  
 The test statistics that assess the statistical significance of abnormal return 
performance over a multi-day period T=T2-T1+1 is:  ݐ஼஺ோ ൌ ஼஺ோሺ೅భ,೅మሻఙෝಲಲೃכ√்      (11) 
Equation 11 assumes time-series independence of the one period mean abnormal 
return. The test statistic is typically unit normal in the absence of abnormal 
                                                 
39 Many other alternative have been examined in the literature. See, for example, Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay  (1997).  
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performance. This is only an approximation since estimates of the standard 
deviation are used (Kothari and Werner (2007)).  
 The test statistics in equation 11 is well specified provided the variance of 
one period mean abnormal return is estimated correctly. Event time clustering 
renders the independence assumption for the abnormal returns in cross-section 
incorrect (Peterson (2005)). This would bias the estimated standard deviation 
downward and the test statistic upward.  
 
B. Cross-sectional Standard Deviation Test 
 
In a cross-sectional standard deviation test, the portfolio test statistics for time t in 
event period is: ݐ஺஺ோ೟ ൌ ஺஺ோ೟ఙෝಲಲೃ೟ √ே⁄     (12) 
And the test statistics for CAR(T1, T2) is: ݐ஼஺ோ ൌ ஼஺ோሺ೅భ,೅మሻఙෝ಴ಲೃሺ೅భ,೅మሻ √ே⁄    
Where  ߪො஺஺ோ೟ and   ߪො஼஺ோሺ೅భ,೅మሻ  are the estimated variance of ܣܣܴ௧  and  ܥܣܴሺ భ், మ்ሻ, respectively. 
 
 
C. Summary of Event Studies 
 
 
Table 3-3 highlights some of the known properties of abnormal returns. The table 
shows the characteristics of event study methods along three dimensions: 
Specification, Power against specific types of alternative hypothesis, and sensitivity 
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of specification to assumptions about return generating process. The table also 
shows the difference in results between short run and long run studies.  
Table 3-3 Summary of event studies 
Criterion Length of Event Window 
 Short  
(<12 months) 
Long  
( 12 months or more) 
Specification  Good Poor/Moderate 
   
Power when abnormal performance 
is: 
  
     Concentrated in event window High Low 
     Not concentrated in event window Low  Low 
   
Sensitivity of test statistic specification to assumptions about return generating 
process: 
   
Expected returns, unconditional on 
event 
Low High  
Cross-sectional dependence of 
sample abnormal returns 
Low Moderate 
Time series dependence of sample 
abnormal returns 
Moderate High 
Variance of abnormal returns, 
conditional on event 
High High 
 
Sensitivity of power to: 
  
 
Sample size 
 
High 
 
High 
Firm Characteristics (size, industry) High High 
Source: Kothari and Werner (2007). 
 
 Horizon length has a large impact on the event study test properties. First, 
short horizon event study methods are generally well specified, but long horizon 
methods are sometimes poorly specified. While much is understood about how to 
reduce misspecification in long horizon event studies, researchers do not have 
complete confidence in any of them. Second, short-horizon methods are quite 
powerful if the abnormal performance is concentrated in the event window. In 
contrast to the short horizon tests, long horizon event studies (even when they are 
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well specified) generally have less power to detect abnormal performance, both 
when it is concentrated in the event window and when it is not. Third, with short 
horizon methods the test statistic specification is not highly sensitive to the 
benchmark model of the returns or assumptions about the cross sectional and time 
series dependence of abnormal returns. This contrasts with long horizon methods, 
where specification is quite sensitive to assumptions about the return generating 
process.  
 However, the short and long horizon test shows some similarities. First, a 
common problem for short and long horizon tests is that when the variance of a 
securities abnormal return conditional on the event increases, test statistics can 
easily be misspecified, and reject the null hypothesis too often. Though this 
problem was first studied in the context of short horizon studies by Brown and 
Werner (1985) and Corrado (1989), this issue is likely to be relevant in long 
horizon studies. Second, power is higher with sample size, regardless of horizon 
length. Third, power depends on the characteristics of the event firms. 
 Like any other methods, event studies have many limitations. However, 
event study methodology is examined heavily in the previous literature and most 
notably we know lot about the limitations of event studies. Fortunately, it is also 
known that how to address most of the problems in event studies. Probably, that is 
the reason, notwithstanding the limitations of event studies that it is “the” most 
commonly used method in corporate finance literature.         
3.4.5 Cross-sectional Tests 
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This focus of this section so far has been on the analysis of mean abnormal return 
following an event. These tests represent the more standard class of tests 
underlying event studies. To provide a more complete picture of the event related 
tests, I briefly describe here the cross-sectional tests that can be used to further 
analyse an event.  These tests examine how the event affects firm’s stock price 
conditional on the characteristics of the firm. For a cross-section of firms, abnormal 
returns are compared to (e.g., regressed against) characteristics of the firm. This 
might help to confirm or investigate the hypothesis being tested. ܣܴ௜௧ ൌ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
Where, 
ARit = abnormal return of firm i for time t 
Xit = set of regressors  ߝ௜௧= random error term. 
 Cross-sectional tests are employed in almost every event study. They are 
relevant when the average abnormal performance of an event is zero. In addition, 
they can be applied, irrespective of the horizon of the event study (short vs long). 
They are simple to do, but as discussed below, “one must be careful in interpreting 
the results” (Capmbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), p 174). 
  One reason why the abnormal returns vary cross sectionally is the event 
affect which is different in different firms. For such as case, Sefcik and Thompson 
(1986) examine the statistical properties of cross-sectional regressions. They are 
concerned with the effects of cross-sectionally correlated abnormal returns and 
heteroskedasticity in the abnormal returns. They argue that accounting for each 
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appears to be important in context of the inferences, and they suggest procedures to 
deal with the issues.  
 Abnormal returns can also vary cross-sectionally because the extent to 
which the event is anticipated may be different for different firms. For example, the 
abnormal returns earned by larger firms are lower compared to the smaller firms, 
because smaller firms are riskier all else being equal. Further, events are 
endogenous, reflecting a firm’s self-selection to choose an event. For example, 
insider purchases can be self-selection events. Recognizing these factors and that it 
is the unexpected information provided by an event that determines the reaction of 
stock prices, which has numerous consequences.    
 Some event studies focus not only on the affect of the event on stock prices 
but also predicting the event (the probability of merger, the probability of insider’s 
purchases versus sells), using sometimes past stock prices as one of the 
independent variable. These tests are broadly categorised as cross sectional 
methods, as the sample includes both event and non-event firms. Typically, 
discrete choice models (e.g., logit, probit models) are used to analyse the 
characteristics that significantly influence the event firms. This seems intuitive 
since my interest is what factors are likely to drive the event, such as insider buy or 
sell trades.  
 Consider the following logit model, where D is the insider trading dummy. ܦ ൌ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧       
Where, ܦ ቄܻ ൌ ͳ, ݂݅ ܫ݊ݏ݅݀݁ݎ ݐݎܽ݀݁Ͳ ܱݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁  
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Xit = set of regressors  ߝ௜௧= Random error term 
The above model is estimated by the maximum likelihood estimators and can 
answer several important questions. I estimate logit models to further analyse the 
event and answer the questions: Is there significant relationship between pre-trade 
share price performance and insider trading? In the context of information content 
of insider trading, are market-to-book and size important factors? 
3.4.6 Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I use a large sample of firms to test the proposition that insider 
trading predicts stock returns and mitigate information asymmetry, particularly in 
the case of IPOs. I test various relevant hypothesis using large samples of UK 
companies from 1999 to 2007 and the event study methodologies. Particularly, 
market reactions to insider trading, lockup expiration returns and long run IPO 
performance are used as specific events. I employ market adjusted model and 
market model to calculate short and long window abnormal returns. Also, I use 
matching firm approach to examine the long run IPO performance. As robustness 
checks, I employ buy-and-hold abnormal returns and Fama-French calendar time 
regressions to analyse the long run IPO performance. Further analyses of the 
abnormal returns are done by cross-sectional regressions and discrete choice 
models.   
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Chapter 4  
4 Market Sentiment, Timing, Predictability, and Information 
Content of Individual and Aggregate Insider Trading 40 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This chapter analyses the drivers of market reaction to insider trading. I find that 
insiders are contrarians as they buy after significant price increases and sell after 
price declines, suggesting that they are likely to be informed. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, this study finds that the buy trades are preceded by significant positive 
returns, and thus convey information about future performance. However, the 
positive event and post-event performance is limited to mainly small firms. This 
study also shows that this excess performance is strongly affected by the stock and 
market volatility, but it is relatively evenly distributed across the bear and bull 
periods. For the sell trades, there is no excess performance in the post-event period. 
The results suggest that the information content of insider trading is weaker than 
previously documented.  
 
Keywords: Insider Trading, UK, information content, Contrarian Strategy, 
managerial timing. 
 
JEL classification: G14. 
                                                 
40 This chapter was presented in Advanced Corporate Finance Course, Aarhus, Denmark in spring 
2008. I thank participants of that course and Jay Ritter for valuable comments. Any remaining errors 
in this chapter are my own.  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Previous studies show that insiders are contrarians as they buy after price decline 
and sell after price run up, but the extent to which such trades convey information 
is mixed. For example, in the short run, while Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that 
insider trades are not informative, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find they do convey 
information to the market as subsequently to their buy (sell) trades share price 
increases (decreases). There are other related studies of managerial decisions that 
also suggest that insiders are better informed about their firms’ prospects. For 
instance, Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that firms issue equity when they are 
overvalued, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) show that firms 
repurchase equity when they are undervalued.41 Managers use valuation levels to 
trade on their personal accounts as well as take corporate level decisions. 
Notwithstanding the enormous literature on insider trading, this paper expands the 
earlier literature in several ways. Whilst previous studies document that insiders are 
contrarians, this study assesses whether insiders buy (sell) in the bear (bull) period 
with the expectation of price reversals. This chapter also assesses whether the 
market reaction to insider trading differs across bull (bear) market conditions, firm 
size and value (growth) stocks.      
  This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this research 
investigates whether managers use market sentiment as a platform to act like 
contrarians. According to Seyhun (1988), insiders sell after significant stock price 
                                                 
41 In this thesis I focus on insider trading in existing companies and IPOs. Different corporate 
decisions are outside the scope of this study.  
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increases and buy after price declines. Other studies find similar trend in aggregate 
insider trading (Seyhun (1992) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001)).  Similar results 
are documented for the aggregate insider trading, meaning that they sell (buy) after 
a price run-up (decline). In line with this, Jiang and Zaman (2010) assert that 
contrarian strategy implies insider trading as a reaction to market returns. I use 
market states to test the contrarian behaviour of insiders. If managers use the 
market platform to act like contrarians, it is expected that purchases to dominate in 
bear periods, and inversely, insiders are expected to sell in the bull period.  I define 
the bull market as January 1999 to March 2000 and January 2004 to December 
2007 and bear period as April 2000 to December 2003.  
A related question is whether there is differential market reactions to insider 
trades in different market conditions. In the institutional trading literature, 
Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) claim that differential market reaction 
to buy and sell trades depend on market conditions. They argue that in bullish 
markets the suppliers of liquidity will not push down prices following a sell order, 
because it is easy to find a buyer. In contrast, in bearish markets institutions have to 
offer discounts to find buyers for their sell orders, which results in buy (sell) trades 
to have a bigger and permanent price impact in bullish (bearish) markets. It is well 
established in the previous literature that insider buy and sell trades trigger different 
market reactions.42 The uneqivocal result, so far, is that purchase transactions 
produce higher market impact than sell trades (see Fidrmuc et al. (2006) for short 
                                                 
42 Director purchases convey positive signal to the market. Conversely, directors signal negative 
news when selling shares. Nevertheless, this signal is less informative as liquidity may be a reason 
for sell rather than changes in their expectations about the firm’s future cash flows may force them 
to sell shares (Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Friedrich et al. (2002)).  
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run, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) for long run). This asymmetry has been attributed 
to more informed trading in purchases than in sells. In this paper, I test whether 
there is asymmetric price response of buy and sell trades in bull and bear periods.  
Second, this study tests whether the insider’s view differs systematically 
from market valuations, and they try to take advantage of misvaluation. Previous 
research on insider trading finds that insiders try to take advantage of perceived 
mispricing, suggesting market timing (Jenter (2005), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) 
and Rozeff and Zaman (1998)). There is evidence that insider trading is not random 
in value and glamour stocks (Rozeff and Zaman (1998)). It has been documented 
that insider buying increases as stock changes from growth to value categories. 
Similarly, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that insiders tend to buy value stocks 
and sell glamour stocks. They also show that contrarian strategies are useful in 
market timing.  I carry an out-of-sample test for managerial timing by corporate 
insiders under UK institutional setting.  
Third, this study investigates whether insiders are actively involved in small 
companies, and whether their timing skill is confined to small companies. There 
may be a considerable amount of information asymmetry in the case of smaller 
firms that lead the insiders to signal to the market through their trading (Aboody 
and Lev (2000)). Previous work has empirically established the importance of 
factor “size” in the context of insider trading literature. For instance, in the US, 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insiders have an advantage in timing of the 
future performance of smaller companies than larger companies. In addition, 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that undervaluation on which behavioural timing 
relies, is likely to be more common, and higher in small firms than large ones: for 
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any given mispricing, ‘there will be a stronger force pushing the price towards 
fundamental value (and thus limiting the magnitude of any misvaluation) for big 
stocks’(p. 363). 
Fourth, recent evidence shows that trading by insiders does not convey 
information after controlling for M/B and size (Jenter, 2005). Similarly, 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that after controlling for M/B and size, insider 
trades in most firms do not predict subsequent stock returns. This research tests 
whether insider trades in the UK are informative after controlling for size and M/B. 
On the other hand, it is possible that insiders mechanistically react to value 
(growth) strategies. Value strategies might produce higher returns because they are 
contrarian compared to “naïve” strategies followed by other investors. Size is also 
critical in event studies. Therefore, I assess whether insider trading is informative 
after controlling for value (growth) strategies and size.  
This study identifies a total of 33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664 listed 
companies, split into 26,268 (77%) buy and 7,723 (23%) sell trades. The sample 
covers two interesting sub-periods: the bull period (January 1999 to March 2000 
and January 2004 to December 2007) and the bear period (April 2000 to December 
2003) in the stock markets. This allows me to test whether insiders time their trades 
differently under different market conditions. This study measures aggregate 
insider trading activity by net purchase ratio (NPR), as used in Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) and relate this ratio to market conditions. This research finds that NPR is 
positive (negative) in bear (bull) market, which implies that insiders purchase (sell) 
in the bear (bull) market. The conclusion holds after controlling for insiders’ 
contrarian behaviour in the regressions. In general, the aggregate insider trading is 
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consistent with contrarian behaviour.  However, the aggregate insider trading does 
not predict market return. 
 This study uses the standard event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 
1985) to compute the abnormal returns around the announcement day (day 0) of the 
trade as disclosed in the RNS. Overall, the results suggest that the buy trades are 
informative and the sell trades do not convey much information to the market. I 
find event day return of 1.02% and -0.13% for buy and sell trades, respectively. 
While the coefficient for buy trade is statistically significant and economically 
meaningful, the coefficient for sell trade is not statistically, or economically, 
significant. The results are in line with Fidrmuc et al. (2006) who find an 
immediate market reaction of 1.16% and -0.26% respectively. My results are in 
direct contrast with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who report a market reaction of 
0.13% and -0.23% for buy and sell respectively when measured around reporting 
period.43 This might be due to the fact that in the US it takes a minimum of 10 to a 
maximum of 40 days for the information to reach the market. Moreover, the 
information might have been leaked and is already reflected in stock prices. The 
definition of US insiders is much wider compared to UK. It is possible that some 
insiders (key employees or large shareholders) might have less inside information 
compared to directors. Thus these factors are likely to explain the relatively smaller 
market reaction in the US.  
This research reports, in the bear market, share prices decline more before 
insiders buy them. The market reaction is higher in the bear market for buy trades, 
                                                 
43 Lakonishok and Lee (2001) report a trading period abnormal return for buy and sell trades of 
0.59% and 0.17% respectively. 
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which is in contrast with Chiyachantana et al. (2004), who find that in bullish 
market institutional buys have a bigger price impact. This may be due to the fact 
that, since the market is in bearish state, insiders’ purchases convey more positive 
signal to the market.  In the bull market, share price increase more, compared to 
bear market, before insiders sell them. Also, the share price declines more in the 
bull market after insider sells, as they convey a more negative signal to the market.  
However, in both buy and for sell trades, this study does not find any significant 
difference in price response in bull and bear periods; the only exception is the pre-
event window for buy trades. So, the behaviour and price response of insider trades 
is not symmetric in bull (bear) markets.  
This research finds that the perceived mispricing by managers, as measured 
by market-to-book ratio, affects significantly the market reaction to the trades. For 
the buy trades, I find clear indication of contrarian behaviour by insiders in value 
stocks (lowest M/B quintile), as they buy after a large decline in price (CAR -7.18, 
t=-11.87). For such trades, the immediate market reaction is larger (CAR of 1.41, 
t=8.43). Such trades are driven by information as the price reversal in the post-
event window is higher. However, in the case of glamour stocks (high M/B), the 
contrarian behaviour is less pronounced.  The difference between “value” and 
“glamour” stocks is statistically significant. The results for sell trades also show 
some evidence of managers’ systematic trading based on their perceptions about 
the company. The insiders are able to sell after a significant price rise. The 
regression results confirm the univariate analysis, suggesting that insiders are able 
to time their trades.  
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To test the effect of size on the information content of insider trading, size 
quintiles are formed. The univariate results on size quintiles show that there is 
evidence of market timing by insiders on their own trades for small stocks.  The 
information content of the buy trades for small companies is much higher 
compared to the large ones. More interestingly, the event day abnormal return for 
the largest quintile is negative, though statistically insignificant. This evidence is 
consistent with Rozeff and Zaman (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who 
show that market reaction is significantly higher for small stocks. The results 
suggests that managers buy stock after a significant price decline, and sell after 
significant run up, and the behaviour is more pronounced in the case of small 
stocks, implying that insiders are more likely to be able to time their trades in small 
companies.  
Insider purchase conveys information to the market, as this study finds 
economically and statistically significant returns around the announcement period. 
However, these returns vary with size and M/B. My results are consistent with 
insiders trading based on the perception of mispricing as the market reaction of 
insider trades vary with the M/B ratio, which might imply that insiders 
mechanistically buy (sell) value (glamour) stocks. Furthermore, insiders are likely 
to buy in small companies where the information asymmetry is higher. The finding 
that most of the abnormal returns vary with M/B and size is consistent with the 
view that insiders trade based on perceived mispricing and smaller companies.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses existing literature, and 
sets up the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4, this study tests the 
109 
 
relationship between market return and aggregate insider trading. Section 5 
presents the results of the event period returns. Section 6 concludes. 
4.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis 
 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2001) state that insider trading is regulated in most 
countries. However, the essence of regulation and enforcement is not homogenous 
across countries. Insider trading in the UK is regulated by the 1977 Model Code of 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the 1985 Companies Act.44 In the US 
insider trading is regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). The 
1934 Securities and Exchange Act and its amendments impose restrictions on 
insider trading. The main differences between the two countries are: (i) the 
definition of an insider (ii) the definition of (illegal) insider trading, (iii) the essence 
of the regulation, (iv)  the time within which insiders have to report their trades and 
(v) the level of enforcement of the regulation. I expect that UK insider trades are 
likely to be more informative than US trades for the following reasons: (i) A trade 
must be made public within at most 6 business days in the UK, compared with up 
to 40 days45 in the US (Fidrmuc et al. (2006)). (ii) Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and 
McConnell et al. (2005) report that the information on insiders’ trades enters the 
public domain in the US only several days after it is released by the SEC. Fidrmuc 
                                                 
44 Detail of these regulations are in Appendix I. 
45 After the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Act the reporting environment has changed. The definition of 
insider covered under Section 16 of the Exchange Act, and the types of transactions which are 
reportable, have not changed. What has changed is the filing deadline for Form 4 has been 
dramatically shortened. It has changed from within 10 days after the close of the calendar month in 
which a reportable transaction occurred to within two business days after the day the transaction 
took place. However, most of the insider trading studies in US is done before the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. 
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et al. (2006) show that no such delay occurs in the UK. (iii) In the UK, mandatory 
reporting by insiders is limited to top management and to the non-executive 
directors only. In contrast, US insiders (legally) comprise a much larger group: 
insiders are large shareholders, (non-executive) directors and managers (officers). 
Officers include not only the top management with board seats, but also a wider 
group of managers (e.g. any vice president in charge of any principal business unit, 
division, or function such as sells, administration, or finance), who may de facto 
possess less information about their firm’s prospects (iv) The UK regulator has 
opted for trading bans in price-sensitive periods whereas the US regulator favours 
more frequent disclosure. All these arguments suggest that directors’ trades in the 
UK are more informative. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 1: Market reactions to insider trades are higher in the UK compared to 
US. 
Previous research unanimously shows that insiders are contrarian traders. 
For example, Seyhun (1986, 1992) shows that insiders are more likely to sell 
(purchase) shares following periods of significant price appreciation (declines), 
consistent with insiders trading in anticipation of subsequent price reversals. If 
markets consist of two types of traders, informed and uninformed (noise), and 
stock prices are affected by the trading of both types of traders, then prices can 
move away from fundamental values (Shiller (1984), De Long et al. (1990)). It is 
possible that noise traders may drive market prices away from intrinsic values even 
in the absence of new information. Hence, a stock that was trading roughly at its 
intrinsic value could decline (rise) significantly because of such noise trading.  
Corporate insiders may then perceive the stock to be undervalued (overvalued) and 
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buy (sell) it. Such a relationship would be viewed as insiders following a contrarian 
investment strategy. Brennan and Cao (1996) show that poorly informed agents are 
‘trend chasers’, purchasing more risky security when its price rises and selling 
when price falls, while better informed agents acts like contrarians, selling on a 
price rise and buying on a fall. These arguments lead me to set up the following 
hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 2: Insiders are expected to buy (sell) after a significant decrease 
(increase) in price, and, after the trade, there should be price 
reversal. 
If the contrarian strategy is employed by insiders at the firm specific level 
then there should be no relation between market returns and insider trading.  On the 
other hand, if “noise” trading is a market wide phenomenon then a relation between 
aggregate insider trading and market return should exist (Jiang and Zaman (2010)). 
In this case, market returns would predict insider trading behaviour. Chowdhury, 
Howe and Lin (1993) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) provide evidence that 
aggregate insider trading is driven by the contrarian strategies. I test whether 
insider trading pattern is different across the bull and bear markets, that is, whether 
insider buying is higher in bear market, and insider selling is higher in bull market. 
If insiders use a market platform to act like contrarians, I expect them to buy in 
bear periods, and sell in bull periods, to reflect their expectations of price reversals. 
Therefore, I split sample period into bull (01/1999 to 03/2000 and 01/2004 to 
12/2007) and bear (04/2000 to 12/2003) periods to assess the trading patterns of 
insiders. 
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Hypothesis 3: There is no difference in buying (selling) between bear vs. bull 
period. 
A related question would be whether there is any difference in the market 
reaction to insider trading in bull (bear) market. Chiyachantana et. al. (2004) 
consider this question in the context of institutional trading. They claim that 
differential market reactions to buy and sell trades depend on market conditions. 
They argue that in bullish markets the suppliers of liquidity will not push down 
prices, following a sell order, as it is easy to find a buyer, while in bearish markets 
institutions have to offer discounts to find buyers for their sell orders, which results 
in buys (sells) having a bigger and permanent price impact in bullish (bearish) 
markets. On the other hand, Friederich et. al. (2002) assert that an additional reason 
for contrarian trades to be informative, is that in bearish markets there is a high 
demand for good stocks which depress the price of smaller stocks. Corporate 
insiders may see this as the time to buy cheap stocks if they have ‘inside’ 
information about the stocks.  Korczak and Lasfer (2009b) examine the differential 
patterns of insider trading in bull (bear) markets. To my knowledge, no study 
considers this impact in the case of insider trading. Therefore, I set up the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: There is no difference in price impact between the bull and bear 
market condition of buy and sell trades.  
Rozeff and Zaman (1998) show that insider transactions are not random 
across growth and value stocks. Insider buying increases as stocks change from 
growth to value categories. If value stocks are undervalued and growth stocks are 
overvalued and investors can profitably trade based on this information, then 
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corporate insiders, who have superior information about the company, have 
incentives to take advantage of misvaluations. Particularly, insiders buy heavily in 
value stocks and sell growth stocks. In line with this argument, Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) find that insiders tend to buy value stocks and sell growth stocks. While 
Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003) document that insider stock sells are greater for 
growth firms, Pitroski and Roulstone (2005) find that insider purchases are 
positively related to book-to-market ratios, and future earnings performance. 
Pitroski and Roulstone (2005) also document that superior information about future 
cash flow changes explains a small portion of insider purchases, than do proxies for 
security misvaluation. Jenter (2005) finds that top managers have contrarian views 
on firm value. He also asserts that the managers’ perceptions of fundamental value 
diverge systematically from market valuation, and the perceived mispricing seems 
to be an important determinant of managers’ decision making.  I, therefore, set up 
the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis  5: Insiders are expected to buy undervalued shares and sell overvalued   
shares. 
Previous literature clearly demonstrates that insiders trade in small 
companies, and earn higher abnormal returns. In contrast, when they trade in large 
companies excess returns are relatively small. For instance, in the US, Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001) find that insider trades in small companies convey more 
information compared to large companies, when measured around the reporting 
period. In the UK, Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis (1994) find that the 
abnormal returns are concentrated in smaller firms. After the seminal work by 
Fama and French (1993), the variable size becomes important in event studies. In 
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the insider trading literature, the importance of size cannot be overlooked (e.g., 
Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (1997)). Moreover, there is evidence that the buy 
trades of insiders are mainly concentrated in small firms (Seyhun (1986), Rozeff 
and Zaman (1988)). In addition, Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that the 
behavioural timing depends on undervaluation, and it is easier to take advantage of 
any undervaluation in small firms, because if the stocks are mispriced, the arbitrage 
forces will push the prices towards their fundamental values, and thus correct the 
misvaluations for any large firms compared to a small firm. These arguments 
suggest the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6: The market evaluation of insider trading is expected to be dependent 
on the size of the company to reflect the level of asymmetric 
information and riskiness.  
Jenter (2005) finds little evidence that managers use inside information in 
their trades. The excess returns after controlling for size and book-to-market effects 
are indifferent from zero. However, these results do not suggest that managers 
never use valid inside information when making private and corporate decisions.  
He argues that his results are consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who 
document that insider trading does not predict subsequent returns, once size and 
book-to-market effects are controlled for. There is some predictability of excess 
returns in the case of equity purchases in small firms, but no predictability of 
excess returns is found for the sell trades. On the other hand, recent research using 
UK data shows that insider buy and sell trades trigger an immediate market 
reaction of 1.16% and -0.26% respectively (Fidrmuc et. al. (2006)). I test whether 
insider trades in UK convey information after controlling for M/B and size effects.  
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Hypothesis 7: After controlling size and M/B, the excess returns of insider trades 
are not different from zero. 
4.3 Data  
 
This research uses Directors Deals, a large database of all UK firms’ directors’ 
trades spanning from January 1999 to December 2007, to collect data on trades 
undertaken by insiders of my sample companies. The database includes news items 
on directors’ trades disclosed by all UK firms to the Regulatory News Service 
(RNS). I exclude a number of observations that are not likely to be driven by 
private information, such as exercise of options or derivatives, script dividends, 
bonus shares, rights issues, awards made to directors under incentive plans or 
reinvestment plans. Also all directors’ transactions in investment companies are 
excluded. After this screening, I obtain 36,943 insiders’ trades from the UK 
market. I check the data for errors and exclude 2,952 (8%) trades as the difference 
in announcement and transaction date is more than 5 days. The final sample 
includes 33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268 (77%) 
purchases and 7,723 (23%) sell trades. This insider-trading database includes 
transaction price, amount, and value, post-transaction holding, change in holding, 
name and position of the insider, and announcement and transaction dates, as UK 
insiders can delay up to five days the announcement of their trade, but most report 
their trades on the RNS on the transaction date (Korczak and Lasfer (2009b)). 
The sample period covers two interesting sub-periods: the bull period 
(January 1999 to March 2000 and January 2004 to Decemeber 2007) and the bear 
116 
 
period (April 2000 to December 2003) in the stock markets, which allows me to 
test whether insiders time their trades differently under different market conditions. 
Adjusted daily share prices, data on FTSE All Share Price Index, market 
capitalization, market- to-book ratio are taken from DataStream.  
4.4 Market Return and Aggregate Insider Trading  
 
4.4.1 Methodology 
 
It is expected that insiders to react to market returns if they are contrarians (Jiang 
and Zaman (2010)). Also, I expect market returns to ‘predict’ aggregate insider 
transactions (See Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Chowdhury, Howe and Lin (1993) and 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001)).  Such a relationship is consistent with the proposition 
that insiders follow a contrarian investment strategy. This chapter tests whether 
insiders are contrarians by using aggregate insider transactions. While the 
aggregate insider trading activity measure is similar to Lakonishok and Lee (2001), 
the objectives are different. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) test the predictive power of 
aggregate insider trading in predicting market returns. This study addresses the 
contrarian behaviour of aggregate insider trading. If insiders are contrarians, it is 
expected that market returns to affect aggregate insider trading. In other words, 
increase (decrease) in market price will lead insiders to sell (buy). I then relate 
insider sell (buy) to market conditions as measured by bull (bear) markets. Since, in 
the bull market prices are up, higher insider sells are expected. In contrast, since in 
bear market, prices are down, higher insider purchases are expected. 
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This research uses net purchase ratio (NPR) which is the ratio of net 
purchases to total insider transactions, to measure the aggregate insider trading 
activities. Each month starting from January 1999 to December 2007, the total 
numbers of insider purchases and sells are calculated. Pound Sterling volume of 
insider trading are also computed. I then calculate the NPR by dividing the net 
aggregate number (volume) of insider purchases by the total aggregate number 
(volume) of insider transactions. I use market returns for 6, 12 and 24 month 
horizons as predictor of insider trades. Return on FTSE All Share price index is 
used as a proxy for market return. Figure 4-1 shows that there a negative 
relationship between NPR and market returns, which supports the contrarian 
behaviour.    
Figure 4-1 Monthly NPR and Market Returns 
 
This figure represents a time series of net purchase ratio (NPR Value) and 6-month prior 
return (PR6) for each month from January 1999 to December 2007. For each month, I 
calculate the total Pound sterling volume (and the total numbers of) insider purchases and 
sells. I then calculate the NPR by dividing the net aggregate value of insider purchases by 
the total aggregate value of insider transactions. Prior Returns (PR6) represents the FTSE 
All Share Index returns over the 6 months before the trade. 
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The following regression model is estimated to examine the relationship 
between aggregate insider trading and return on market: NPR୲ ൌ α ൅ ȕPR ሺkሻ୲ 
Where, NPR is the aggregate insider trading activity in month t, PR ሺkሻ୲ is the prior 
k-holding period return on market at time t. A negative relationship is expected 
between NPR and prior-return as contrarian strategy imply a buy (sell) after a price 
decline (rise). Since, NPR is positive (negative) if insiders are net buyer (seller) 
then I expect prior-return (PR) should be negatively related to NPR.  
 
4.4.2 Regression results  
4.4.2.1 Impact of pre-event returns on aggregate insider trading 
 
I use 6-, 12-, 24- month prior return to examine whether the insiders buy (sell) as a 
reaction to market returns. Table 4-1, Panel-A and Panel-B, reports regression 
results based on NPR number of transactions and NPR money volume, 
respectively. In all the regressions, it is found that prior-return over k-period is 
statistically and economically significant. The negative sign of PR implies that 
insiders are contrarians and suggest that insiders sell after a price rise, and they buy 
after a price decline. The results are consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) 
and Jiang and Zaman (2010). 
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Table 4-1 Aggregate Insider Trading and Market Return 
Prior 
Return(months) 
Constant PR  ܴଶതതതത 
Panel A: Number of  transactions 
6 -0.04 
(-1.03) 
-2.02*** 
(-4.44)  
 23.7 
12 -0.04 
(-0.73) 
-1.32*** 
(-3.36) 
 18.2 
24 -0.04 
(-0.92) 
-0.55*** 
(-3.06)  
 8.0 
     
Panel B: Money Volume  
6 -0.39*** 
(-10.14)  
-2.08*** 
(-4.71)  
 29.6 
12 -0.39*** 
(-7.26)  
-1.26*** 
(-3.48)  
 19.5 
24 -0.37*** 
(-5.72)  
-0.76*** 
(-3.03)  
 18.8 
     
This table reports the regression results from the following model. NPR୧,୲ ൌ α ൅ ȕPRሺkሻ୧,୲ + İi,t 
Where, NPR of aggregate insider trading activity in month t,  PRሺkሻ୧,୲  is the prior k-period 
holding period return on market at time t. I predict market returns for 3, 6, 9 and 12 month 
horizons. Each month starting from January 1999 to December 2007, I calculate the total 
numbers of (and the total Pound sterling volume) of insider purchases and sells. I then 
calculate the NPR by dividing the net aggregate number (volume) of insider purchases by 
the total aggregate number (volume) of insider transactions. The Newey-West 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***,**,* 
represent significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.  
 
Although all the coefficients of prior-return are negative, the coefficient of 
PR becomes smaller as the holding period become longer. For example, the 
coefficient is -2.02 when 6 month prior return is used compared to -0.55 when 24 
month prior return is used. This provides evidence that insiders rely more on recent 
price performance. The adjusted R2 also declines from 23.7% to 8%. Similar results 
are obtained using the NPR measure based on money volume. The predictive 
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power of money volume based NPR is higher than the number of transaction based 
NPR. It may imply that when market moves are larger insiders make large trades.  
4.4.2.2 Aggregate insider trading in bear and bull markets 
 
After examining the relationship between market return and aggregate insider 
trading activity, this study follows a similar methodology to test whether insiders’ 
trading is related to market conditions. Net purchase ratio (NPR) is used as 
aggregate measure of insider trading activity. The following model is estimated: ܴܰܲ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅  ȕ BB ൅ ȖPRሺkሻ୲ 
 
BB is a dummy equal to one for two periods: January 1999 to March 2000 and 
January 2004 to December 2007. Bear market is from April 2000 to December 
2003. NPR୲୧  is the NPR of aggregate insider trading activity in month t, PRሺkሻ୲  is 
the prior k holding period return on market at time t. 
Table 4-2 shows the mean and median net purchase ratios in the bull and 
bear markets. I calculate the NPR based on amount of shares traded and Pound 
Sterling value of trades. The mean NPR (value) for bull and bear market is -0.59  
and -0.23, respectively. It shows that the NPR is more negative when the market is 
in bullish state compared to bearish state. The medians are very closer to means. 
NPR (amount) shows that in bull market it is negative while in bear market it is 
positive, suggesting that insiders are net sellers in bull market and net buyers in 
bear market.  
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Table 4-2 Mean Differences in NPR between Bull and Bear Markets 
 Mean Median  
 Bull Bear Bull Bear P-value of mean diff. (bull-bear)
    
NPR (amount) -0.25 0.12 -0.28 0.11 0.00 
NPR (value) -0.59 -0.23 -0.62 -0.28 0.00 
   
This table represents mean (median) of net purchase ratio for each month from January 1999 to 
December 2007. The bull market and contains two periods (January 1999 to March 2000 and 
January 2004 to December 2007). For each month, I calculate the total numbers of (and the total 
Pound Sterling volume) insider purchases and sells. I then calculate the NPR by dividing the net 
aggregate number of insider purchases by the total aggregate number of insider transactions. 
 
Figure 4-2 shows that in bear market most of the NPRs are positive 
suggesting that insiders are net buyers. In bull market (shaded area) most of the 
NPRs are negative, meaning insiders are net sellers. 
Figure 4-2 Aggregate Insider Trading and Bull (Bear) Market 
 
 
This figure represents a time series of net purchase ratio for each month from January 1999 
to December 2007. The shaded region is the bull market and contains two periods (January 
1999 to March 2000 and January 2004 to December 2007). For each month, I calculate the 
total numbers of (and the total Pound Sterling volume) insider purchases and sells. I then 
calculate the NPR by dividing the net aggregate number of insider purchases by the total 
aggregate number of insider transactions.  
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Table 4-3 reports (both panel A and B) the results for regressions. In first 
regression, I only use the BB dummy as an independent variable to examine the 
effect of bull (bear) market on NPR. In the other regressions, I use 6-, 12-, 24-
month prior returns with the BB. The results are consistent with the notion that 
insiders buy trades increases in bear market and insider sell trades is higher in the 
bull market. Both the NPR measures are negatively related to BB dummy, 
suggesting that insider buy in the bear market with an expectation to sell in the bull 
market. Table 4-3, Panel A and Panel B, shows that insiders use the bull (bear) 
markets as a platform to act like contrarians. The evidence holds even after 
controlling for the contrarian behaviour of the insiders by incorporating prior-
returns. After controlling for contrarian strategies, it is shown that insiders further 
use bull (bear) market to time the market. For example, in Panel A, the second 
regression shows that after controlling for 6-month prior returns insiders use bull 
(bear) market to sell (buy) securities.  
 
 
 
Table 4-3 Aggregate Insider Trading and Bull/Bear market 
Prior return 
(Months) 
Constant BB Dummy PR ܴଶതതതത 
Panel A: Number of  transactions 
 0.12 
(1.18) 
-0.37*** 
(-3.27) 
-- 16.1 
6 0.04 
(0.63) 
-0.17* 
(-1.89) 
-1.57 *** 
(-3.12) 
25.3 
12 0.03 
(0.43) 
-0.16 
(-1.17) 
-0.89* 
(-1.80) 
18.7 
24 0.12 
(1.18) 
-0.37*** 
(-2.45) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
15.3 
123 
 
Panel B: Money Volume 
 -0.22** 
(-2.09) 
-0.37*** 
(-3.24) 
-- 18.1 
6 -0.32*** 
(-4.54) 
-0.15* 
(-1.65) 
-1.70*** 
(-3.20) 
31.0 
12 -0.30*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.18 
(-1.51) 
-0.79* 
(-1.99) 
20.6 
24 -0.28 
(-3.85) 
-0.20* 
(-1.90) 
-0.46** 
(-2.04) 
20.9 
This table reports the regression results from the following: 
 NPR୧,୲ ൌ ߙ ൅  ȕ BB Dummy ൅ ȖPRሺkሻ୧,୲ 
Bull Market, BB, includes two periods: January 1999 to March 2000 and January 2004 to December 
2007. Bear market is from April 2000 to December 2003. NPR୲୧  is the NPR of aggregate insider 
trading activity in month t,  PRሺKሻ୧,୲  is the prior two year holding period return on market at time t. 
Each month starting from January 1999 to December 2007, I calculate the total numbers of (and the 
total Pound sterling volume) of insider purchases and sells. I then calculate the NPR by dividing the 
net aggregate number (volume) of insider purchases by the total aggregate number (volume) of 
insider transactions. I use 6, 12 and 24 –month prior returns. The Newey-West autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***,**,* represent significant at 1, 5 and 
10 percent level respectively.  
 
 
4.4.3 Predictability of post trade returns 
 
The previous section reports that insiders are contrarians. Here, it is tested whether 
the aggregate insider trading predicts future market returns. If insider trades are 
informative, a positive relationship between aggregate insider trading measure 
(NPR) and future market return is expected.  The following regression is estimated 
to examine the relationship between aggregate insider trading and return on market: ∏ ሺͳ ൅ RM,୩ ୲ାT௧ୀ௞ ሻ െ ∏ ൫ͳ ൅ R୤,୩൯ ൌ Ƚ ൅ Ⱦ NPR୲୲ାT୲ୀ୩ ൅ γPRʹ4୲     
 
Where, ܴM,୩ is the market return in month k, R୤,୩ is the monthly treasury bill rate in 
month k, NPR୲  is the NPR of aggregate insider trading activity in month t,  PRʹ4୲   is the prior two year holding period market return at time t. I include the 
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prior two year holding period return in the regressions to control for the fact that 
insiders are contrarians, following Lakonishok and Lee (2001). I also control for 
the momentum factor documented in previous studies, as stocks that perform the 
best (worst) over a 3 to 12 month period tend to continue to perform well (poorly) 
over the subsequent 3 to 12 months (Jagadeesh and Titman (2002)). I control for 
the fact that the current market return is affected by the previous market returns. By 
doing this, it would be possible to separate out the insider’s information from 
simple contrarian strategy/momentum effect.   
Table 4-4 reports the regression results for 3, 6, 9 and 12 months holding 
period. In contrast to my expectations, the coefficient of NPR is negative and 
significant in most regressions. For example, Panel A, Table 4-4 shows that the 
coefficient of NPR is -0.05 (t=-3.28) for 3-month holding period, which suggests 
that insider trading predicts stock prices, but I expect the coefficient of NPR to be 
positive, as purchases should lead to positive market reaction if insider trading 
signals future performance. For other holding periods, the results are qualitatively 
similar. I obtain similar results when I analyse money volume for holding period 3 
and 9, although, for holding period 6 and 12 the coefficient is not significant. The 
negative coefficient of NPR is in contrast with the earlier studies done in the US 
market where, for example, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find significant positive 
coefficient. The differences in the results may be related to institutional settings. In 
particular, since in the UK insider trades are disclosed shortly (up to 5 days) after 
their execution, their information content is likely to be compounded in stock 
prices in the short, rather than in the long run. 
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Table 4-4 Predictive Ability of Post-trade Returns 
Holding Period(months) Constant NPR PR24 ܴଶതതതത 
Panel A Number of  transactions    
3 -0.01(-1.11) -0.05 (-3.28) *** 0.03(0.79) 12.3
6 -0.02(-1.22) -0.07(-2.90) *** 0.04(0.59) 13.9
9 -0.03(-1.31) -0.11(-3.48)*** 0.02(0.22) 15.8
12 -0.05(-1.40) -0.14(-3.33) *** -0.01(-0.12) 14.4
     
Panel B Money Volume     
3 -0.02(-2.49) -0.04(-1.86)* 0.03(0.64) 8.0 
6 -0.04(-2.06) ** -0.05(-1.57) 0.05(0.56) 7.6 
9 -0.06(-1.87) * -0.07(-1.69) * 0.04(0.30) 5.9 
12 -0.07(-1.56) -0.07(-1.25) 0.02(0.14) 2.0 
This table reports the regression results from the following model. ∏ ሺͳ ൅ RM,୩ ୲ାT௧ୀ௞ ሻ െ ∏ ൫ͳ ൅ R୤,୩൯ ൌ Ƚ ൅ Ⱦ NPR୲୲ାT୲ୀ୩ ൅ γPRʹ4୲     
Where, ܴM,୩ is the return on market in month k, R୤,୩ is the monthly treasury bill rate in 
month k, NPR୲  is the NPR of aggregate insider trading activity in month t,  PRʹ4୲   is the 
prior two year holding period return on market at time t. Each month starting from January 
1999 to December 2007, I calculate the total numbers of (and the total Pound sterling 
volume) of insider purchases and sells. I then calculate the NPR by dividing the net 
aggregate number of insider purchases by the total aggregate number of insider 
transactions. I predict market returns for 3, 6, 9 and 12 month horizons. The Newey-West 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***,**,* 
represent significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.  
 
 
 
4.5 Event Period Returns 
4.5.1 Methodology 
 
The previous section provides evidence that insiders are contrarians at the 
aggregate basis. However, the aggregate insider trading measure cannot predict 
market returns. This section explores individual insider trades to examine the 
contrarian behavior and information content of insider trades. Daily net purchase 
ratios are used to define the individual insider trading signals. This study uses the 
standard event study methodology based on the market model (Brown and Warner 
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(1985)), with the parameters  and  computed over the estimation window [-240, 
-41] days relative to the event day to investigate the stock price reaction to 
directors’ trades. The event period is [-40, +40]. I use the FTSE All share index, 
which covers 800 UK listed firms (about 50% of the companies listed in the main 
market and more than 97% market value of equity), as the market index because 
my sample includes small as well as large firms. I define event dates as the dates 
when the insider trades are announced.46  
I use the univariate methodology, which includes tests of differences 
between bull-bear periods, to examine whether insiders time the market according 
to market conditions. Also, I form quintiles according to M/B ratios to test whether 
insiders buy undervalued shares, and sell overvalued shares and whether they time 
their trades.  A major difference between the current study and Rozeff and Zaman 
(1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) is in forming those quintiles. Rozeff and 
Zaman (1998) rank their companies into deciles each year by annual book-to-price 
ratios. Similarly, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) divide their sample into three book-
to-market (B/M) groups based on the B/M ratio at the end of April of each calendar 
year. The annual measures are not likely to be good proxies for market mispricing 
and timing by the insiders in the context of individual insider trades where the 
announcements are made daily. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) examine whether value 
and/or growth strategies adopted by insiders can earn different returns in the long 
run. However, in this thesis, my objective is to examine whether there is any 
significant difference in market reactions of insider trades in the short run in value 
                                                 
46 The date is the day the director’s transaction is released to the RNS.  
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and growth stocks, and for such an analysis, it is better to compute the M/B ratios 
closer to the insider trading dates to evaluate the extent to which the insider trading 
decision is driven by firm’s immediate past misvaluation. Therefore, I compute the 
market-to-book ratios 5 days just before the insider trading announcement dates to 
form M/B quintiles. M/B ratios for all trades are obtained for t-5 days’; the 
companies are sorted in quintiles each year by M/B ratios. Similar procedures are 
applied to form quintiles based on size. I calculate chi-square statistics to test 
whether the cumulative abnormal returns across quintiles are different. The chi-
square statistics is given by the following equation: 
߯ʹ ൌ ෍ ሺܥܣܴ௜௧௛ ௤௨௜௡௧௜௟௘ െ ܥܣܴ௢௩௘௥௔௟௟ሻߪ௜௧௛ ௤௨௜௡௧௜௟௘௡௜ୀଵ ଶ 
In a multivariate framework, a set of regressions are estimated to control for 
different variables. I follow Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) and Bozcuk and 
Lasfer (2005) in context of institutional trading, and control for firm size, level of 
over-(under)valuation as measured by M/B. I also include variables to account for 
stock and market volatility effects, following Grinblat and Keloharju (2001). 
According to Huddart and Ke (2006) the prior variance of stock price (i.e., a 
measure of the uncertainty surrounding firm value prior to the insider’s trade), and 
the magnitude of the mispricing affects insider trading. Also industry effects are 
controlled for following Jenter (2005).  Therefore, I estimate the following model 
seperately for the buy and sell trades: 
1 2 3 4
5 35
1 1
( ) /j j j j j
k j k j
k k
CAR Ln Size M B StockVol MktVol BBDum
Year Industry
     
  
     
    
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where, 
Ln(size)= Log of firm size measured as market value of equity 5 days before the 
trade 
M/B= Market-to-book ratio, where market value of equity is taken 5 days before 
the trade and the book value is the book value of equity at balance sheet date.  
Stock Vol= standard deviation of stock returns over -240 to-41 days. 
Mkt Vol= standard deviation of market returns over -240 to-41 days.  
BB Dum= Dummy equal to 1 for Bull Market 
Year=Year dummies 
Industry=Industry dummies 
4.5.2 Empirical Results 
 
4.5.2.1 Descritive Statistics and Information Content of Insider trades 
 
Table 4-5 presents the descriptive statistics and t-tests for differences in means. 
Panel A presents the mean differences for company fundamentals. I measure size 
as the market value of equity before 5 days of the trade, M/B as the market value to 
book value of equity before 5 days of the trades, Stock volatility as standard 
deviation of stock measured from -240 to -41 days window relative to the trade, 
and market volatility as standard deviation of market index over the same window. 
The results show strong differences between buy and sell trades. The average 
company size for buy and sell trades are different, and, a t-test of differences in 
means shows that they are statistically different. This is an early indication that the 
stocks insiders buy and they sell are different, which is consistent with previous 
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literature (for example, see Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). The average M/B is also 
different for buy and sell trades. Furthermore, the mean difference t-test shows that 
they are statistically different.  
Table 4-5, Panel B, reports event studies results. For the whole sample  the 
cumulative abnormal returns for buy trades over the pre-event periods [-40, -2] is 
negative and highly significant. In contrast, before the sell trades the abnormal 
returns are positive and significant. These trends are plotted in Figures 4-3 and 4-4. 
The results clearly indicate the contrarian strategies adopted by insiders, the impact 
of the trades on the announcement dates and post-trade performance.   
The event day return and post-event day returns for buy trades are positive 
and significant. In contrast, for the sell trades, the event day returns are negative, 
but not significant. Interestingly, the post-event day abnormal returns are not 
negative and not significant for sell trades.  After the buy trades, share prices 
recover to a certain extent. However, after the sell trades, share prices do not 
decline, rather the trend stops and share prices level off.  These results support the 
earlier findings that the buy trades convey information, but the sell trades are not 
informative (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). The t-test of differences in mean shows 
that the buy and sell trades are different.  
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Table 4-5 Descriptive Statistics and Market Reaction of Insider Trades 
 
 
Panel A: Fundamentals 
 Buy trades Sell trades (p Buy-sell) 
 Mean Median Mean Median  
Size (Market Cap) 5073.86 403.1 6817.81 403.34 0.02 
M/B 2.28 1.46 3.94 2.34 0.00 
Stock Volatility 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.019  
Market Volatility 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011  
Number of 
Observations 
26,268  7,723   
 
Panel B: Market Reaction of Insider trades 
 Buy trades Sell trades (p Buy-Sell) 
 Mean Median Mean Median  
CAR(-40,-2) -4.32*** 
(-15.37) 
-2.16 5.60*** 
(10.05) 
4.90 0.00 
CAR(-1,+1) 1.02*** 
(13.11) 
0.42 -0.13 
(-0.83) 
-0.17 0.00 
CAR(+2,+40) 2.13*** 
(7.59) 
2.04 0.24 
(0.44) 
0.64 0.00 
This table represents descriptive statistics of the companies in my sample and event study results. 
Panel A represents company fundamentals. Size is the market value of equity before 5 days of the 
trades, M/B is the market value to book value of equity before 5 days of the trades, Stock volatility 
is standard deviation of stock measured from -240 to -41 days window, and market volatility is 
standard deviation from market from the same window. Panel B presents cumulative average 
abnormal returns around directors’ share trading events computed using event study methodology. 
The market model coefficients  and  are estimated over days -240 to -41 relative to the event, 
with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. All results are reported relative to 
directors’ share trading announcement day, i.e., the date of the public announcement of directors’ 
share trading. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.1 level, respectively. 
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Figure 4-3 Excess Return of Insider Purchases 
Abnormal Return 
 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
 
 
 
The figure presents average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal returns, 
respectively around directors’ share trading events computed using event study 
methodology. The market model coefficients  and  are estimated over days -240 to -41 
relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. The full 
sample includes 33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268 
purchases and 7,723 sell trades. All results are reported relative to directors’ share trading 
announcement day, i.e., the date of the public announcement of directors’ share trading. 
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
-4
0
-3
7
-3
4
-3
1
-2
8
-2
5
-2
2
-1
9
-1
6
-1
3
-1
0 -7 -4 -1 2 5 8 1
1
1
4
1
7
2
0
2
3
2
6
2
9
3
2
3
5
3
8
-0.05
-0.045
-0.04
-0.035
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
-4
0
-3
7
-3
4
-3
1
-2
8
-2
5
-2
2
-1
9
-1
6
-1
3
-1
0 -7 -4 -1 2 5 8 1
1
1
4
1
7
2
0
2
3
2
6
2
9
3
2
3
5
3
8
132 
 
 
Figure 4-4 Excess Return of Insider Sells 
Abnormal return 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
The figure presents average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal returns, 
respectively around directors’ share trading events computed using event study 
methodology. The market model coefficients  and  are estimated over days -240 to -41 
relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. The full 
sample includes 33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268 
purchases and 7,723 sell trades. All results are reported relative to directors’ share trading 
announcement day, i.e., the date of the public announcement of directors’ share trading 
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Lakonishok and Lee (2001) note that the abnormal returns around the 
reporting dates are not economically meaningful, though, statistically significant. 
For example, they report abnormal returns of 0.13% and -0.23% for purchases and 
sells, respectively around reporting day. These results are in contrast with my 
results where I find abnormal returns of 1.02% and -0.13% for buy and sell trades, 
respectively. I find that the abnormal returns for the buy trades are statistically and 
economically significant when measured around announcement date. An important 
question is, why are the abnormal returns higher in the UK compared to the US? 
One possibility is that this may be due to the faster reporting practice in the UK 
market regarding insider's trade. In the UK, it can take up to 6 days for the 
information to be revealed to the market. In the US, insiders’ trades are announced 
at the earliest 10 days and at the latest 40 days after the transaction. Furthermore, 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and McConnell et al. (2005) argue that even after a 
trade has been reported, it takes few days for outsiders to obtain the information.  
A second reason why the UK CARs may be higher than those in the US is 
that, the UK insiders trade under certain trading restrictions (such as blackout 
period before earnings announcements), whereas in the US, regulation does not 
impose such trading bans. As a result, UK insiders trade less frequently, and, 
therefore, their transactions may contain more information. The third reason that 
might explain the differences in the market reaction related to the definition of 
insiders is much broader in the US compared to the UK.  In the US insiders include 
of officers (comparable to U.K. executives), directors (comparable to U.K. 
nonexecutives), and other key employees and large shareholders that own more 
than 10% of the firm’s stocks. Indeed, while in the U.K. insiders are defined as 
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executives and nonexecutives, U.S. insiders comprise (i) officers including the 
company president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, and any 
vice president in charge of any principal business unit, division, or function 
(Fidrmuc et al. (2006)), (ii) directors and other persons who perform a policy-
making function within the company (Bettis et al. (2000)), as well as (iii) other key 
employees. It is plausible that some insiders (key employees and large 
shareholders) may have less inside information than officers or directors.  Thus, 
given more the wide-ranging definition of insiders in the US, I expect that US 
insider trades are less informative and hence the price reaction is smaller. 
4.5.2.2 Market Sentiment and Price Impact of Insider Trades: 
Univariate Results 
 
This study examines price impact asymmetry and hence test for market timing by 
splitting the sample period into bull (01/1999 to 03/2000 and 01/2004 to 12/2007) 
and bear (04/2000 to 12/2003) periods. It is found that the behaviour of share prices 
following buy and sell trades does not depend on the market conditions (Table 4-
6). The mean difference t-tests show that behaviour of CAR’s over different event 
windows are not significantly different. The only exception to this is: buy trades 
over the estimation window [-40,-2] in bull and bear market show significant 
differences. My results are in line with Korczak and Lasfer (2009), who find that 
the behaviour of share prices following buy and sell trades does not depend on 
market conditions. These findings are in contrast with Chiyachantana et al. (2004) 
who assert that in a bull market, suppliers of liquidity are suspicious of buy orders, 
and run up the prices in the face of a strong buying interest.  
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Table 4-6 Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Different Market Condition 
Event window Full Sample Bear Period Bull Period P Bear-Bull 
 Panel A: Buy 
 
No of observations 26,268 
 
10,274 15,994  
-40,-2 -4.32*** 
(-15.37) 
 
-5.53*** 
(-13.87) 
-3.14*** 
(-7.39) 
0.00 
-1,+1 1.02*** 
(13.11) 
 
1.12*** 
(10.14) 
0.92*** 
(7.83) 
0.41 
+2,+40 2.13*** 
(7.59) 
2.23*** 
(5.60) 
2.03*** 
(4.77) 
0.71 
 Panel B: Sell 
 
No of observations 7,723 
 
2,312 5,411  
-40,-2 5.60*** 
(10.05) 
 
5.06*** 
(7.12) 
6.11*** 
(8.17) 
0.27 
-1,+1 -0.13 
(-0.83) 
 
-0.26 
(-1.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
0.39 
+2,+40 0.24 
(0.44) 
0.76 
(1.08) 
-0.26 
(-0.35) 
0.20 
The table presents cumulative average abnormal returns around directors’ share trading 
events computed using event study methodology. The market model coefficients  and  
are estimated over days -240 to -41 relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Index as the 
proxy for market portfolio. The full sample includes 33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664 listed 
companies, split into 26,268 purchases and 7,723 sell trades. All results are reported 
relative to directors’ share trading announcement day, i.e., the date of the public 
announcement of directors’ share trading. The bull period covers from January 1999 to 
March 2000 and January 2004 to December 2007 and the bear period covers April 2000 to 
December 2003. The last column represents the p-values from mean difference t-test. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
level, respectively. 
 
 
Chiyachantana et al. (2004) assert that suppliers of liquidity are not so cautious 
about the institutional sell orders in a bullish environment and do not run down 
prices so much when they face a selling interests. In bearish markets the situation is 
exactly the opposite. In bullish market buys have a bigger price impact, and in 
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bearish markets sells have a bigger price impact. I find evidence which is almost 
the other way round. The absolute magnitude of CARs for buy trades in bear 
periods are higher than the bull period trades [-5.53 vs -3.14, 1.12 vs 0.92, 2.23 vs 
2.03 over the event window (-40,-2), (-1, +1), (+2, +40) respectively]. The only 
evidence which is consistent with Chiyachantana et al. (2004) is the absolute 
magnitude of CAR of sell trade in the bear period, which is higher than sell trade [-
0.26 vs -0.001 over the event window (-1, +1)]. However, in both the cases, buy 
and sell trades, I did not find any significant difference in price response in bull and 
bear periods.  
4.5.2.3 Market-to-book Quintiles: Univariate Analysis 
 
The previous section examines price impact asymmetry in bull (bear) markets. This 
section assesses whether there are any connections between company fundamentals 
and the timing of insider trades. By following Rozeff and Zaman (1998), 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005), I hypothesize that insiders 
perceptions of fundamental value diverge systematically from market valuations, 
and the perceived mispricing is an important determinant of the insiders decision 
making. The tests in this section are also consistent with value strategies, where 
investors buy low M/B stocks, which have performed poorly in the past and sell 
stocks with high M/B which performed well in the past. 
In recent years, value strategies have attracted much academic attention. De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) argue that extreme losers outperform the market 
over the subsequent several years. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991), and 
137 
 
Fama and French (1992) show that stocks with high earnings/price ratios earn 
higher returns. Certain types of value strategies, then, appear to have beaten the 
market. It is also possible that value strategies generate higher returns because they 
are contrarian to usual strategies followed by other investors (Lakonishok, Shliefer 
and Vishny (1994)). In this section, I analyse whether the superior returns of 
insiders’ trade are due to value strategies, or as a result of insider's private 
information.  
This study tests the hypothesis that insiders buy (sell) shares in their own 
company if they perceive that their company is under- (over-) valued. I analyse the 
short-term abnormal returns in the pre-trade (-40, -2) and post-event (+2, +40) 
periods. I then split the sample into quintiles based on each firm’s market-to-book 
ratios of the companies. The market-to-book is taken prior 5 days to the trade, to 
capture the decisions taken by the insiders. If their decision to trade based on 
market-to-book, it should be as close as possible to the announcement date of the 
trade, not the beginning of the year, as done in  previous studies (e.g. see Rozeff 
and Zaman (1998), and Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). Low (high) M/B companies 
are expected to generate higher (lower) abnormal returns in the post-trade periods, 
if insider trading signals under- (over-) valuation, and the market revalues these 
companies after the trade. The pre-event return will be higher as we move from low 
M/B to high M/B quintile. On the other hand, the event and post event returns will 
be smaller as we move from low to high M/B quintile. 
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Table 4-7 Distribution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Market-to-Book 
 Market to Book Quintiles   
 Low 2 3 4 High P
 High-
Low 
)5(2  
 Panel A: Buy 
 
-40,-2 -7.18*** 
(-11.87) 
 
-6.82*** 
(-12.02) 
-4.58*** 
(-7.06) 
-1.76*** 
(-3.03) 
-1.11 
(-1.59) 
0.00 82.06*** 
-1,+1 1.41*** 
(8.43) 
 
0.97*** 
(6.16) 
0.83*** 
(4.61) 
0.78*** 
(4.86) 
1.01*** 
(5.33) 
0.38 7.17 
+2,+40 3.46*** 
(5.72) 
3.08*** 
(5.42) 
1.33** 
(2.06) 
1.95*** 
(3.34) 
0.79 
(1.08) 
0.00 12.43** 
 Panel B: Sell 
 
-40,-2 3.30*** 
(2.57) 
 
4.70*** 
(4.10) 
5.64*** 
(5.40) 
6.88*** 
(6.83) 
7.33*** 
(6.35) 
0.01 7.72 
-1,+1 -0.07 
(-0.19) 
 
0.14 
(0.46) 
0.09 
(0.33) 
-0.37 
(-1.36) 
-0.44 
(-1.39) 
0.37 2.83 
+2,+40 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.99 
(0.95) 
-0.60 
(-0.61) 
0.22 
(0.19) 
0.89 1.18 
The table represents cumulative average abnormal returns around directors’ share trading 
by using the event study methodology. The market model coefficients  and  are 
estimated over days -240 to -41 relative to the event date, with FTSE All Share Index as 
the proxy for market portfolio. The full sample includes 33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664  
listed companies, split into 26,268 purchases and 7,723 sells. All results are reported 
relative to directors’ share trading announcement day, i.e., the date of the public 
announcement of directors’ share trading. The market-to-book quintiles were formed 5 
days before the announcement dates. If I define t as the event date then I use t-5 days’ M/B 
ratio to form quintiles based on the M/B ratio. In forming the quintiles I first sort the CARs 
by year according to Market-to-book ratio. Each year I then sort the CARs in quintiles by 
market-to-book ratio. Finally, I sort them based in quintiles. In doing so, I have removed 
the year effect from M/B quintiles. P high-low reports the p value of mean difference test 
between CAR’s from highest M/B versus lowest market-to-book quintiles. The last column 
reports chi-square test for differences in means across market-to-book quintiles. t-statistics 
are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, 
respectively. 
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Figure 4-5Abnormal returns of insider purchases by growth quintiles 
 
Figure 4-6 Abnormal returns of insider sells by growth quintiles 
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The analysis of M/B quintiles show evidence of signalling over- (under-) 
valuation (Table 4-7, Panel A and Figure 4-5). Low M/B companies (value stocks) 
are companies that are undervalued. I expect insiders in these companies to signal 
undervaluation when they purchase shares, resulting in positive post-event 
abnormal returns.  As expected, for buy trades, as we move from low M/B to high 
M/B stocks, the post event abnormal returns are getting smaller. For example, the 
CAR for quintile 1 is 3.46 (t=5.72) and for quintile 5 is 0.79 (t=1.08) in the post 
event window. The mean difference t-test indicates that quintile 1 is statistically 
different from quintile 5. Also, the chi-square test for differences among the means 
reject equality of means. The pre-event returns also show results which were 
expected. As we move from low M/B to high M/B stocks, the pre event abnormal 
returns are larger. The mean of ‘value’ (low M/B) and ‘glamour’ (high M/B) stocks 
are different. Moreover, the chi-square test shows differences among the mean. 
When insiders buy in low M/B companies, the immediate price reaction of trades 
and price recovery is much higher, compared to high M/B companies. This is 
consistent with value strategies.   
In contrast, high M/B stocks are glamour stocks, which are likely to be 
over-valued. The post-sell trades’ abnormal returns in these companies should be 
negative. Table 4-7, Panel B and Figure 4-6 show that for sell trades do not show 
very strong evidence of signalling over-valuation. Only, the pre-event window 
CARs show some evidence of insiders’ systematic trading based on their 
perceptions about the company. For example, the CARs are getting higher as we 
move from value stocks to glamour stocks in the pre-event period, which is 
consistent with theory. There are also differences in mean between value and 
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glamour stocks. However, the chi-square test does not indicate that there are 
significant differences among the quintiles. The event-day and post-event day 
returns are not fully consistent with predictions. None of the CARs across the M/B 
quintiles are statistically significant. The mean difference t-test is not significant 
and the chi-square test shows there are no significant differences among the means. 
Overall, insiders sell after a significant rise in prices and the trend stops after they 
sell. It suggests weak evidence of timing. Therefore, my results suggest that 
insiders are able to time their trades, but they are not fully capable of changing the 
perception of the market regarding the full value of their companies. The results 
provide partial support for the proposition insiders follow growth strategies when 
they sell their shares.  
4.5.2.4 Size Quintiles: Univariate Results 
 
Table 4-8, Panel A and Figure 4-7 show the univariate results on size quintiles. The 
results show that there is evidence of market timing by the insiders for small 
stocks. If managers have timing abilities in small companies, I expect the pre-event 
cumulative abnormal returns to be higher as we move from small to large 
companies. Also, the event and post-event abnormal returns will be lower as we 
move from small to large companies.  In case of buy trades, the pre-event returns 
do not increase as expected, but the signs are as predicted. For instance, for 
smallest size quintile CAR is -2.25 (t= -2.69) compared to -2.93 (t= -4.87) for large 
size quintile stocks. The mean difference t-test between small and large companies 
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is statistically insignificant, but the chi-square test for the differences in means for 
different quintiles is highly significant.   
 
Table 4-8 Distribution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Size 
 Size Quintiles   
 Small 2 3 4 Large P
 small-large )5(2  
 Panel A: Buy 
 
-40,-2 -2.25*** 
(-2.69) 
 
-4.89*** 
(-7.53) 
-7.79*** 
(-12.42) 
-3.76*** 
(-6.75) 
-2.93*** 
(-4.87) 
0.53 43.79*** 
-1,+1 3.02*** 
(13.03) 
 
1.22*** 
(6.77) 
0.76*** 
(4.37) 
0.15 
(1.03) 
-0.12 
(-0.70) 
0.00 156.47*** 
+2,+40 2.95*** 
(3.52) 
 
3.47*** 
(5.34) 
2.36*** 
(3.76) 
0.94* 
(1.68) 
0.48 
(0.81) 
0.00 57.33*** 
 Panel B: Sell 
 
-40,-2 4.62*** 
(3.40) 
 
5.65*** 
(6.14) 
6.67*** 
(6.25) 
5.58*** 
(4.54) 
5.45*** 
(5.76) 
0.58 1.55 
-1,+1 0.20 
(0.53) 
 
-0.44 
(-1.73) 
-0.28 
(-0.95) 
0.28 
(0.82) 
-0.40 
(1.54) 
0.27 5.02 
+2,+40 3.00** 
(2.21) 
-0.83 
(-0.89) 
-0.08 
(-0.08) 
-0.46 
(-0.38) 
-0.42 
(-0.45) 
0.00 6.39 
The above table represents cumulative average abnormal returns around directors’ share 
trading by using event study methodology. The market model coefficients  and  are 
estimated over days -220 to -41 relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Index as the 
proxy for market portfolio. The full sample includes 33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664  
listed companies, split into 26,268 purchases and 7,723 sells. All results are reported 
relative to directors’ share trading announcement day, i.e., the date of the public 
announcement of directors’ share trading. The size quintiles were formed 5 days before the 
announcement dates. If I define t as event date then I use t-5 days’ size to form quintiles 
based on the size. In forming the quintiles CARs are first sorted by year according to size. 
Each year CARs are then sorted in quintiles by size. Finally, they are sorted in quintiles. 
By doing so, the year effect from Market-to-book quintiles has been removed. P small-large 
reports the p value of mean difference test between CARs from highest market-to-book 
versus lowest market-to-book quintiles. The last column reports chi-square test for 
differences in means across size quintiles. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * 
denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. 
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Figure 4-7 Abnormal returns of insider purchases by size quintiles 
 
 
Figure 4-8 Abnormal returns of insider sells by size quintiles 
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In terms of event and post-event CARs the results are in line with 
expectations.  For example, the event day CARs are gradually declining as we 
move from small to large companies (3.02, 1.22, 0.76, 0.15 and -0.12 respectively 
with the latter two not being statistically significant).  The post-event CARs also 
show similar patterns (2.95, 3.47, 2.36, 0.94, 0.48 respectively, with all significant 
except the last one). The mean difference t-test between small and large companies 
shows significance at 1% level for event day and post-event abnormal returns. The 
evidence is substantiated by the chi-square test which shows that there is 
significant difference across the means over the different quintiles for both event-
day and post-event returns. Overall, the results support the proposition that insiders 
buy stock after a significant price decline, that after purchases share price recovers, 
and that this behaviour is more pronounced in the case of small stocks.  
The results for the sell trades do not show very strong evidence of market 
timing in the case of small companies (Table 4-8, Panel B and Figure 4-8). Only 
the pre-event window CARs show some mixed evidence of managers’ systematic 
trading based on their perceptions about the company. For example, the CARs are 
getting higher as we move from quintile 1 to quintile 3 and then decline again. 
There are also no significant differences in mean between small and large stocks. 
The chi-square test indicates that the differences across the quintiles is not 
statistically significant. The event-day and post-event day returns are not fully 
consistent with predictions. None of the CARs across the size quintiles are 
statistically significant, except the post-event return for quintile 1. The mean 
difference t-test is not significant for event-day returns and the chi-square test 
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shows that there are no significant differences among the means. Overall, insiders 
sell after a significant rise in prices and the trend stops after they sell. This shows 
weak evidence of timing. Therefore, the results indicate that insiders are able to 
time their buy trades but not sell trades in the case of small companies. This is 
consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who find that insiders timing ability is 
much pronounced in small stocks.  
My results are in line with the view that insider trading in small companies 
conveys more information as abnormal returns are higher for small companies 
compared to large ones. For instance, Lakonishok and Lee (2001), in the context of 
US, find that the abnormal returns are higher for small stocks while there is no 
immediate market reaction for large stocks. In the context of UK, similar findings 
were reported in Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis (1994) who find that the 
abnormal returns are concentrated in smaller firms. Gregory, Matatko and Tonks 
(1997) conclude that the variable size can be of fundamental importance in an 
event study where a large number of smaller companies are included in the sample. 
These results are consistent with higher information asymmetry for small firms 
(e.g., Aboody and Lev (2000) and the view that small firms are risky (e., g., Fama 
and French (1993)).   
4.5.2.5 M/B and Size Sorting of Abnormal Returns 
 
This section provides two-way sorting based on M/B and size. The purpose of two-
way sorting is to examine the effect of M/B and size simultaneously. Jenter (2005) 
shows that insiders trade in US hardly convey any information after controlling for 
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M/B and size. I examine in this section whether this is the case in UK. I find 
interesting results. In the case of buy trades, most of the results in earlier analysis 
were driven by small companies and low M/B companies (Table 4-9). For 
example, the event period returns show that all the returns across M/B quintiles are 
significant only for small company quintile. None of the event period returns are 
significant for big company quintile. Also, the post-event returns are significant in 
small company quintile and all the post-event returns are insignificant in large 
company quintile.  
For example, the event-day return for largest company quintile and largest 
M/B quintile is even negative (-0.58, t = - 0.98). The post-event return for the 
largest company and high M/B quintile is also negative (-0.31, t=-0.23). These 
results are consistent with earlier findings in the context of US that most of the 
insider returns are not indistinguishable from zero, once the size and M/B effects 
are controlled for.  However, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that the abnormal 
returns around the reporting dates do not depend on size or M/B. I find that the 
reporting period abnormal returns are directly related to M/B and size. My results 
are consistent with the view that smaller companies are associated with more 
information asymmetry and hence the market reaction is higher. Smaller companies 
are  also more risky, which may yield higher return when insiders trade.   
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Table 4-9 Distribution of Abnormal Returns of Buy Trades by Size & M/B 
Low M/B 2 3 4 High M/B
  Pre-trade Returns (-40,-2)
Small 
 
-4.65*** 
(-3.62) 
-4.83*** 
(-3.52)
-3.62** 
(-2.34)
-3.40** 
(-2.04)
-0.32 
(-0.15) 
2 
 
-12.82*** 
(-5.56) 
-13.32*** 
(-6.30)
-6.44*** 
(-3.63)
-5.02** 
(-2.13)
0.29 
(0.14) 
3 
 
-7.62*** 
(-4.08) 
-4.82*** 
(-2.73)
-6.87*** 
(-3.19)
-7.18*** 
(-3.68)
-0.73 
(-0.36) 
4 
 
-9.09*** 
(-4.57) 
-5.75*** 
(-2.55)
-1.95 
(-0.86)
-2.26 
(-0.96)
-2.17 
(-1.32) 
Big 
 
-1.68 
(-0.25) 
-14.91*** 
(-3.54)
-3.64 
(-1.53)
-1.05 
(-0.62)
-2.06 
(-1.09) 
Event day Returns (-1,+1)
Small 
 
1.92*** 
(4.80) 
2.35*** 
(5.48)
2.35*** 
(4.87)
1.90*** 
(4.87)
4.13*** 
(6.04) 
2 
 
1.38** 
(1.91) 
0.88 
(1.33)
0.65 
(1.18)
1.20* 
(1.64)
2.54*** 
(3.80) 
3 
 
1.10* 
(1.87) 
0.52 
(0.94)
-0.49 
(-0.73)
0.20 
(0.32)
0.45 
(0.72) 
4 
 
0.43 
(0.69) 
-1.68** 
(-2.38)
0.33 
(0.47)
0.44 
(0.59)
0.22 
(0.43) 
Big 
 
3.16 
(1.53) 
0.09 
(0.07)
-0.31 
(-0.41)
0.06 
(0.12)
-0.58 
(-0.98) 
Post-trade Returns (+2,+40)
Small 
 
4.66*** 
(5.11) 
2.49** 
(2.55)
1.98* 
(1.80)
2.07* 
(1.74)
3.12** 
(2.01) 
2 
 
5.23*** 
(3.19) 
7.07*** 
(4.70)
0.67 
(0.53)
1.80 
(1.07)
1.64 
(1.08) 
3 
 
3.58*** 
(2.69) 
1.49 
(1.18)
2.05 
(1.34)
3.45 
(2.49)
-1.73 
(-1.22) 
4 
 
-0.66 
(-0.47) 
1.57 
(0.98)
1.07 
(0.66)
1.60 
(0.96)
1.56 
(1.33) 
Big 
 
1.34 
(0.29) 
7.13** 
(2.38)
0.43 
(0.25)
0.96 
(0.79)
-0.31 
(-0.23) 
The above table represents cumulative average abnormal returns around directors’ share trading by 
using event study methodology. The market model coefficients  and  are estimated over days -
220 to -41 relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. The 
full sample includes 33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268 purchases 
and 7,723 sells. All results are reported relative to directors’ share trading announcement day, i.e., 
the date of the public announcement of directors’ share trading. The M/B and size quintiles were 
formed 5 days before the announcement dates. If I define t as event date, then I use t-5 days’ M/B 
and size to form quintiles based on M/B and size. In forming the quintiles the CARs were first by 
year according to M/B and size. Each year then the CARs were sorted in quintiles first by M/B and 
then by size. By doing so, the year effect have been removed from quintiles. T-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively 
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Table 4-10 Distribution of Abnormal Returns of Sell Trades by M/B and Size 
Low M/B 2 3 4 High M/B 
Pre-trade Returns (-40,-2)
Small 
 
3.83** 
(2.51) 
2.91 
(1.05)
4.01 
(1.60)
2.59 
(1.00)
0.11 
(0.02) 
2 
 
7.67*** 
(4.94) 
1.21 
(0.56)
10.60** 
(2.40)
1.39 
(0.47)
0.48 
(0.14) 
3 
 
3.82** 
(2.02) 
3.84 
(1.55)
10.40*** 
(3.10)
5.32** 
(2.18)
8.03** 
(3.43) 
4 
 
10.66*** 
(3.99) 
7.44*** 
(3.49)
3.85 
(1.20)
7.56*** 
(3.90)
3.20 
(1.22) 
Big 
 
4.23 
(1.42) 
9.52*** 
(3.95)
7.97*** 
(4.52)
7.22*** 
(3.38)
4.17 
(1.06) 
Event day Returns (-1,+1)
Small 
 
-0.45 
(-0.94) 
0.50 
(0.57)
-0.08 
(-0.10)
0.80 
(0.98)
-1.32 
(0.90) 
2 
 
0.27 
(0.56) 
0.14 
(0.21)
-1.90 
(-1.37)
0.51 
(0.55)
0.31 
(0.29) 
3 
 
0.79 
(1.33) 
-0.75 
(-0.97)
0.04 
(0.03)
0.63 
(0.83)
-0.67 
(-0.91) 
4 
 
-1.03 
(-1.23) 
-0.61 
(-0.92)
0.03 
(0.03)
0.01 
(0.01)
-0.37 
(-0.44) 
Big 
 
0.16 
(0.17) 
-0.33 
(-0.44)
-0.43 
(-0.77)
-0.80 
(-1.19)
-0.66 
(-0.54) 
Post-trade Returns (+2,+40)
Small 
 
1.80 
(1.39) 
-0.30 
(-0.13)
-0.83 
(-0.39)
-4.77** 
(-2.16)
4.25 
(0.90) 
2 
 
1.90 
(1.44) 
1.28 
(0.69)
-1.51 
(-0.40)
-2.43 
(-0.96)
-2.19 
(-0.77) 
3 
 
-1.02 
(-0.63) 
2.04 
(0.97)
-0.28 
(-0.10)
3.54* 
(1.70)
1.41 
(0.71) 
4 
 
-1.76 
(-0.77) 
-1.04 
(-0.57)
2.40 
(0.88)
-0.43 
(-0.26)
-1.20 
(-0.54) 
Big 
 
5.19** 
(2.04) 
-1.07 
(-0.52)
-2.31 
(-1.54)
1.43 
(0.78)
3.58 
(1.08) 
The above table represents cumulative average abnormal returns around directors’ share trading by 
using event study methodology. The market model coefficients  and  are estimated over days -
220 to -41 relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for market portfolio. The 
full sample includes 33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268 purchases 
and 7,723 sells. All results are reported relative to directors’ share trading announcement day, i.e., 
the date of the public announcement of directors’ share trading. The M/B and size quintiles were 
formed 5 days before the announcement dates. If I define t as event date, then I use t-5 days’ M/B 
and size to form quintiles based on M/B and size. In forming the quintiles the CARs were first by 
year according to M/B and size. Each year then the CARs were sorted in quintiles first by M/B and 
then by size. By doing so, the year effect have been removed from quintiles. T-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively 
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4.5.2.6 Cross Sectional Variation in Abnormal Returns 
 
This section runs cross-sectional regressions to control for a number of factors 
simultaneously. The overall results of univariate analysis show that insiders buy 
(sell) undervalued (overvalued) stocks as measured by M/B and find evidence of 
market timing in the purchase of small company stocks. In particular, as we move 
from low to high M/B quintile and small to large quintile the pre-event, event and 
post-event abnormal return varies. Clearly, these provide evidence that the 
abnormal returns vary with M/B and size.  Thus the same variables are used in the 
regressions for the pre-, post- and event day abnormal returns. It is also standard in 
the literature to control for M/B and size effects (for example, see Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005)). Also variables are included to account for stock and 
market volatility effects following Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001).  
In order to isolate the pure cross-sectional component of the M/B  and size 
effect on insider trading,  a set of regressions are estimated using the whole sample 
period from 1999 to 2007. The M/B effects are negative and signifiacnt in case of 
buy trades, suggesting that managers buy undervalued stocks (Table 4-11). These 
results are consistent with the M/B quntile analysis. Therefore, it appears that 
insider  trading decisions  are related to relative market valuations. I also examine 
the effect of size in market timing by insiders. The coefficient is negative and 
significant for the buy trades, which is consistent with the evidence that insiders try 
to time the market in case of small companies. In the case of buy trades, the stock 
volitility and market volitility are positive and significant in most cases, suggesting 
that risky stocks earn higher returns, and high market volitility is related to higher 
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returns. This is consistent with Huddart and Ke (2006), who assert that for 
companies where information assymetry is higher, the abnormal return is higher. 
Overall, the results suggest that insiders time their buy trades. 
Table 4-11 Regression Results: Buy Trades 
 Buy Trades 
 CAR-40,-2 CAR-1,+1 CAR+2,+40 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.103*** 
(-2.66) 
 
-0.048 
(-1.03) 
0.003 
(0.79) 
-0.005 
(-0.37) 
0.003 
(0.11) 
-0.085*** 
(-2.39) 
Ln (Size) -0.002 
(-0.88) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.79) 
-0.003*** 
(-5.27) 
-0.003*** 
(-5.09) 
-0.004** 
(-2.23) 
-0.004** 
(-2.23) 
Market to book -0.001 
(-0.15) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.42) 
-0.001* 
(-1.94) 
-0.003* 
(-2.36) 
-0.007 
(-1.61) 
-0.007* 
-(1.80) 
Stock Volatility -0.750 
(-1.43) 
 
-0.79 
(-1.53) 
0.518*** 
(4.80) 
0.510*** 
(3.13) 
0.840*** 
(2.52) 
0.789*** 
(2.36) 
Market Volatility 0.21*** 
(4.52) 
 
0.89*** 
(2.52) 
0.353 
(0.60) 
0.838 
(1.06) 
0.29*** 
(3.17) 
0.523*** 
(5.42) 
BB Dummy 0.038*** 
(4.29) 
 
-- 0.001 
(0.44) 
-- 0.008 
(1.25) 
-- 
Industry Dummy Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Year Dummy -- 
 
Yes -- Yes -- Yes 
R2adjusted 0.06 
 
0.06 0.053 0.053 0.042 0.033 
F (Probability) 6.55 (0.00) 6.15(0.00) 5.72 (0.00) 5.40(0.00) 3.53(0.00) 3.73(0.00) 
The above table reports the regression results using the following model. 
 
1 2 3 4
5 35
1 1
( ) /j j j j j
k j k j
k k
CAR Ln Size M B StockVol MktVol BBDum
Year Industry
     
  
     
    
where, ,j tCAR  is the CAR of insider trades for the (-40,-2), (-1,+1) and (+2,+40) event 
windows. Model 1 is the model with bull (bear) dummy and industry dummy and model 2 
is model with year dummy and industry dummy. Ln(size)  is the log of size of the company 
measured as market value of equity, M/B  is the market-to-book ratio. It is standard in the 
insider trading literature to control for size and M/B. For instance, Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) found that after controlling for size and market-to-book effects the magnitude of 
abnormal performance declines. Stock Vol  is volatility of stock measured by standard 
deviation over 180 days prior to the event and  Mkt Vol is volitility of market measured by 
standard deviation over the same estimation period. The BB dummy is one if the trade is 
from bull period (January 1999 to March 2000 and January 2004 to December 2007) and 
151 
 
zero otherwise. White heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics is reported in parenthesis. 
The last row reports F-statistics with p-values in the parenthesis next to it. ***, ** and * 
indicates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 4-12 Regression Results: Sell Trades. 
 Sell Trades 
 CAR-40,-2 CAR-1,+1 CAR+2,+40 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 0.105*** 
(3.05) 
 
0.103*** 
(2.94) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
0.002 
(0.29) 
-0.052* 
(-1.76) 
-0.048* 
(-1.89) 
Ln (Size) -0.002 
(-0.64) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.72) 
-0.005 
(-0.84) 
-0.006 
(-0.74) 
-0.004*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.004** 
(-2.25) 
Market to book 0.001 
(1.44) 
 
0.001 
(1.55) 
-0.001 
(-0.57) 
-0.003 
(-0.64) 
0.002* 
(1.74) 
0.001* 
(1.65) 
Stock Volatility 0.594* 
(1.77) 
 
0.601* 
(1.68) 
0.075 
(0.25) 
0.073 
(0.31) 
0.553 
(0.54) 
0.353 
(0.46) 
Market Volatility -0.856* 
(-1.85) 
 
-0.921* 
(-1.72) 
0.414 
(0.45) 
0.264 
(0.41) 
0.852*** 
(4.54) 
0.912*** 
(4.52) 
BB Dummy 0.005 
(0.44) 
 
-- 0.003 
(0.57) 
-- 0.002 
(0.52) 
-- 
Industry Dummy Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy -- 
 
Yes  -- Yes -- Yes 
R2adjusted 0.025 
 
0.021 0.035 0.020 0.022 0.022 
F (Probability) 3.64 (0.00) 3.55(0.00) 0.46 (0.81) 0.38(0.85) 5.06 (0.00) 4.59 (0.00) 
The above table reports the regression results using the following model. 
 
1 2 3 4
5 35
1 1
( ) /j j j j j
k j k j
k k
CAR Ln Size M B StockVol MktVol BBDum
Year Industry
     
  
     
    
where, ,j tCAR  is the CAR of insider trades for the (-40,-2), (-1,+1) and (+2,+40) event 
windows. Model 1 is the model with bull (bear) dummy and industry dummy and model 2 
is model with year dummy and industry dummy. Ln(size)  is the log of size of the company 
measured as market value of equity, M/B  is the market-to-book ratio. Stock Vol  is 
volatility of stock measured by standard deviation over 180 days prior to the event and  
Mkt Vol is volitility of market measured by standard deviation over the same estimation 
period. The BB dummy is one if the trade is from bull period (January 1999 to March 2000 
and January 2004 to December 2007) and zero otherwise. White heteroscedasticity 
consistent t-statistics is reported in parenthesis. The last row reports F-statistics with p-
values in the parenthesis next to it. ***, ** and * indicates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
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In the case of sell trades, the coefficient of M/B is positive but not 
significant (Table 4-12). The sign is consistent with the predictions suggesting that 
insiders sell overvalued stocks. The sign of size is negative in all equations but it is 
only significant in case of CAR(+2,+40). The negative sign is consistent with the 
finding in univariate size quintile analysis. Stock volatility is significant in case of 
CAR(-40,-2) only. Market volitility is significant in all the equations. Overall, the 
results suggest that M/B and size significantly affect market reaction of insider 
trading.  
Finally, the documented pattern of insider purchases and sells across M/B 
quintiles and size quintiles could be due to some omitted variable measuring an 
unobserved heterogeneity across the firms in different quintiles. One crude measure 
of heterogeneity across the firms is the industry in which it operates. It is well 
established that the market-to-book ratios in the same industry tend to move 
together and that several industries are characterized by extreme valuations. Some 
particular businesses need huge amount of investment, and the size of the 
companies of that particular industry can be larger than others. To determine 
whether the market-to-book and size effect on insider trading is simply an industry 
effect, I incoporate industry dummies in the regressions. To assess whether the 
results are not time dependent, I also include year dummies in my regressions.  In 
none of the cases the industry dummies or year dummies are significant, suggesting 
that results are not driven by industry or any particular year.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
This study employs a unique data set to test whether insiders time their trades or 
not. I examine first whether insider trading is related to market sentiment as 
measured by bull (bear) market. Previous studies on insider trading almost 
unanimously find that insiders are contrarians. This research tests whether insiders 
use market sentiment to act like contrarians. The aggregate insider trading activity 
shows a relationship between market timing by insiders, and market sentiment as 
measured by bull (bear) periods. This provides evidence that insiders use market 
sentiment as a platform to act like contrarians. However, I did not find any 
significant difference in price response in bull and bear periods. 
This study documents that the magnitude of the abnormal returns of insider 
trades is higher in the UK compared to the US, in line with Fidrmuc et al. (2006). I 
provide several explanations for the greater market reactions of UK insider trades. 
There is a considerable difference in institutional settings and insider trading 
regulations between the UK compared to the US and I attribute the greater market 
reaction in the UK to these factors. It is possible that the wide-ranging group of 
insiders in the US may have less information compared to executive and non-
executive directors in the UK. Also, in the US, insider trading is disclosed in the 
market between 10 and 40 days compared to a maximum of 6 days in the UK.  
This study then examines whether there are any relationships between 
company fundamentals and timing of insider trades, as addressed in Rozeff and 
Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005). Insiders tend to buy 
stocks with poor past performance, and those that are cheap according to the 
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measures, such as M/B. They tend to purchase value stocks which underperform in 
the past, and sell glamour stocks which perform well in the past. The results 
suggest that insiders tend to have contrarian views with regard to their own 
company’s stock. Their disagreements with the market are not randomly distributed 
across firms, but seem instead to be described by insiders in low valuation firms 
evaluating their stocks as undervalued and insiders in high valuation firms 
evaluating their stocks as overvalued. Therefore, it appears that the perception of 
mispricing is an important factor behind the market timing behaviour by the 
corporate insiders.  
Consistent with the previous literature, the ability of insiders to time their 
trades is not uniform across all market capitalization groups. Insiders have a 
relative advantage in timing in the case of small stocks than large stocks. Also, 
results show that insider purchases are useful, while sells are not associated with 
low returns. Insiders have many reasons to sell shares but the main reason to buy 
shares is to make money; the results are consistent with this view. The evidence 
that price does not decline after sell trades implies that the party who bought the 
shares is not hurt by the sell trades of insiders. Thus, this should not be a cause of 
great regulatory concern.   
The results call into question as to whether insiders are able to earn excess 
returns with their trades once the size and M/B effects are controlled for. Recent 
insider trading literature confirms the finding that most excess returns to insider 
trades can be explained by the size and M/B effects, and suggests that the 
economically significant excess returns in older studies is due to the lack of control 
for these observable firm characteristics (Jenter, 2005). The most comprehensive 
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study of insider trading by Lakonishok and Lee (2001) shows that most of the 
return predictability through insider trades vanishes once size and M/B are 
controlled for. There is some predictability of excess returns left using equity 
purchases in small firms, but no predictability of excess returns at all is found on 
the sell side. In line with the recent literature, I find that equity purchases in small 
firms are informative while the sell trades do not convey any information in the 
short-run.  
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Chapter 5  
 
5 IPO Lockup Arrangements and Trading by 
Insiders47 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses the insider trading behaviour within the lockup period. I find 
that prestigious underwriters and the length of the lockup drive these trades. 
However, while insiders sell in over-performing, large, and low institutional 
holding IPOs, they buy in underperforming IPOs with lower underpricing and 
proportion of shares locked. On the lockup expiry dates, there is significant price 
drop for early buy but not for early sell IPOs. This early trading activity is likely to 
reflect the underwriters’ power over managers, not venture capitalists, to mitigate 
the information asymmetries of newly listed firms. 
 
 
Key words: Initial public Offering, Lockup, insider trades, information asymmetry, 
London Stock Exchange.  
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G24. 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 This chapter formed the basis for Hoque, H. and M. Lasfer (2009), “Insider trading around IPO 
lockup arrangements”, which was presented at the 2009 EFA Bergen Meetings, and the EFMA 
Milan Meetings. I thank Huainan Zhao, Arie Melnik, Scott Hsu (discussant in EFA), John Doukas 
(discussant in EFMA) and seminar participants at the 2009 EFA conference in Bergen, 2009 EFMA 
conference in Milan, and Cass Business School for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are 
my own responsibility. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Most of the IPOs contain lockup agreement where insiders are restrained from 
selling their holdings before a certain date. The ban on insider sells for a certain 
period of time is frequently alleged to be a necessary commitment device to induce 
the public to buy shares at the offering.  Because insiders have better information 
about the firm’s future prospects, they may try to take advantage of that 
information at, or soon after, the initial public offering. If insiders knew that the 
price immediately after the offering was excessively high, they might wish to cash 
out at a high price. The lockups are likely to act as a commitment device to 
alleviate the moral hazard problem. In this case, the level of the information 
asymmetries regarding the actions of the managers is important. A firm which have 
higher moral hazard problem would have to accept a longer lockup in order to 
convince investors to buy stock in the offering (Brav and Gompers (2003)). During 
the period of time when insiders are prohibited to sell shares, the information 
regarding firm’s future prospects will be revealed and will reduce the chances that 
insiders will act opportunistically. Hence, the lockup provision would be a 
commitment device. If the lockups are commitment device, and, therefore, insiders 
are not expected to sell shares within the lockup period. Insider trading (if any) 
within the lockup period is the central theme of this chapter.    
Underwriters set, in almost all IPOs, lock-up options to mitigate the 
information asymmetries between issuing firms and investors, and to reduce their 
reputation risk. These are voluntary agreements with corporate insiders not to sell 
shares without their written consent during a specified post-IPO period. A typical 
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lock-up may specify that insiders should not offer, issue, sell, contract to sell, issue 
options in respect of or otherwise dispose of, directly or indirectly, ordinary shares 
or any securities of the company that are substantially similar to the ordinary shares 
or any other securities exchangeable for or convertible into ordinary shares.48 These 
agreements contained in the prospectuses indicate clearly the number (or 
proportion) of shares locked and the length (or the expiry date) of the lockup 
period. Despite the popularity of lockups, their potential monitoring costs and 
constraints on insiders’ holding risks, the IPO literature has not fully covered a 
number of questions, namely, how do underwriters enforce them? Do they allow 
some insiders to sell, but make others increase their commitments by buying 
additional shares during the lockup period? When do they do so, and what is the 
impact of these early trades on stock prices? In this paper, I construct a unique data 
set of 831 UK IPOs containing all lockup information from prospectuses and 
insider trading over the period 1999-2006 to answer these questions. 
This chapter is partially motivated from observed differences in institutional 
settings between the UK and the US. For example, the relationship between IPOs 
and their underwriters is likely to be long-term in the UK, since all quoted firms 
need to have a corporate broker, usually the IPO underwriter, as an interface with 
the London Stock Exchange and shareholders, and arranges insider trades, 
seasoned equity offerings and share buybacks. This requirement implies that 
lockups are likely to be more binding in the UK, and insiders are not expected to 
                                                 
48 The analysis of the prospectuses shows that this agreement is not binding only in limited 
circumstances, when the consent of the underwriter should not be unreasonably withheld or delayed. 
These include the event of an intervening court order, a takeover offer relating to the company’s 
shares becoming or being declared unconditional, the death of the insider, transfers to relatives and 
family trusts and to beneficiaries of such trusts, and transfers to companies in the same group as the 
shareholder. We were not able to identify these specific events. 
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break them for fear of incurring costs of finding new brokers or risk of delisting, 
particularly for AIM firms. At the same time, the rent seeking potential is likely to 
be higher as insiders have to use their corporate broker to undertake their trades.49 
Chambers and Dimson (2009) also argue that in the UK, investment bankers have 
increased their market power through time, because of the erosion of trust. The 
purpose of this chapter is to look for evidence on this power, through underwriters’ 
impact on lockups and their enforcement, as it examines whether insiders are 
released before the lockup expiry dates, and whether insiders are pushed to increase 
in commitments in some IPOs.  
I focus on the insider trading activity within the lockup period. It is shown 
that, interestingly, while both the buy and sell trades undertaken by insiders occur 
in IPOs with longer lockup periods, and the presence of prestigious underwriters, 
the stock price performance on the trading and lockup expiry dates is significantly 
different across the early buy and early sell IPOs. I find that in the 40 days 
preceding the trade, IPOs subject to insider early sells generate significant positive 
abnormal returns of 9.72%, compared to -8.43% for early buy IPOs. These results 
suggest that this early trading activity is likely to be pre-arranged with the 
underwriters, as while the sell trades are early releases following good 
performance, the buys are likely to be undertaken to signal an increase in 
                                                 
49 All UK listed companies retain a corporate broker, usually the underwriter of the IPO, as a pre-
requisite for their listing on the London Stock Exchange. The corporate broker acts as a long-term 
retained adviser and is specifically responsible for managing the day-to-day relationship with the 
corporate client and provides equity market-related advice, and new issues, co-ordinates 
institutional investor relations services, and liaises with the London Stock Exchange and UK Listing 
Authority on regulatory issues facing listed companies. In addition to primary equity issuance, 
corporate brokers execute equity related transactions, including insider trades, share buybacks, stake 
building in target companies. See, for example Financial Times 28 April 2009 p. 21 and Wall Street 
Journal Europe 4 May 2009 p. 23 for a listing and concentration of major corporate brokers. 
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commitments and to support the price of underperforming IPOs. I also find that 
stock prices increase by 2.49% on the announcement date of buy trades, but the 
post-event period abnormal returns are not significant, implying that the 
information content of these trades and the price support are short-lived. For early 
sell IPOs, the resulting negative signal is confined mainly to the event and the 
short-term post-event period, as share prices recover to generate positive returns in 
the period leading up to the lockup expiry date.  
The chapter also analyses insider trading on the lockup expiry date. In line 
with previous evidence (e.g., Brav and Gompers (2003) and Field and Hanka 
(2001)), I find significant price decline for the whole sample on the lockup 
expiration dates of -1.85% (t = -3.70), and for the IPOs with actual sell trades, the 
abnormal returns of -2.5% (t = -3.55) are significantly lower than the remaining 
IPOs. Interestingly, no IPO with actual sell is from my two subsamples of early 
buy and sell IPOs. However, early sell IPOs generate significant positive abnormal 
returns in the pre-event and no negative returns in the post-event period. In 
contrast, the early buy IPOs underperform significantly on and during the lockup 
expiry date. These results hold even after controlling for other effects, as 
regressions show that the abnormal returns on the lockup expiry dates are 
significantly lower for IPOs with early buys and actual sell trades on the lockup 
expiry dates, but positive, though not significant, for early sell IPOs. Insiders are 
divided into executive managers and venture capitalists (non-executives). I find 
that while the dummy for sell trades executed by executives is not significant, that 
for buy trades is negative and significant, suggesting that IPOs where executive 
directors are buying, are the worst performers. 
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This chapter also analyzes the determinants of the lockup lengths (Brav and 
Gompers (2003), Brau, Lambson, and McQueen (2005)). They argue that lockup 
contracts may emanate from the agency costs, information asymmetries between 
managers and shareholders, signalling of firm’s quality, rent seeking by 
underwriters, and, commitment hypothesis. This research finds that lockups are 
likely to serve as commitment devices to overcome potential adverse selection at 
the offering and to signal firm’s quality. Although the average lockup is relatively 
larger than the US, I find that the drivers of the lockup lengths are similar, as they 
are relatively shorter when IPOs are large, underwritten by prestigious investment 
banks, backed by VCs, held by institutions, and issued in hot market and in the 
main market rather than  the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). When two 
markets are separated, relatively similar results were found, except that size and 
shares locked are significant in the main market, while hot market dummy is 
significant in AIM. This study does not find support for the rent-seeking 
hypothesis, as the gains from such trades are relatively small and IPOs did not raise 
additional capital during the lockup period.  
I find that, during the study period, nearly 90% of all UK IPOs have 
lockups. The average (median) length of the lockup of the sample firms is 391 
(365) days, significantly longer than the 180 days reported in the US (Bradley et al. 
(2001)). Although it is found that lockup lengths range between 86 and 1096 days, 
they are, consistent with Bradley et al. (2001), relatively standardized, as about 
70% of lockups are exactly one year, but only 3% are below 180 days and less than 
10% are above 18 months. Compared to previous UK evidence, the lengths appear 
to be shortened as the respective figures reported by Espenlaub et al. (2001) are 
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561 (730) ranging between 158 and 1095 days for 52 IPOs in 1992-1998.50 I show 
that the longer lockup periods in the UK are likely to be related to the fact that 
lockups are usually divided into two periods; the first when insiders cannot sell at 
all, and the second when insiders can do so with the underwriter’s agreement.51 
However, even if I consider only the 53% of sample firms with only one lockup, I 
find that the average length is more than one year. 
Finally, this study reports that, while the average lockup length is evenly 
distributed across sample period, the early buy and sell trades are relatively new 
phenomenon, as about 80% occur in the period 2004 to 2006, and the vast majority 
are in lockups longer than or equal to the average of one year. However, I find 
strong differences between the early sell and early buy samples. First, the 
frequency of early buys of 31% of my sample IPOs is larger than the 14% of firms 
that have insider sells prior to the lockup expiration date. On average, insiders 
undertake two sell trades and three buy trades and they occur about half way the 
lockup period. Moreover, the proportion of shares sold is significantly higher than 
those bought. The analysis of the drivers of these trades shows that while insiders 
sell in large, and low institutional holding IPOs, they buy in IPOs with lower 
                                                 
50 However, these results are likely to be firm specific as Chambers and Dimson (2009) identify 
more than 10 times (558) UK IPOs issued during the period 1992-98. Lockup contracts were also 
compulsory during their sample period (1992-2000) for mineral and scientific research companies 
with trading records of less than three years 
51 For example, the prospectus of Proactis Holdings PLC, listed on  2 June 2006 states: “The 
Directors have undertaken that, subject to certain limited exceptions, they will not sell or otherwise 
dispose of, or agree to sell or dispose of, any of their interests in Ordinary Shares held by them 
respectively until the expiry of 12 months after First Admission. In addition, the Directors have 
agreed that they will not sell or otherwise dispose, agree to sell or dispose of any of their interests in 
Ordinary Shares held by them without the prior written consent of Teather & Greenwood 
[underwriter] for a period of 12 months following the end of the above period.” 
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underpricing and proportion of shares locked. Overall, my results of the buy trades 
provide support for the commitment hypothesis.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the UK 
institutional features, reviews the literature and sets up the hypotheses. Section 3 
presents a discussion of my data. Section 4 provides the empirical results, and the 
conclusions are in Section 5. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Background 
5.2.1 Lockup Agreements in the UK Markets  
 
Companies listed in both markets (Main market and AIM) are required to maintain 
a corporate broker, or sponsor, who is usually the underwriter. The Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), equivalent to SEC in the US, requires an approved 
sponsor to act as advisers and provide certain services. This regulatory model, 
similar to Hong Kong, has the most defined and extensive role for an advisor to a 
listed company to act as an intermediary between the company and the regulator. In 
contrast, in the US, the investment bank has no direct obligations to the SEC (FSA 
Listing Rules (2007)). The sponsor is particularly responsible for any transaction 
the company undertakes, such as raising capital, share buybacks and trades 
undertaken by insiders. For AIM companies, the sponsor, referred to as NOMAD 
(Nominated Adviser), has relatively similar functions as the advisors of companies 
listed on the Main Market.  
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In both markets, companies need to specify clearly the lockup contract in 
their prospectuses. If this is not the case, they need to specify the reasons. 
Companies state the lockup expiry date as a definite calendar date (e.g., 7 June 
2007) as in the US, or it may be related to a specific corporate event, such as the 
earnings announcement or the publication of the annual report. Finally, lockups 
may be staggered if the locked up shares are only gradually released before the 
expiry date. I find that the lockup lengths are relatively more standardized 
compared to the Espenlaub et al. (2001) who report that in the UK lockup periods 
and characteristics are not homogeneous during their study period of 1992-98. 
Some examples of lockup agreements are presented below, which clearly 
show that insiders are not allowed to sell shares before lockup expirations. The first 
two lockup agreements are mentioned in terms of calendar date. Though the last 
lockup expiry date is different for different shareholders, for my purpose, I took 
end of first year as lockup expiry date as 27.1 percent of the shares become 
available to the market.  
 
Knowledge technology 
 
“Following the Offer assuming the Offer is fully subscribed, the Directors will hold 
40,666,667 Ordinary Shares representing a maximum of 48.7 percent of the 
enlarged issued share capital of the Company and may be issued with a further 
40,000,000 Ordinary Shares following the exercise of the Founder Warrants. In 
accordance with the AIM Rules, the Directors have agreed not to dispose of any 
shares held by them in the twelve months following Admission, except in a number 
of exceptional circumstances and furthermore not to dispose of any shares issued to 
them under the Founder Warrants within six months of such issue without the 
consent of Beaumont Cornish.” 
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Punch Tavern 
“Certain of the Directors and Existing Shareholders have agreed that, during a 
period of 180 days from the date of Admission, they will not, without the prior 
written consent of Merrill Lynch, sell any Ordinary Shares (or any right or option 
in respect thereof) other than sells to affiliates or by way of acceptance of a 
takeover offer for the Company, and certain of the Existing Shareholders have also 
agreed that, during a further period of 360 days thereafter, any such Existing 
Shareholder wishing to sell Ordinary Shares will do so in accordance with 
arrangements designed to ensure an orderly market in the Company’s shares.” 
 
Customvis 
 
“The Directors and Novamed Limited (a company controlled by Simon Gordon, 
one of the directors) have undertaken to the Company and Collins Stewart not to 
dispose of any interest which they have in the share capital of the Company for a 
period of two years after Admission or, if earlier, until such date as the Company 
announces an interim profit for the six month period to 31 December 2004. The 
Directors and Novamed Limited have also given orderly marketing undertakings to 
the Company and Collins Stewart for the 12 months following the end of the lock-
in arrangements. 
 
Jennifer van Saarloos, Custom Lasers Inc, Asian Lasers Inc and Moksh Pty Ltd, 
who together hold approximately 27.1 per cent. of the issued share capital of the 
Company following the Placing, have each entered into a lock-in agreement with 
the Company and Collins Stewart pursuant to which they have agreed not to 
dispose of any of the Ordinary Shares held by them for a period of 12 months after 
Admission. These Shareholders have also agreed to orderly marketing undertakings 
to the Company and Collins Stewart for the 12 months following the end of the 
lock-in arrangements.” 
 
The analysis of the prospectuses shows that this agreement is not binding 
only in limited circumstances, when the consent of the underwriter should not be 
unreasonably withheld or delayed. These include the event of an intervening court 
order, a takeover offer relating to the company’s shares becoming or being declared 
unconditional, the death of the insider, transfers to relatives and family trusts and to 
beneficiaries of such trusts, and transfers to companies in the same group as the 
shareholder. 
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While in the US there are no legal rules about lockup periods (Ofek and 
Richardson (2000)), in the UK certain types of companies are subject to 
compulsory lockups.52 Until January 2000, lockup agreements are mandatory for 
UK mineral and scientific research-based companies that did not satisfy the 
standard minimum-age requirement of three years. More specifically, the directors 
and other key employees of these companies are not allowed to sell shares either in 
the IPO or during the period of two years commencing with the first day of listing. 
Shareholders holding at least 10% of the securities are not allowed to sell during 
the first six months following the IPO or until the publication of the semi-annual 
results, whichever is longer, and they could not sell more than 40% of their 
holdings during the first two years following the IPO. In January 2000, the new 
listing rules scrapped these compulsory lockups, but companies with less than three 
years of trading records are now required to include a statement in their prospectus 
detailing the lockup arrangements or provide reasons for their absence. An 
additional chapter on innovative high-growth companies was included to the 
Listing Rules in January 2000 making lockup agreements not compulsory for 
innovative high-growth companies, but if these firms do not satisfy the three years 
minimum age requirement, they have to include a lockup statement in their 
prospectus, if not specify the reasons. 
 
 
                                                 
52 See Espenlaub et al. (2001, 2002) for details. 
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5.2.2 Review of the Literature 
 
To the best of my knowledge, no previous study analyse in detail insider trading 
within the lockup period. There are a limited number of studies that analyse only 
insider sells, not buys, within the lockup period. For example, Brav and Gompers 
(2003) test the commitment hypothesis by using insider selling activities within the 
lockup period and report that the companies where there are less information 
asymmetry, insiders are allowed to sell their shares. Field and Hanka (2001) test 
the hypothesis that the negative abnormal returns around the lockup expiry date is 
driven by worse than expected insider selling. They find that when insiders are 
selling, the abnormal returns are more negative. However, the lockup expiry returns 
are not solely driven by aggressive insider selling as stock prices decline even in 
the absence of actual insider sell trades.   
Espenlaub et. al. (2002) analyse the directors trading around lockup 
expiration using 94 IPOs from UK. They find that companies with a good stock 
price performance, before lockup expiry dates are more likely to have directors 
sells. However, most of their sample firms have a relative lockup date, which made 
it difficult to estimate the expiry date. They also report that directors selling activity 
increases significantly following the lockup expirations. They measure the 
cumulative abnormal returns for -4 to +4 weeks relative to the lockup expiration 
week. They report insignificant lockup expiration returns. They also report that, 
firms with directors’ sells have lower abnormal returns,53 compared to firms 
                                                 
53 The abnormal returns were measured weekly basis. The mean difference t-test also shows that 
there is no difference between these two abnormal returns. 
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without directors’ sells. However, most of the abnormal returns are statistically 
insignificant.   
Previous studies argue that lockup contracts reduce the information 
asymmetry and mitigate the agency problems between the insider-managers and the 
outside shareholders (Brau et al. (2004)). Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) argue that 
investors are ready to pay more for a firm with a lockup agreement for two reasons: 
(i) any negative information being withheld is likely to be revealed before the 
locked-up shares can be sold, reducing the benefit of withholding information, and 
(ii) as long as insiders retain large holdings, their incentives are aligned with 
outsiders’ incentives. Empirically, a large number of studies provide support for 
these arguments as insiders refrain from selling shares during the lockup period for 
fear of conveying negative signals to the market (e.g., Brau and Fawcett (2006)). 
Since significant selling activity occurs after lockup expiry (e.g., Brav and 
Gompers (2003)), insiders do wait until lockup agreement is expired to reduce the 
holding in their IPO. 
Brav and Gompers (2003) develop three additional competing hypotheses 
to explain the existence and length of the lockup period (i) signalling firms’ 
quality, (ii) commitment hypothesis, and (iii) rent seeking by underwriters. They 
find that lockups are driven by the commitment hypothesis, but reject the signalling 
and the rent seeking hypotheses. However, Brau et al. (2005) contradict these 
results and provide support for the commitment and signalling hypotheses. They 
show that Brav and Gompers (2003) evidence of an inverse relationship between 
transparency and lockup length supports the signalling model at least as much as 
the commitment explanation. They also report that the length of the lockups is 
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positively associated with high information asymmetries, low idiosyncratic risk and 
high potential for moral hazard.  
On the lockup expiry dates share prices, in general, tend to decline 
independently of whether insiders do actually trade (e.g., Brau et al. (2004), Brav 
and Gompers (2000, 2003), Bradley et al. (2001), Ofek and Richardson (2000), 
Field and Hanka (2001)). These results are puzzling as, since lockups are well-
known agreements at the time of the IPO and all their parameters are specified in 
the IPO prospectus, the price reaction on their expiry dates will normally be zero, 
unless if insiders sell their holdings. This phenomenon is related to several 
explanations.  
Brau et al. (2004) argue that since, lockup expiration dates provide an 
opportunity for insiders to sell their holdings, the potential for un-alignment of 
objectives and agency conflicts increases, resulting in a potential decrease in 
investors’ demand for shares. They find a significantly positive relationship 
between the percentage of management ownership after the IPO, their proxy for 
agency costs, and the five-day cumulative abnormal returns. Another related 
explanation is the information content of insider trading when insiders sell on the 
lockup expiry date. These arguments are in line with previous studies on insider 
trading that report significant price decline on the announcement of sell trades (e.g., 
Seyhun (1986, 1988)) as the market considers that such trades reflect negative 
private information. Field and Hanka (2001) provide alternative hypotheses that 
may explain the observed pattern in the returns around the lockup expiration. 
Consistent with the downward-sloping demand curve hypothesis, they find that the 
abnormal returns are more negative when the trading volume is abnormally high. 
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Other studies focus more on market micro-structure factors, such as the bid-ask 
bounce, liquidity effects and biased expectations of supply shocks. Overall, the 
empirical support for the drivers of the negative lockup expiry date abnormal 
returns is mixed (e.g., Ofek and Richardson (2000)). This is most probably due to 
the difficulties in distinguishing between IPOs that are actually subject to sell 
trades, and others with potential sells, because of the lack of data on the actual 
insider selling trades around the lockup expiry dates.  
The only study, to the best of my knowledge that analyse UK lockups is 
Espenlaub et al. (2001). They analyse a small sample of 188 firms that raise equity 
on the London Stock Exchange during 1992-1998. They examine the 
characteristics of the lockup agreements in the UK and report that lockup 
agreements in the UK firms are much more complex, varied and diverse as 
compared to the US contracts. They analyse the market reaction of lockup 
expiration and find evidence of negative share price movements around the lockup 
expiry dates, though, statistically not significant. The drop in stock returns around 
the expiry date is particularly pronounced for high-tech companies. 
5.2.3 Testable Hypotheses 
 
The previous two sections highlighted the differences between the US and the UK 
institutional settings, and the controversies surrounding lockups. The existence of 
corporate brokers, the lockup requirements for IPOs with less than three years 
trading activity, and the UK insider trading disclosure rules, which specify that any 
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trades should be disclosed on or within five working days after the actual trade,54 
allow to assess further the main hypotheses underlying lockups, and to expand 
more previous evidence. I first start by analysing the existence and the 
determinants of the lockup lengths. In the US, the informational asymmetries 
between insiders and outsiders is mitigated to a lesser extent, since their periods are 
relatively short, and firms disclose little information between their IPO and the 
lockup expiration date. Given the UK institutional setting, particularly, the 
existence of corporate brokers and the disclosure requirements of any insider 
trades, stricter lockup contracts are expected, and the information production to be 
higher within the lockup period, to reduce the information asymmetry between 
insiders and outside shareholders. Thus, I contrast my results with previous 
predominantly US evidence (e.g., Brav and Gompers (2003)) and provide evidence 
on lockup lengths under different institutional settings. This study tests the 
hypothesis that the lockup lengths reflect the firms’ quality, asymmetric 
information and agency problems. The focus particularly is on the potential role 
and power of underwriters in setting up lockups and enforcing them. Moreover, I 
assess whether the institutional holding, which is relatively large in the UK, affects 
lockup lengths and the probability of early trades. In the US, Chen, Jegadeesh and 
Wermers (2000), Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) and Ben Dor (2003) report that 
                                                 
54 The UK Model Code prescribes much faster reporting of directors’ dealings. The directors must 
inform their company as soon as possible after the transaction and no later than the fifth business 
day after a transaction for their own account or on behalf of their spouses and children (Hillier and 
Marshall (2002)). In turn, a company must inform the LSE without delay and no later than the end 
of the business day following receipt of the information. This implies that the information about 
insider transaction reach market as late as 6 days after transaction. In contrast, in the US, during the 
pre-Sarbanes-Oxley period, insiders have to report their trades on the 10th of the month following 
the transaction, resulting in a maximum delay of between 10 and 42 days, depending on the trading 
date. As a result, most previous studies could not analyse insider-trading event on or before the 
lockup expiry date. 
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institutional ownership is positively related to performance while in the UK they 
appear to be passive (e.g., Franks et al. (2001), and Faccio and Lasfer (2000)).  
In the second stage, this study assesses the observed relatively significant 
insider selling as well as buying activity during lockup periods, and determines the 
characteristics of IPOs that are subject to early insider sell or buy trades. I test the 
hypothesis that insiders are likely to be able to sell their locked up shares before the 
expiry dates if the post-IPO performance is abnormally positive. Such price 
performance will be consistent with the mitigation of the information asymmetry 
problem, and a reduction in the commitment of insiders (Brau et al. (2005)). In 
addition, if the post-IPO share prices are high, underwriters can extract rent from 
the execution of trades by insiders, and, as shown in previous studies, insider sell 
trades are likely to occur after stock price run-ups (e.g., Seyhun (1986)). Therefore, 
it is expected that insider sells before the lockup expiry dates to be consistent with 
the four main hypotheses underlying the existence of lockups, i.e., information 
asymmetry, signalling firm quality, commitment, and rent seeking hypotheses 
(Brav and Gompers (2003)). In contrast, insiders are likely to increase their 
holdings before the lockup expiry dates if stock prices decline in the post-IPO 
period. I also analyse the market reaction to such trades, and assess whether the 
event period abnormal returns are similar to conventional insider trading returns, 
as, in the UK, companies have to announce any insider trades to the market when 
they are undertaken. 
Finally, this study analyses the stock market behaviour around the lockup 
expiry dates and assess whether the actual sell trades and the pre-lockup early 
trades affect the well-documented stock prices decreases. This research contributes 
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to this literature in several ways. First, it is assessed whether, as in the US, stock 
prices drop on the lockup expiry dates. Second, actual and expected sell trades are 
differentiated by analysing separately IPOs where insiders sell on the expiry dates. 
Third, I relate the actual sell trades, if any, and lockup expiry dates abnormal 
returns to the trading behaviour of insiders before the lockup expiry dates. I expect 
a higher propensity to sell on the expiry dates in IPOs where insiders increase their 
holding, i.e., early buy trades IPOs, leading to significantly lower returns than the 
remaining IPOs. In contrast, for IPOs with early sells, the expiry dates abnormal 
returns are expected to be positive, as insiders have already sold before the lockup 
expiry dates. The commitment and signalling hypotheses suggest that firms that 
have bad (good) news, or are less (more) subject to moral hazard, and potential 
agency conflicts, should have lower (higher) lockup expiry dates abnormal returns. 
Overall, I expect the sign and the magnitude of abnormal returns to be lower 
(higher) in IPOs where insiders buy (sell) before lockup expiry dates. 
5.3 Data Sources 
 
This study starts with all the 1,117 IPOs that went public on AIM and London main 
market between January 1999 and 2006. The following filters were used to 
construct final sample. 76 companies were excluded for which the prospectuses 
cannot be found in Perfect Filings database. Further 15 companies were excluded 
with missing share price data on DataStream, and 195 firms with missing lockup 
date or ownership data from the prospectuses. Final sample includes 831 (74%) 
IPOs with complete data.  
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The LSE database is used to collect data on the quotation market (AIM or 
Main market), admission date, country of incorporation, issue price, market value, 
money raised, name of the broker, and for AIM IPOs, the advisor. I download all 
prospectuses from Perfect Filings database and hand-collect all information 
relating to lockup arrangements, including lockup dates, percentage of shares 
locked-up, fraction of insider shares locked up, directors’ ownership before and 
after IPO, percentage sold in the IPO, institutional ownership, and venture capital 
backing. I further use DataStream to collect any delisting dates, and accounting 
and market data, which includes daily stock prices and indices, to compute the 
stock returns, market capitalization and turnover, which is used as proxy for size, 
accounting return on assets to measure profitability, and price-to-book ratio to 
proxy for growth.  
Finally, I use Directors Deals, a large database of all UK firms’ directors’ 
trades spanning from January 1999 to December 2007, to collect data on trades 
undertaken by insiders of the sample IPOs. The database includes news items on 
directors’ trades disclosed by all UK firms to the Regulatory News Service (RNS). 
A number of observations that are not likely to be driven by private information, 
such as exercise of options or derivatives, script dividends, bonus shares, rights 
issues, awards made to directors under incentive plans or reinvestment plans, are 
excluded.  All directors’ transactions in investment companies are also excluded. 
After this screening, 36,943 insiders’ trades from the UK market are obtained. I 
check the data for errors and exclude 2,952 (8%) trades as the difference in 
announcement and transaction date is more than 5 days. The final sample includes 
33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268 (77%) 
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purchases and 7,723 (23%) sell trades. This insider-trading database includes 
transaction price, amount, and value, post-transaction holding, change in holding, 
name and position of the insider, and announcement and transaction dates, as UK 
insiders can delay up to five days the announcement of their trade, but most report 
their trades on the RNS on the transaction date (Korczak and Lasfer (2009)).  
This study matches the IPO sample with the insider trading data and found 
4,762 transactions in 657 IPOs, split into 3,513 (74%) buy and 1,249 (26%) sell 
trades. The remaining 358 IPOs do not have any insider transactions. This study 
then matches the dates of the trades with the lockup expiry dates. I include in 
sample of early sells and buys, any trade that occurs during the period spanning 
from the IPO date to one day before the lockup expiry date. If the company have a 
staggered lockup contract I consider any insider trading activity as early trades if it 
happens within the first lockup expiry date.  I exclude any events when both buy 
and sell trades occur to eliminate any sells from the post-IPO buys. My final 
sample includes 186 early sell and 694 early buy trades in 116 and 254 IPOs, 
respectively.  
This study uses the standard event study methodology to assess the market 
reaction on the insider trading events and lockup expiration dates. The market 
adjusted model is used to compute the abnormal returns over the event window [-42, 
+42] relative to these events. The market adjusted abnormal returns are calculated 
against the corresponding market indices, the AIM all share price,55 and FTSE All 
share indices, for AIM and main market companies, respectively. 
                                                 
55 As an alternative to AIM all share price index, we used the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies 
(HGSC) Index as the market index. My results are qualitatively similar.  
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5.4 Empirical Results 
5.4.1 The Distribution of Lockups and Early Insider Trades 
 
Table 5-1 provides the descriptive statistics of sample firms. Panel A. reports the 
lockup and fundamental characteristics of the data, with mean, 10th, 50th and 90th 
percentiles. Interestingly, the average (median) length of the lockup is 391(365) 
days, more than double that in the US, where, for example, Brav and Gompers 
(2003) and Field and Hanka (2001) find a median of 180 days. The sample IPOs 
offered 38.6% (32.9%) of their shares in the market, and the mean (median) shares 
locked amounts to 29.5% (24%) of the shares outstanding. The average 
underpricing of 22.5 % is close to Chambers and Dimson (2009) of 24.9% over the 
period 1999-2006, but higher than the 14.7% reported by Brav and Gompers 
(2003), although this is mainly due to differences in sample periods.56  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 We use Chambers and Dimson (2009), Table 3, column 1 Number of IPOs, and column 2 EW 
(equally weighted) mean return, to estimate their average underpricing. We find that in 1988 to 
1996, Brav and Gompers (2003) report average US underpricing of 14.7%, but Chambers and 
Dimson (2009) UK data implies 10.78%. 
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Table 5-1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics of the lockup and fundamental characteristics   
               10th Percentile Median Mean 90th Percentile 
Days locked                                                                 306                  365  391 548 
Shares locked (%)                                                   1.50                 24.00   29.40   68.00 
Percent  of offering as primary shares                    12.6                 32.90   38.60   78.00 
Underpricing (%)                                                                -1.50                   9.90   22.50   51.30 
Market value of equity( 2008 £m)                                     3.20                21.60 140.20 204.10 
Market-to-book                                                                 0.88                   3.01    3.88   11.15 
Return on Assets                                                               -52.6                  -2.60   -34.6   11.10 
 
Panel B. Annual distribution of the sample IPOs 
Year  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
IPOs 
Average money raised (£m) 
39 
187.2 
144 
253.5 
59 
106.8 
44 
84.1 
39 
100.0 
159 
51.6 
201 
73.6 
146 
138.4 
Days Locked 427 374 410 437 404 392 388 375 
Early sell (%) 
Early buy (%) 
3 
0 
9 
2 
6 
3 
6 
2 
3 
7 
12 
15 
21 
26 
41 
44 
Panel C. Lockup ranges 
Lockup days <89 90-180 181-364 365 366-550 551-720 721-1096 
Observations 7 25 80 560 79 19   61 
Percent of observations 
Early sell (%) 
Early buy (%) 
0.84 
0 
0 
3.00 
5 
4 
9.63 
19 
7 
67.38 
38 
56 
9.50 
15 
13 
2.28 
10 
2 
7.34 
13 
18 
 
Panel D. Means [Medians] of lockup days, shares locked up and underpricing 
Sample N Days Locked Shares locked (%) Underpricing (%) 
 
Market value>median 
 
416 
 
387[365] 
 
26.0[18]
***
 
 
26.4[10.7]
***
 
Market value<median 415 395[365] 32.8[30] 18.6[9.0] 
p-values for differences in means  0.23 0.00 0.00 
     
Prestigious underwriter  166 338[365]
***
 25.2[18]
***
 9.1[6.7]
***
 
Other underwriter 665 403[365] 30.4[25] 26.0[10.5] 
p-values for differences in means  0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
Venture-backed 116 357[365]
***
 19.7[15]
***
 28.8[9.0] 
Non-venture-backed 715 396[365] 30.6[25] 21.5[10.0] 
p-values for differences in means  0.00 0.00 0.13 
     
Main Market 141 334[365]
***
 23.3[16]
***
 18.6[7.7] 
AIM  690 402[365] 30.6[25] 23.5[10.0] 
p-values for differences in means  0.00 0.00 0.21 
     
 Institutional holding  504 379[365]
***
 25.4[20]
***
 22.8[9.2] 
No Institution holding  327 411[365] 36.0[31] 22.1[10.5] 
p-values for differences in means  0.00 0.00 0.28 
     
Bubble period 183 380[365] 35.2[33]
***
 32.1[9.7]
***
 
Non-bubble period 648 388[365] 27.0[21] 16.4[10.0] 
p-values for differences in means  0.20 0.00 0.00 
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The sample includes 831 IPOs from January, 1 1999 to 31 December 2006, for which I could find 
lockup information. Days locked is the length of lockup period, Shares locked is the ratio of shares 
locked to shares outstanding. Percentage of offering as primary shares is the fraction of offering that is 
new shares.  Underpricing is the percent return on the first day from the offering price to the closing 
price. Market value is the offering price times shares outstanding in 2008 millions of Pound Sterling 
constant terms. Market-to-book  is the ratio of market capitalization at the IPO divided by the book 
value of the equity in the first reporting period after IPO. Return on assets is the net income divided by 
total assets in the first reporting period after the IPO. Average Money Raised is the ratio of money raised 
in 2008 £bn over the number of IPOs. Early sells (buys) are trades that occurred prior to the lockup 
expiration dates. Prestigious underwriters are the global underwriters defined in Derrien and Kecskes 
(2007). Venture-backed is dummy equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists. AIM is for 
Alternative Investment Market and Main market is the Official List. Institutional holding refers to any 
institutional investors who hold more than 3% share at the time of IPO. Bubble period is defined as 
1999-2000 period following Levis (2008). Hot market is when the IPO volume increases significantly 
and includes two periods January 1999 to March 2001 and January 2004 to end of 2006. Cold market is 
the remaining sample period. ***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
In terms of fundamentals, the results indicate that, while the average market 
value of equity of sample firms is £140m (about $210m), the sample includes small 
as well as large firms. Consistent with Brav and Gompers (2003), the sample IPOs 
are high growth and make losses, as the average (median) market-to-book ratio is 
3.88 (3.01), and return on equity is -34.6% (-2.6%).  
In Panel B., I report the annual distribution of IPO sample and the lockup 
lengths. The volume of IPOs is relatively high in 2000, the ‘Bubble’ period, 
followed by a relatively quiet period 2001-2003, and then a heavy IPO activity 
period of 2004-2006. These results are in line with Chambers and Dimson (2009). 
In terms of money raised, IPOs appear to be relatively larger in 1999-2000 with an 
average of £200m per issue, compared to £88m in the post-2001 period. The most 
interesting results relate to the distribution of the average lockup lengths. The 
results show that the maximum of 437 days is reached in 2002 and the minimum of 
374 is in 2000. However, I note that the distribution is relatively homogeneous, 
Hot market 676 412[365]
***
 28.5[23]
***
 27.1[10.0] 
Cold market 155 381[365] 33.7[29] 18.9[7.1] 
p-values for differences in means  0.00 0.00 0.12 
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higher than the median of 365 days and in no single year is the average close to the 
180 days documented in the US. Finally, I report the annual distribution of insider 
trades that occur before the lockup expiry dates. Interestingly, the results indicate 
that 74% of early sells, and 85% of early buys occur in 2004-2006, indicating that 
the early trades are relatively more recent, and probably reflecting the increase in 
IPO volume. During the internet boom and early 2000s, very few IPOs have early 
insider trades. These results suggest that, while the early trading activity is sample 
period dependent, which I account for in my analysis below, the lockup lengths are 
relatively constant across the sample period. 
Panel C. reports the distribution of the lockup length by ranges and shows 
that more than 67% (560 companies) of the sample firms have lockups of one year. 
It is interesting to note that less than 1% of IPOs have lockups lower than 3 months 
(89 days) and only about 4% have lockups less than 180 days. In contrast, 19% 
have lockups above one year, and more than 7% lockups are higher than 2 years 
(721 days). The concentration of lockups in the 365 days period suggests that they 
appear to be more standardised than Espenlaub et al. (2001).57 Similarly, Field and 
Hanka (2001) and Brav and Gompers (2003) also find clustering of the lockup 
lengths in the US, but closer to relatively shorter period of 180 days.  
Panel C also shows the distribution of the early buy and sell trades. I note 
that the vast majority (56%) of the buy trades occur in lockups of one year, and 
33% in lockups higher than one year, and thus, only 11% are in lockups lower than 
                                                 
57 Espenlaub et al. (2001) find that only 54 out of their 188 IPOs (29%) have a fixed expiry date. In 
addition, the directors set expiry dates in ‘absolute’ terms, i.e. by specifying (a period after) a 
calendar date. The remaining firms set expiry dates relative to other, more or less predictable, events 
such as the publication of results. 
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one year.  In contrast, the sell trades are relatively more evenly distributed, as 38% 
of the trades occur in lockups of either one, or more than one year and 24% are in 
lockups lower than one year. It is interesting to note that only 5% of the sell trades 
occur in lockups of less than 180 days, suggesting that, on an average, the holding 
period of UK insiders in their IPO shares is relatively longer than that in the US. 
Panel D reports the distribution of lockup length, percentage of shares 
locked and underpricing, split into various categories. I find that the average lockup 
length is independent of the IPO size and the bubble period,58 but it is lower in 
IPOs with prestigious underwriters,59 venture capitalist backing, main market 
quotation, institutional holding, and those issued in cold market. However, the 
median lockup length across these groups of 365 days is relatively constant. In 
addition, the lower means are relatively close to 365 days than the 180 days in the 
US. In particular, Brav and Gompers (2003) report the average (median) lockup 
lengths of IPOs with prestigious underwriters of 193 (180) days in the US, 
compared to my findings of 338 (365) days, suggesting that, in the UK 
underwriters are able to exert more power to lock insiders over a longer period. I 
also note that their prestigious underwriters represent about 50% of their sample, 
while my data shows 20% (166/831).    
The second column reports the proportion of shares locked. The results 
indicate that this proportion is significantly lower in IPOs that are large, 
underwritten by prestigious investment banks, backed by venture capitalists, held 
                                                 
58 We define bubble period as 1999-2000 period, following Levis (2008). 
59 We follow Derrien and Kecskes (2007) and include in prestigious underwriters global investment 
banks such as ABN AMRO, Cazenove  & Co., Credit Lynnais Securities, Dresdner Kleinwort 
Wassertein, HSBC Securities, Credit Suisse, KBC Securities, Lehman brothers, Nomura 
International, Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, SG securities, UBS, West LB, Merrill Lynch 
International, Goldman Sachs.  
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by institutional investors, and issued in the main market (as opposed to AIM), and 
in non-bubble and hot periods. My results are not consistent with Brav and 
Gompers (2003). First, their average (median) proportion of shares locked of 
57.0% (60.9%) is much larger than my 29.4% (24.0%). Second, they find that this 
proportion is positively related to IPO size, prestigious underwriters and venture-
backed IPOs. It is interesting to note that IPOs underwritten by prestigious 
underwriters have relatively shorter lockup lengths but also smaller proportion of 
shares locked than the remaining IPOs.   
The last column shows that while the level of underpricing is unaffected by 
venture capitalist backing, market of quotation, institutional holding and hot market 
period, it is lower in IPOs that are small, underwritten by prestigious investment 
banks, and issued in non-bubble periods. These results are also not fully consistent 
with Brav and Gompers (2003) who show that venture capitalists and prestigious 
underwriters do not affect their underpricing, but it is higher in larger IPOs.  
5.4.2 The Determinants of Lockup Lengths 
 
The results in the previous section are based on univariate analysis. This section 
explores further the determinants of lockup lengths by running a set of regressions 
to account for simultaneous effects of all the potential factors, and contrast my 
results with US evidence. The dependent variable is the logarithm of lockup 
lengths in days. The independent variables are similar to previous studies (e.g., 
Brav and Gompers, 2003) for comparative purposes. They include a set of dummy 
variables to capture venture capitalist backing, Venture-backed; underwriting by 
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prestigious/global investment bank, Prestigious underwriter; the presence of large 
institutional investors, Institutional holding; issuance of the IPO during the period 
when the IPO volume increases significantly, namely, January 1999 to March 2001 
and January 2004 to end of 2006, Hot market; industry impact, i.e., if the IPO is in 
the following industries: computer manufacturing, electronic equipment, computer 
and data processing services, and optical, medical and scientific equipment, High-
tech Dummy; and finally, listing on AIM as opposed to the main market, AIM 
Dummy.  
IPO fundamentals and other lockup characteristics are controlled for by 
including Size, the log of market value of equity in 2008 constant terms, Market-to-
book, the ratio of market value at the IPO divided by the book value of the equity 
in the first reporting period after IPO, Shares locked, the fraction of insider shares 
subject to lockup restrictions, Shares issued, the ratio of shares issued and fully 
traded over number of shares outstanding and, Cash Flow Margin, the ratio of 
operating cash flows to sells. I replace observations whose values are either lower 
than the 1st or higher than 99th percentiles by the sample median to eliminate any 
effect of outliers for each variable. I show separate results for the main market and 
AIM to capture any other unobservable legal and institutional differences across 
the two markets.  
Table 5-2 reports the results. For the sample as a whole, the lockup lengths 
are negatively related to venture capital backing, prestigious underwriter, 
institutional holding, size and hot market dummy, but positively related to shares 
locked. In the second regression, I include AIM dummy instead of size to 
overcome the multicollinearity problem. As expected, AIM IPOs have longer 
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lockups than those listed on the main market. I find similar results when I split my 
sample into the two markets, with the exception of size and shares locked up that 
are significant in the main market but not on AIM, and the hot market dummy that 
affects more AIM IPOs.  
Consistent with Brav and Gompers (2003), the results indicate that larger 
firms, underwritten by prestigious underwriter, backed by venture capitalist, and 
firms with institutional investors all have, on average, shorter lockups. These 
factors are associated with less informational asymmetry about the IPO’s 
aftermarket value and future prospects. For example, insiders in firms with high 
quality underwriters, or venture capital backing, are less likely to refrain from 
disclosing private information to outside investors, and, therefore, have less need 
for commitment of a longer lockup. The presence of institutional investors in the 
firm is also an alternative proxy for a reduction in the information asymmetries and 
an increase in monitoring of insiders, resulting in shorter lockups.  
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Table 5-2 Determinants of the Length of the Lockup 
 Full Sample Full Sample Main Market AIM 
Constant 13.04*** 
[12.44] 
23.7*** 
[12.28] 
6.54*** 
[9.7] 
6.02*** 
[4.45] 
Venture-backed -0.07*** 
[-2.01] 
-0.06** 
[-1.98] 
-0.19** 
[-2.14] 
-0.03** 
[-1.99] 
Prestigious underwriter -0.16*** 
[-4.28] 
-0.13*** 
[-3.43] 
-0.04*** 
[-3.38] 
-0.11*** 
[-2.71] 
Institutional holding -0.03*** 
[-2.26] 
-0.03*** 
[-2.15] 
-0.02** 
[-2.02] 
-0.03** 
[-1.86] 
Size -0.02*** 
[-2.49] 
 -0.17*** 
[-5.64] 
-0.01 
[-1.34] 
Market-to-book 0.0007 
[0.45] 
0.001 
[0.95] 
0.001 
[0.55] 
0.005 
[0.93] 
Shares locked 0.001** 
[1.71] 
0.001 
[1.13] 
0.005*** 
[3.11] 
0.0001 
[0.19] 
Shares issued at IPO  -0.002 
[-0.46] 
-0.002 
[-0.26] 
-0.001 
[-0.25] 
-0.002 
[-0.31] 
Cash flow margin -0.007 
[-0.93] 
-0.002 
[-0.43] 
-0.07* 
[-1.71] 
-0.007 
[-1.40] 
Hot Market Dummy 0.05** 
[1.72] 
0.05*** 
[2.01] 
0.12 
[0.11] 
0.07*** 
[2.43] 
High-tech Dummy -0.05 
[-1.35] 
-0.04 
[-1.15] 
-0.03 
[0.28] 
-0.03 
[-0.68] 
AIM Dummy  0.17*** 
[3.70] 
  
     
Adjusted R2 10.9 12.1 7.2 9.8 
Number of Observations 831 831 141 690 
The sample includes 831 IPOs from January 1 1999 to 31 December 2006, for which I could find 
lockup information and other market data. The dependent variable is the log of the lockup days. 
Venture-backed is dummy equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists. Prestigious 
underwriter is dummy variable equal to one if global underwriter is the underwriter for the float. 
Institutional Holding is a dummy variable equal to one if institutional investors hold more than 3% 
share at the time of IPO. Size is the log of market value of equity in 2008 constant terms. Market-to-
book is the ratio of market capitalization at the IPO divided by the book value of the equity in the 
first reporting period after IPO. Shares locked is the fraction of insider shares that are subject to 
lockup restrictions. Shares issued at IPO is the ratio of shares issued and fully traded over number 
of shares outstanding. Cash Flow Margin is the ratio of operating cash flows over sells. Hot market 
is a dummy equal to one if the IPO is during the period when the IPO volume increases significantly 
and includes two periods January 1999 to March 2001 and January 2004 to end of 2006. High-tech 
Dummy is equal to one if the IPO is in the following industries: computer manufacturing, electronic 
equipment, computer and data processing services, and optical, medical and scientific equipment. 
AIM Dummy is equal to one if the IPO is listed on the Alternative Investment Market. To eliminate 
the possible effect of outliers, for each variable, I replace observations whose values are either lower 
than the 1st or higher than 99th percentiles by the sample median. t statistics are in the brackets. ***, 
**, * significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
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In line with Brav and Gompers (2003), shares issued at IPO, and cash flow 
margin do not affect the lockup length. I also include high tech dummy as I expect 
high-tech companies to have longer lockup lengths as they are more risky, but the 
coefficient is negative and not significant. However, unlike Brav and Gompers 
(2003), market-to-book is not significant, suggesting that high-growth companies 
do not necessarily have high lockup periods. Such companies are likely to have 
high-risk, and, therefore, should have longer lockup lengths. Although the 
coefficient is positive, it is not significant. Nevertheless, overall results of this 
chapter are relatively similar to US evidence as reported by Brav and Gompers 
(2003) and suggest that institutional setting has relatively smaller effect on the 
design of lockups.  
 
5.4.3 Insider Trading Prior to Lockup Expiration    
 
This section explores the behaviour of insider equity selling from IPO allocation 
and buying prior to the lockup expiration. Since the UK financial regulator, the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), does not mandate lockups, as they are only an 
agreement between the underwriter and the IPO firm, insiders can sell their stock 
prior to lockup expiration if the underwriter chooses to free them from the 
obligation to hold shares until the lockup expiration. Since lockups are a 
commitment mechanism, I consider that insiders are likely to be released from 
lockup restrictions if their potential to take advantage of outside shareholders is 
reduced. Following Brav and Gompers (2003) and Brau et al. (2005), the 
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commitment and signalling hypotheses predict that insiders in high quality IPOs 
are more likely to be released early from lockup contracts. I, therefore, expect these 
firms to have higher post-IPO abnormal returns, as well as prestigious 
underwriters, and to be backed by venture capitalists. 
For the buy trades, this study considers two hypotheses: (i) the IPO is a 
good company and insiders want to increase their holdings, and (ii) the company is 
doing badly and insiders buy to support the price, and to increase the commitment 
and the signalling effects. In the first case, the test is consistent with the 
asymmetric information hypothesis put forward in the context of trading literature. 
For example, Brennan and Cao (1996) argue that informed investors are contrarians 
while uniformed investors are trend followers. In this case, I expect insider 
purchases to be driven by only the decline in share prices, and other variables such 
as venture capital backing, the presence of institutional investor, and the quality of 
underwriters are not likely to be important. The post-event CARs are expected to 
be positive and significant. In contrast, if the objective of insiders’ purchases is to 
support the price following price decline, then it is possible that they are driven by 
the underwriters, and the locked-in venture capitalists, by making insiders increase 
their commitments, and the signalling of the firm’s quality. In this case, I expect 
the insider purchases to be related to the presence of venture capitalists, high 
quality underwriters, shares locked, and length of the lockup. The post-event CARs 
may not be significant if the signal is not credible.  
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5.4.3.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 5-3 presents a summary of insider trading prior to the lockup expiry dates. 
Panel A. shows that the average and median number of early insider sells amount 
to two. The average lockup period of such companies is 423 days. Since the 
average for the sample as a whole is 391 days, as reported in Table 1, Panel C., the 
results imply that the sell trades are likely to occur in longer lockups. The average 
(median) sells occur 58% (62%) of the way from the IPO to the lockup date, i.e., 
about 245 days after the IPO date. The average (median) proportion of shares 
locked relative to shares outstanding is 33% (30%), but these shares locked 
represent 95% (100%) of the holdings of insiders, out of which they sold 5.63% 
(0.51%). In relation to the shares outstanding, the average (median) sell trades 
represent 2.54% (0.23%). Interestingly, before they sell, share prices increase by an 
average (median) of 9.72% (8.15%), suggesting that such sells occur in IPOs that 
appear to have done very well. 
Panel B. reports the results for the buy trades. The results are qualitatively 
similar to Panel A., with the exception of the proportion of shares bought and the 
pre-trades share price behaviour. On average, insider buys represent a smaller 
proportion of the shares locked (0.91%), and shares outstanding (0.21%). In 
contrast to the sell trades, the buy trades are more likely to occur in 
underperforming IPOs, as the mean (median) abnormal stock returns are -8.47% (-
4.64%).    
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Table 5-3 Summary Statistics of Insider Trading prior to Lockup Expiration 
Dates 
 10
th 
percentile
Median Mean 90th 
Percentile
Panel A. Early sell trades 
Number of trades 
Days Locked 
1
184
2
365
2 
423 
4 
730 
Sell time as fraction of lockup length (%) 15 62 58 95 
Shares locked relative to shares outstanding
Shares locked relative to insider shares 
7
70 
30
100 
33 
95 
73 
100 
Shares sold early relative to shares locked 0.06 0.51 5.63 10.25 
Shares sold early relative to shares 
outstanding 
CAR-42,-2 
0.02 
 
-6.15
0.23 
 
8.15
2.54 
 
9.72 
6.78 
 
25.48 
Panel B. Early buy trades 
Number of trades 
Days Lockup
1
360
2
365
3 
438 
5 
731 
Buy time as fraction of lockup length (%) 9 43 61 93 
Shares locked relative to shares outstanding 
Shares locked relative to  insider shares
10
66
26
100
30 
93 
65 
100 
Shares bought early relative to shares locked
Shares bought early relative to shares 
outstanding 
0.035
0.005 
0.27
0.045 
0.91 
0.213 
1.69 
0.345 
CAR-42,-2 -38.5 -4.64 -8.47 13.38 
I obtained insider holdings data for the period January 1999 to December 2007 from the Directors 
Deals and match it with my constructed lockup dataset. The early sells (buys) are trades that 
occurred prior to the lockup expiration dates. The sample includes 186 sell trades by 116 IPOs 
(Panel A) and 694 buy trades by 254 IPOs (Panel B).  Sell (buy) time as a fraction of lockup length 
is the ratio of the number of days from the IPO date to the trade date over the lockup length. CAR
-42,-
2, the cumulative abnormal return 40 day pre-event window. I use the standard event study 
methodology to compute the abnormal returns with α and ȕ based on regression of stock returns on 
the FTSE All Share Price Index for main market companies and AIM All Share Price Index for 
AIM companies. 
 
Table 5-4 presents a comparative analysis of early trades firms against the 
remaining IPOs. Panel A. reports summary statistics of the 116 firms that are 
released from lockups compared to the 715 with no early sell trades. The early sell 
trades represent 14% out a total sample of 831 IPOs, in line with US evidence of 
17% and 15% reported by Field and Hanka (2001) and Brav and Gompers (2003) 
respectively. Interestingly, the vast majority (85%) of these companies released are 
from AIM.  Insiders sold an average of 16.42% (with a maximum, not reported of 
190 
 
56.8%) of their shares locked. These companies are also more likely to have longer 
lockups (423 days vs. 389), a larger proportion of shares held, a smaller proportion 
with institutional presence, and they are larger, not from high-tech industry and 
backed by venture capitalists. Compared to the remaining 715 IPOs, early sell IPOs 
generate significantly larger returns prior to the insider sells (9.72% vs. 0.52% for 
the remaining IPOs),60 and they had significantly lower underpricing at the time of 
IPO (9.53% vs. 23.09%). These results appear to suggest that the early sell trades 
are more likely to occur in lower moral hazard and information asymmetry firms, 
and imply that underwriters do not allow early sells in low-liquidity firms, those 
not backed by venture capitalist and with low returns because of the higher level of 
asymmetric information. Consistent with previous evidence on insider trading (e.g., 
Korczak and Lasfer (2009)), the announcement and post-announcement abnormal 
returns are negative and significant, suggesting that the sell trades provide negative 
information to the market.  
IPOs where insiders sell prior to lockup expiration are underpriced by 
9.53% (Table 5-4). This is consistent with asymmetric information models of Rock 
(1986). The underpricing is also consistent with Holmstrom-Tirole (1993) who 
asserts that when stockholders realize that they will lose money on trades with 
speculators, they pay less for the shares they buy when the firm issues them. In the 
post-IPO period, the adverse selection problem induced by insiders’ sells is 
mitigated by the share price run-up during that time period. Since, underwriters 
allow insiders to sell shares in firms with recent share price run-ups, it mitigates the 
                                                 
60 For the no insider trade sample, we measure the 40-day abnormal return as the abnormal return 
over the whole lockup period standardised to 40 days. 
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adverse selection, and, at the time of lockup expirations, investors are not affected, 
as the early sell IPOs do not experience a significant price drop around lockup 
expirations. On the other hand, the IPOs where insiders buy early are underpriced 
even more (18.87%). Insiders’ early buy trades occur in IPOs where the share price 
declines in the post-IPO period. Given that early buy IPOs perform badly in the 
post-IPO period, investors pay even less for them at the offering stage.      
 
Table 5-4 Characteristics of IPOs with and without Early Insider Trades 
Insider trading prior to lockup expiration Yes No p-value of diff. in 
mean  
Panel A. Early sell trades 
Number of IPOs 
AIM companies (%) 
116
85
715
15
 
Number of trades 186 –  
% Shares sold relative to shares locked
Average Lockup (days) 
16.42
423*** 
–
389 
 
0.00 
% Shares locked relative to shares outstanding
% Shares locked relative to insider shares
33***
95**
29
90
0.00 
0.05 
CAR -42,-2 
CAR -1, +1 
CAR +2,+42 
9.72***
-1.78***
 
-5.96***
0.52
 
0.00 
 
Underpricing 
Size 
9.53***
274***
23.09
125
0.00 
0.05 
Prestigious underwriter (%) 23.2 19.6 0.18 
Venture-backed (%) 19.22** 11.49 0.05 
Institutional Holding (%) 48.38*** 62.63 0.00 
High-tech (%) 3.7*** 10.6 0.00 
Panel B. Early buy trades
Number of IPOs 
AIM companies (%) 
254
94
577
6
 
Number of trades 694 –  
% Shares bought  relative to shares locked
Average Lockup (days) 
4.83
438*** 
–
388 
 
0.00 
% Shares locked relative to shares outstanding
Shares locked relative to insider shares
30
93***
31
97
0.11 
0.05 
CAR-42,-2 
CAR -1, +1 
CAR +2,+42 
-8.47***
2.43*** 
1.02
-3.01 0.00 
Underpricing 
Size 
18.87
169.45
22.99
151.16
0.23 
0.26 
Prestigious underwriter (%) 20.74 20.81 0.85 
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Venture-backed (%) 15.85** 10.72 0.04 
Institutional Holding (%) 64.69 61.48 0.13 
High-tech (%) 10.66 10.27 0.25 
Panel C. Abnormal Returns Around Insider Trades relative to All UK Insider Trades
                                                               Early sell        All       p-val           Early buy  All       p-val
N 
CAR -42,-2 
CAR -1, +1 
CAR +2,+42 
116
9.72*** 
-1.78*** 
-5.96*** 
7,723
5.60*** 
-0.13 
0.24 
 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00
254 
-8.47*** 
2.43*** 
1.02 
26,268
-4.32*** 
1.02*** 
2.13*** 
 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00
 
 
CARs are the cumulative abnormal return over various windows. For the no trade sample, I 
measure the 40-day abnormal return as the abnormal return over the whole lockup period 
standardised to 40 days. Underpricing is the percent return on the first day from the 
offering price to the closing price. Size is the market value of equity in 2008 constant 
terms. Prestigious underwriter is defined if the global investment bank has underwritten 
the issue. Venture-backed is the proportion of IPOs backed by venture capitalist. 
Institutional Holding is the proportion of companies where institutions hold more than 3%. 
High-tech Dummy is equal to one if the IPO is in computer manufacturing, electronic 
equipment, computer and data processing services, and optical, medical and scientific 
equipment. I report p-values for the mean difference test between early trade and no trade. 
***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel B. reports the results for the 694 buy trades undertaken in 254 IPOs. 
The number of IPOs with buy trades represents 31% of total sample firms, and as 
far as I know, no previous study considers such trades. Interestingly, nearly all the 
254 IPOs with buy trades (94%) are quoted on AIM, and as a result, only 6% of the 
remaining 577 companies without insider buy trades are from the AIM. Insiders 
bought an average of 4.83% (with a maximum, not reported of 28.2%) of their 
shares already locked. In line with the sell trades reported in Panel A., the buy 
trades appear to occur in IPOs with longer lockup days, high proportion of shares 
locked relative to shares held, and those with high venture capitalists backing. 
Unlike the early sell trades reported in Panel A., the buy trades do not appear to 
occur in large and IPOs with low institutional block ownership. The most 
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interesting findings relate to the level of underpricing and the share price 
performance around the event dates. Unlike the early sell trades IPOs, the average 
underpricing of the 254 early buy IPOs of 18.87% is statistically higher than that of 
early sell IPOs (Panel A.), but similar to the 22.99% of the remaining 577 IPOs. In 
addition, the results indicate that early buy trades IPOs underperform significantly 
in the pre-event period, as the CAR-42,-2 of -8.47% are statistically significant and 
lower than the -3.01% observed for the remaining 577 IPOs. On the event period, 
the abnormal returns increase by 2.43%, but this positive share price performance 
appears to be limited, as the post-event abnormal returns of 1.02% are not 
significant. These results suggest that early insider buys are more likely to be 
undertaken to support prices for underperforming IPOs rather than to convey 
private information about future performance.  
Table 5-4 (Panel C) compares insider trading within lockup period and 
insider trading in all companies in the UK during the sample period. The 
information content is higher for the trades undertaken within the lockup period 
compared to all insider trades. For example, the event-period return for early sell 
trades is -1.78%, compared to -0.13% for all sells. For early buys, the immediate 
market reaction is 2.43% compared to 1.02% for all buys. The mean differences are 
significant at 1% level for both sell and buy trades for pre-event, event and post-
event periods. These results are consistent with the view that information 
asymmetry is higher in IPOs. 
 Fishman and Hagerty (1992) assert that insider trading might have two 
adverse effects on stock price efficiency. First, with insider trading the number of 
informed traders in the market is lower and insiders hinder non-insiders from 
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acquiring information and trading. Second, with insider trading, the information in 
the market is not evenly distributed, i.e., insiders have information advantage. 
Since insiders have informational advantage, lockup restricts insiders from selling 
shares after IPO. The existence (lack) of insiders may discourage (stimulate) 
information production by the analysts, hence negatively (positively) affecting the 
efficiency of stock prices. 
 
5.4.3.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
Logit regressions are estimated to determine which firms are more likely to have 
insider trades prior to lockup expiration. The results are reported in Table 5-5. The 
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the early insider sell (Panel A.) or 
buy (Panel B.) occur prior to lockup expiration, and zero otherwise. As predicted 
by the commitment and signalling hypothesis, Panel A. shows that firms with 
reduced information asymmetry problems are more likely to have early insider 
sells. The abnormal returns over the preceding 40-day period are positively related 
to the probability of early sells, suggesting that investors are less likely to be 
concerned with the insiders cashing out in firms that have done well in the past. 
Interestingly, the probability of early sell trades is not affected by venture capitalist 
backing, underpricing and the proportion of shares locked. Instead, it is positively 
related to prestigious underwriter, lockup length, and size, but negatively related to 
institutional holding. These results suggest that underwriters are likely to be behind 
the insiders’ decision to sell shares before the lockup expiry dates. Since these 
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IPOs are doing well, they suggest that underwriters release insiders when there is 
no need for signalling, and the potential agency costs that might arise from insiders 
selling are likely to be small. Since these IPOs have a lower institutional 
ownership, and the coefficient of venture-backing is not significant, my results 
suggest that underwriters do not face constraints from these two investors when 
they decide to release insiders from their lockup commitments. 
Panel B. reports the results for early buy trades. Unlike the results for the 
early sell trades, the coefficient of the pre-trade cumulative abnormal returns (CAR-
42,-2) is now negative and significant, suggesting that insiders buy in 
underperforming IPOs. The probability of insider buy trades is also affected by the 
IPO under-pricing, venture capitalists backing, and the proportion of shares locked. 
In addition, institutional holding, size and high tech dummy are now not 
statistically significant. However, in line with the results for the sell trades, 
prestigious underwriters and the lockup lengths are significantly related to the 
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Table 5-5 Logit analysis of early trades by insiders 
 Estimate Standard Error p-value 
Panel A. Early sell trades 
Intercept -1.561** 0.730 0.032 
CAR-42,-2 5.127
*** 0.867 0.000 
Underpricing (%) -0.004 0.003 0.139 
Venture backed 
Prestigious Underwriter 
-0.590
1.970***
0.435
0.390
0.175 
0.000 
Institutional Holding -0.982*** 0.212 0.000 
Days Locked 0.0016*** 0.0005 0.006 
Size  0.0002* 0.0001 0.066 
Shares locked  0.003 0.006 0.668 
High-tech Dummy 
Year Dummies 
-0.784* 0.426
YES 
0.065 
 
 
Pseudo R2 
  
19.29
 
Panel B. Early buy trades 
Intercept -0.176 0.414 0.673 
CAR-42,-2 -2.006
*** 0.335 0.000 
Underpricing (%) -0.004*** 0.001 0.005 
Venture backed 
Prestigious Underwriter  
0.298*
0.294*
0.165
0.152 
0.071 
0.054 
Institutional Holding 0.065 0.081 0.419 
Days Locked 0.003*** 0.0004 0.000 
Size 0.0001 0.0001 0.154 
Shares locked  -0.007* 0.004 0.082 
High-tech Dummy -0.0002 0.185 0.999 
Year Dummies 
 
 YES  
Pseudo R2  17.43  
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for early insider sell (buy) trades. Insider 
sell sample includes 186 events by 116 IPOs and 715 IPOs with no sell trades. Insider buy 
sample includes 694 trades by 254 IPOs and 577 IPOs with no buy trades. CAR
-42,-2, the 
cumulative abnormal return 40 day pre-event window. For the no trade sample, I measure 
the 40-day abnormal return as the abnormal return over the whole lockup period 
standardised to 40 days. Underpricing is the percent return on the first day from the 
offering price to the closing price. Venture backed is dummy variable equal to one venture 
capitalist is present. Prestigious underwriter is defined if the global investment bank has 
underwritten the issue. Institutional Holding is a dummy variable equal to one if 
institutions hold more than 3% share at IPO date. Days locked is the log of the lockup 
period. Size is the log of market value of equity in 2008 constant terms. Shares locked is 
the number of shares locked over the holdings of insiders. High-tech Dummy is equal to 
one if the IPO is in computer manufacturing, electronic equipment, computer and data 
processing services, and optical, medical and scientific equipment. Year dummies are 
included in both regressions to control for time effects.  ***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.1 levels, respectively.  
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probability of insider early buy trades. In line with the commitment hypothesis, my 
results suggest that underwriters are likely to play a significant role in insiders’ 
decision to increase their holdings before the lockup expiry dates to support the 
price of underperforming IPOs, probably with the help of venture capitalist, but not 
institutional investors, as their holding is not statistically significant. This implies 
that insiders increase their holdings to support the price of their IPOs, and increase 
their stakes when their proportion of shares locked up is low and probably not 
sufficient to reduce the information asymmetries.  
Similar qualitative results are obtained in robustness checks. In particular, 
the coefficient of CAR-42,-2 is always positive for early sell and negative for early 
buy trades and statistically significant. I also find that Prestigious Underwriter is 
correlated with Under-pricing (-0.106) and Venture-Backed (0.040), in line with 
Brav and Gompers (2003). When I exclude these two variables, I find that for both 
the buy and sell trades Prestigious Underwriter is positive and significant 
(coefficient = 1.48, p-value = 0.00 for sell, and for the buy trades 0.161, 0.01, 
respectively). When I exclude this variable, I find that for both early sell and buy 
trades, underpricing is negative and venture-backed is positive, and both variables 
are statistically significant. The remaining results are qualitatively similar.  
Finally, the rent-seeking hypothesis is tested. As in Brav and Gompers 
(2003), I consider that investment banks may request lockups to commit insiders to 
maintain the IPO underwriters in future seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). As 
argued above, this commitment is likely to be stronger in the UK as companies 
need to maintain their underwriters throughout their quotation life. I first look 
through all the news announcements of sample IPOs to assess whether they had 
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any SEOs. I find only seven out of the 116 early sell trade IPOs (6%) and 15 out of 
254 early buy trades (5.9%) had SEOs over the sample period. These results 
suggest that investment bankers’ gains from underwriting the relatively small 
number of SEOs are likely to be insignificant. I further estimate the gains from 
insider dealing as in the UK companies have to use their underwriters in any 
insider transactions. I find that the average (median) market making fee for sell 
trades are £35610.8, equivalent to about $ 50,000 (£1101.6, $1,500), and £2944.2, 
$4100 (£97.2, $136) for the buy trades. I consider that these gains are very small to 
provide support to the rent-seeking hypothesis.  
5.4.4 Market Reaction on Lockup Expiration Dates 
 
This section explores the market reaction on the lockup expiration dates. As stated 
in Section 5-1, previous studies provide mixed evidence on the drivers of the 
puzzling price drop on the lockup expiry dates. This study contributes to this 
literature by isolating the impact of IPOs where insiders actually sell on the lockup 
expiry dates and assess whether the early insider buy/sell trades affect this drop. In 
particular, I test the proposition that the price drop is higher (lower) in IPOs with 
early buy (sell) trades as investors may expect a higher selling probability from 
early buy than early sell IPOs.   
In line with previous evidence (e.g., Brav and Gompers (2003)), I compute 
the abnormal returns for each IPO over the event window-10 to +10, where day 0 is 
the lockup expiry date. I compute the abnormal returns using the market model 
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with the FTSE AIM All Share Price Index61 and the FTSE All Share Price index as 
the corresponding market returns for AIM and main market IPOs, respectively. 
Table 5-6 reports the results of the cumulative abnormal returns over various event 
windows. Panel A. shows that for the sample as a whole, the average event date 
abnormal returns of -1.85% are statistically significant (t = -3.7). This negative 
performance extends to the seven days post event period, as share prices decrease 
abnormally by -0.95% in the +3 to +10 days. In the pre-event period and on the 
event date zero, the abnormal returns are not significant. Overall, my results are 
relatively consistent with previous evidence. For example, Brav and Gompers 
(2003) and Field and Hanka (2001) report event date abnormal returns of -1.5%, 
and -2.0%, respectively, and suggest that lockup expiry dates are likely to increase 
the agency conflicts between managers and outside investors and opens up ways 
for trading on insider information.62 However, it is not clear as to whether this 
negative abnormal performance is driven by the actual sell trades of insiders or 
market expectations. 
This study expands previous evidence in several ways. First, the sample 
IPOs are divided into early buy and early sell trade IPOs. Contrasting results are 
found. In particular, the abnormal returns of IPOs with early sell trades are 
significantly higher than the early buy trade IPOs. For the early sells sample, share 
prices increase substantially in the pre-event period as the CAR-10,-3 of 4.13 are 
positive and statistically significant. During the event period, the CAR-2, +2 of -1% 
                                                 
61 Similar results were found using the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index.  
62 Insiders should not trade up to two months before earnings and one before any other news 
releases. However, Korczak and Lasfer (2007) report that they trade strategically on news 
announcements during these restricted periods. Internationally, insider trading rules are not enforced 
(Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)). 
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are significant, but only 42% observations are negative. In the post-event period 
and on the event date zero, the abnormal returns are not significant. Overall, the 
results indicate that IPOs with early sell trades are not affected significantly by the 
lockup expiry dates.  
In contrast, IPOs with early buy trades generate significantly lower 
abnormal returns on the lockup expiry dates. The pre-event abnormal returns of -
0.01% are not statistically different from zero, but on the event and post-event 
periods, the abnormal returns are all negative and significant. These abnormal 
returns are also significantly lower than the corresponding abnormal returns for the 
early sell trade sample, as reflected in the p-value of differences in means reported 
in the last column of Table 5-6. These results appear to imply that the market is 
expecting more sell trades from early buy IPOs, as insiders increased their holdings 
in the pre-lockup expiry period, which may be reduced in the post-lockup 
expiration dates.  
This study checks further these results by identifying IPOs where insiders 
actually sold their stakes during the lockup expiry dates. Given the requirements of 
insiders to report their trades up to five days after the actual transaction, I select 
days -5 to day +5 around the lockup expiry dates. I also use the transaction date as 
opposed to the announcement date of insider trades. I find no trades before or after 
day zero, but I identify 10 trades on the event date. None of these transactions is in 
early buy/sell sub-samples. Table 5-6, Panel B, presents the abnormal returns 
around the lockup expiry dates of IPOs without and with actual sell trades. The 
results of the former sub-sample are relatively similar to Panel A. However, as 
expected, the abnormal returns of IPOs with insider sells on the expiry date 
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underperform significantly those without sells, particularly in the event and post-
event periods, with 70% to 80% negative returns, compared to 57% and 52% for 
IPOs without actual sell trades. 
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Table 5-6 Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Lockup Expiration Dates 
All Early Sell Early Buy Mean 
difference 
p-value CAR t-stat 
Percent 
Negative CAR t-stat 
Percent 
Negative CAR t-stat 
Percent 
Negative
CAR -10,-3 -0.09 -0.45 55   4.13
***   8.27 41 -0.01 -0.04 56 0.00 
CAR -2,+2 -1.85
*** -3.70 57 -1.00*** -2.00 42 -0.46*** -2.32 49 0.03 
CAR +3,+10 -0.95
** -1.90 52 -0.70 -1.41 42 -1.68*** -3.37 52 0.00 
AR 0 -0.50 -1.25 49   0.16   0.32 44 -1.22
*** -2.43 57 0.00 
Panel B. Abnormal Returns of IPOs with and without Actual Sells on Expiry Dates 
IPOs without actual sells IPOs with actual sells Mean 
difference 
p-value CAR t-stat 
Percent 
Negative CAR t-stat 
Percent 
Negative 
CAR-10,-3 -0.09 -0.43 55 -0.10 -0.49 70 0.28 
CAR-2,+2 -1.84 -3.32 57 -2.50 -3.55 70 0.02 
CAR+3,+10 -0.85 -1.86 52 -1.50 -2.96 80 0.04 
AR0 -0.50 -1.24 49 -0.56 -1.26 80 0.20 
The sample includes 831 IPOs over the period 1999-2006. I use the standard event study methodology to compute the abnormal returns with α and 
ȕ based on regression of stock returns on the FTSE All Share Price Index for main market companies and AIM All Share Price Index for AIM 
companies. Early sell are IPOs where insiders sell before lockup expiration (116 companies with 186 trades). Early buy are IPOs where insiders 
buy before lockup expiration (254 companies with 694 trades). Panel B reports the differences in the cumulative abnormal returns over various 
event widows between IPOs with and without actual sell trades on the expiry dates. I do not divide the sample in this panel into early buy and early 
sell trades as none of these actual sells are from these two subsamples. ***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Figure 1 plots the daily average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the 
21 event days. The results clearly indicate the dominance of early sell trade IPOs 
over the remaining IPOs throughout the whole period. These results confirm my 
early findings that early sell IPOs do very well, and, thus, underwriters do not need 
to commit further insiders to lockup contracts. For the remaining IPOs, while the 
pre-event CARs are relatively homogeneous, the event and post-event period 
abnormal returns are significantly lower for IPOs with actual sell trades, but they 
are also negative for IPOs with early buy trades. I also find that the -1.68% 
CAR+3,+10 for the early buy IPOs are significantly lower than the -0.95% for the 
whole sample (p = 0.00), but relatively similar to the -1.50% for the actual sell 
trades IPOs (p = 0.77). These results provide further support to my earlier findings 
that insiders buy before the lockup expiry dates in underperforming IPOs and that 
they are likely to support the price, but such price support is likely to be short-
lived.  
Figure 5-1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Lockup Expiration Dates 
 
The sample includes 831 UK IPOs over the period 1999-2006. I compute the abnormal 
returns using the standard event study methodology with α and ȕ based on regression of 
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stock returns on the FTSE All Share Price Index for main market companies and AIM All 
Share Price Index for AIM companies. I obtain the daily share price and indices data from 
DataStream. Early Sell IPOs are IPOs where insiders sell before lockup expiration (116 
IPOs with 186 trades). Early Buy IPOs are IPOs where insiders buy before lockup 
expiration (254 IPOs with 694 trades). IPOs with Actual Sell Trades on Expiry Dates 
represent the 10 firms where insiders have actually sold stakes on the expiry date. 
 
 
The price drop on the lockup expiration leads me to examine whether the 
trading volume is abnormally high around the event period. The abnormal volume 
may partly reflect the shares sold for the first time in the market by insiders, but 
other investors may also sell by following the trading strategy of the insiders. The 
analysis of the trading volume will also allow to assess whether the price drop 
detected in the previous section is the result of actual sell trades or market makers’ 
decrease in price. This study, therefore, assesses whether the price drop on the 
lockup expiration dates is associated with greater abnormal volume.  
This study follows Field and Hanka (2001) methodology in calculating the 
abnormal volume. I, first, obtain the daily volume from DataStream. Then, I define 
normal volume as the mean daily volume in days t-71 to t-11 relative to the lockup 
expiry date. The abnormal volume is the daily volume divided by the mean daily 
volume minus 1. To eliminate the effect of outliers in my analysis I set observation 
greater than 99th percentile in each event day equal to the median observation. For 
the sample as a whole, the abnormal trading volume before the lockup expiry dates 
is mainly insignificant but it starts picking up at date -3. The significant increases 
occur in day zero when the peak of 80% is reached and did not revert to zero, even 
when I increase the post event period, suggesting a permanent change in trading 
activity. My results are consistent with Field and Hanka (2001) and Brav and 
Gompers (2003) but the latter find that a peak of 56% on day +2.  
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Given the data availability on the actual trades in the UK market, this study 
is able to extend previous studies by stratifying the overall sample into sub-groups. 
Figure 5-2 indicates that the abnormal trading volume is not homogeneously 
distributed. The volume of IPOs with buy and sell trades is relatively random, with 
no significant change in the pre- and post-event period. In contrast, in the 
remaining IPOs, the abnormal volume is highly volatile. As expected, the volume 
of IPOs with actual sell trades increased significantly on day zero to reach about 
60%. However, the figure implies that, since for the overall sample the increase is 
80%, the remaining IPOs, i.e., those not subject to early buy/sell trades or actual 
sell trades on the lockup expiry dates appear to drive the higher abnormal trading 
volume. These results are surprising and suggest that the high volume reflects 
expectation of investors of potential, not actual, insider sell trades. As robustness 
check, I increase the post event window and find that the abnormal volume does 
not revert to zero, while the trend in IPOs subject to early buy/sell trades remains 
relatively random. 
 
Figure 5-2 Abnormal Volume around Lockup Expiration Dates 
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The sample includes 831 UK IPOs over the period 1999-2006. The abnormal volume is the 
daily volume divided by the mean daily volume over t-71 to t-11 days relative to the 
lockup expiry date, minus 1. I obtain the daily volume from DataStream. To eliminate the 
effect of outliers in my analysis I set observation less than 1st or greater than 99th percentile 
in each event day equal to the median observation. Early Sell IPOs are IPOs where insiders 
sell before lockup expiration (116 IPOs with 186 trades). Early Buy IPOs are IPOs where 
insiders buy before lockup expiration (254 IPOs with 694 trades). IPOs with Actual Sell 
Trades on Expiry Dates represent the 10 firms where insiders have actually sold stakes on 
the expiry date. 
 
These results of stock price performance around the lockup expiry dates are 
puzzling for two main reasons. First, it is expected that sell trades to occur more in 
IPOs where insiders purchase shares before the lockup expiry dates. Given that 
these IPOs underperform, insiders are expected to rush to sell when their lockup 
contract expired. I find no sell trades in these companies. Could it be that the 
underwriters extend further the lockup expiry dates in these IPOs? I could not find 
data to test this hypothesis. Second, consistent with previous evidence, the 
abnormal returns of all IPOs, independently of the actual sell transactions, decrease 
on the lockup expiry dates. Although the price decline may appear to be consistent 
with a simple downward sloping demand curve story, it is hard to explain the 
results in a rational expectations framework. In the case of lockups, investors 
already know that a higher amount of shares will be available after the lockup 
expiration day. The market is expected to foresee the number of shares sold at 
expiration accurately, and, thus, on average, the abnormal returns should be zero 
(Allen and Postlewaite (1984)). For the downward-sloping demand curves to 
explain the price decline that I observe, as in the case of Field and Hanka (2001), 
the market must hold consistently inaccurate prior beliefs about the fraction of 
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equity that will be sold at expiration, and hence must be consistently surprised by 
how many shares actually come to the market.  
Under the efficient market hypothesis, this temporary mispricing should be 
arbitraged away, as rational arbitrageurs will even leverage and drive the price to 
the fundamental level, and reap all the rewards of the arbitrage. In this case, I 
expect zero price reaction. However, various studies document possible cases 
where returns on the lockup expiry dates may be different from zero. For example, 
there may be limits to arbitrage, which may arise from the agency problems of 
investment managers. This is the case where noise trader risk gets worse in the 
short run and force fund managers, who cannot convince their investors they are 
skilled, to liquidate at a time when expected returns are the highest (Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997)). Pontiff (1996) discusses costly arbitrage, which might prevent 
investors from undertaking investments that would correct the temporary 
mispricing, even if they know how many shares were coming to the market. 
Investors may not want to gamble against the stock by selling it short, particularly 
if the stock is volatile. Finally, the expiry dates abnormal returns may be different 
from zero if the transaction costs are higher than the price drops, making any 
trading not profitable. Brav and Gompers (2003) estimate average transaction costs, 
as measured by the bid-ask spread, to be 6.3%, much higher than my reported 
abnormal returns.  
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5.4.5 Cross-sectional Differences in Lockup Expiry Dates 
Abnormal Returns 
 
In this section, I provide further evidence on the drivers of the lockup expiry dates 
abnormal returns, and assess, in particular, the impact of the early buy and sell 
trades. This study also follows previous evidence and test whether cross-sectional 
differences in abnormal returns around the expiry dates can shed light on the 
competing hypothesis that can explain lockups. This study follows Brav and 
Gompers (2003) and to Field and Hanka (2001) and regress the CAR-2, +2 around 
the lockup expiry dates on a set of explanatory variables.63 In particular, in line 
with Brav and Gompers (2003), I use a set of dummy variables equal to one if (i) 
the abnormal return between IPO and the lockup expiration is above the median; 
(ii) insider sell occurs before lockup expiration; (iii) the firm is financed by a 
venture capitalist; and (iv) the underwriter is prestigious. In addition, a set of 
control variables are included to capture lockup characteristics and firms’ 
fundamentals, including, the percentage of post-IPO insider shares locked, shares 
issued at IPO relative to shares outstanding, stock price volatility, cash flow 
margin, market-to-book ratio, and size as proxied by the log of market value of 
equity in 2008 constant Pound Sterling. However, I do not include SEO dummy 
before lockup expiry dates because none of my sample firms raised additional 
capital. Instead, I focus more on the impact of insider trading before and on the 
lockup expiry date and the UK institutional framework. I, therefore, add a set of 
dummy variables equal to one if (i) insiders buy stocks before the lockup expiry 
                                                 
63 Brav and Gompers (2003) use buy-and-hold abnormal return from two days before to two days 
after lockup expiration as the dependent variable. 
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dates; (ii) insiders sell on the lockup expiry dates, (iii) institutions hold large 
stakes; and (iv) if the IPO is a high-tech company. The inclusion of insider sell 
dummy before lockup expiration controls for a reduced desire of insiders to sell 
after the lockup expiration. I present the results for the sample as a whole and for 
the main market and AIM separately to assess further the impact of the institutional 
differences between the two markets.  
Table 5-7 Regression Results of CAR-2, +2 around the Lockup Expiration 
Dates 
 Full Sample Main Market AIM 
Constant -0.06* 
[-1.66] 
-0.05 
[-1.35] 
-0.06 
[-0.75] 
Insider early sell 1.10 
[0.69] 
0.47 
[0.24] 
0.51 
[0.42] 
Insider early buy -1.74*** 
[-2.58] 
-1.24*** 
[-2.20] 
-1.32* 
[-1.72] 
Executive Sell Dummy 
 
0.01 
[0.14] 
0.25 
[0.13] 
0.01 
[0.55] 
Executive Buy Dummy 
 
-0.32*** 
[-3.49] 
-0.34*** 
[-3.31] 
-0.30*** 
[-3.37] 
Actual sell trade on expiry date 
 
Shares locked  
 
Performance 
-0.48 
[-3.45] *** 
-0.03*** 
[-2.51] 
1.71*** 
[2.20] 
-0.51 
[-2.96] *** 
-0.02*** 
[-2.40] 
1.60** 
[2.02] 
-0.53 
[-1.98] ** 
-0.01*** 
[-2.76] 
1.85** 
[1.97] 
Size 0.01 
[1.36] 
0.01 
[1.56] 
0.02 
[0.58] 
Market-to-book  0.02 
[0.03] 
0.003 
[1.13] 
0.001 
[0.64] 
Venture-backed -1.07 
[-0.69] 
-0.96 
[-1.54] 
-0.03 
[-0.85] 
Prestigious underwriter -0.05 
[-0.60] 
-0.008 
[-0.42] 
-0.005 
[-0.31] 
Institutional holding -0.96 
[-0.99] 
-0.18 
[-0.90] 
-0.15 
[-1.50] 
Shares issued at IPO  0.03*** 
[2.59] 
0.01** 
[2.25] 
0.01*** 
[2.82] 
Cash flow margin -0.01 
[-1.15] 
-0.01 
[-0.31] 
-0.01 
[-0.27] 
Stock price volatility -0.53*** -0.44** -0.67** 
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[-2.74] [-1.96] [-2.56] 
High-tech Dummy -0.50 -0.20 -0.20 
 
Year Dummies 
[-0.30] 
Yes 
 
[-0.23] 
Yes 
 
[-0.88] 
Yes 
 
Adjusted R2 2.35 2.90 2.20 
N 831 141 690 
The dependent variable is Cumulative abnormal return from -2 to +2 days around the 
lockup expiration date. Insider early Sell is a dummy variable taking the value of one if 
insiders sell prior to lockup expiration. Insider early buy is a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if insiders buy before lockup expiration. Actual sell trade on expiry date is a 
dummy equal to one if insiders actually sell on the lockup expiry date. Shares locked is the 
fraction of insider shares that are subject to lockup restrictions. Performance is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the cumulative abnormal return since the offering is higher than 
median. Size is the log of market value of equity in 2008 constant terms. Market-to-book is 
the ratio of market capitalization at the IPO divided by the book value of the equity in the 
first reporting period after IPO. Venture-backed is dummy equal to one if the IPO is 
backed by venture capitalists. Prestigious underwriter is dummy variable equal to one if 
global underwriter is the underwriter for the float. Institutional Holding is a dummy 
variable equal to one if institutional investors hold more than 3% share at the time of IPO. 
Shares issued at IPO is the ratio of shares issued and fully traded over number of shares 
outstanding. Cash Flow Margin is the ratio of operating cash flows over sells. Stock price 
volatility is the standard deviation of the daily returns of the firm’s abnormal return in the 
period beginning one day after IPO and ending 11 days before lockup expiration. High-
tech Dummy is equal to one if the IPO is in the following industries: computer 
manufacturing, electronic equipment, computer and data processing services, and optical, 
medical and scientific equipment. To eliminate the possible effect of outliers, for each 
variable, I replace observations whose values are either lower than the first or higher than 
99th percentiles by the sample median. t statistics are in the brackets. ***, **, * significant 
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.   
 
 
The results, reported in Table 5-7, indicate that the incidence of the sell 
trades before the lockup expiry dates has no effect on the event dates abnormal 
returns for the full sample as well as when the two markets are separated. The 
coefficient of the sell dummy is positive but not significant. These results are 
consistent with Brav and Gompers (2003) and suggest that IPOs where insiders had 
early sell trades are less likely to engage in significant selling activity after the 
lockup expiry dates, thus mitigating the expiry dates’ information asymmetry. In 
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contrast, the coefficient of the buy dummy is negative and significant, suggesting 
that companies where insiders increase their holdings underperform significantly 
on the expiry dates, probably reflecting the increase in the level of information 
asymmetry about the likelihood of large sell trades of the original shares locked up 
and the additional shares acquired before the lockup expiry date. However, these 
results hold even when a dummy is included for actual sell trades on the lockup 
expiry dates, which is negative and significant. The dummy for the buy trades 
undertaken by executive directors is also negative while that of the sell trades is not 
significant, suggesting that executive directors, as opposed to non-executives who 
are the venture capitalists, are made to increase their holdings. These results, thus, 
imply that while the early buy trade strategy may result in positive returns on the 
transaction dates, its impact in the post-trade period is limited, as shown above, and 
becomes negative at the lockup expiry dates. I check for robustness by including 
each of these variables at a time and by excluding the other explanatory variables. 
Similar qualitative results were found.   
Some of the remaining results are consistent with Brav and Gompers 
(2003), and provide support to the commitment and the signalling quality 
hypotheses. For example, the proportion of shares locked relative to shares 
outstanding is negative and significant. At the same time, the proportion of shares 
issued at IPO is positive and significant. These results suggest that the higher the 
number of shares locked, the higher the probability of selling after the lockup 
expiry dates, and, therefore, the higher the price drop, but the higher the proportion 
of shares sold at IPO, the lower the expected number of shares to be sold after the 
lockup expiry dates. Stock price volatility is negative and significant, suggesting 
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that costly arbitrage limits the ability of the arbitrageurs to short sell before the 
lockup expiration dates, as volatility proxies for information asymmetry. 
Furthermore, cash flow margins, prestigious underwriters, growth as measured by 
market to book, and size, are not significant, and therefore, they do not appear to 
exert any impact on the lockup expiry dates abnormal returns. 
However, in contrast to Brav and Gompers (2003), my results show that the 
pre-lockup expiry date performance is positive and significant, suggesting that 
companies that did well in the past are associated with lower price declines during 
the event date abnormal returns. I checked whether the early sell trades of insiders 
or their actual sells on the lockup expiry dates drive these results. This study finds 
that the coefficient of performance is positive and significant even if the remaining 
explanatory variables are excluded. I also find that the presence of venture 
capitalist does not explain the expiry dates abnormal returns, as its coefficient is 
negative but not significant. I also follow Brav and Gompers (2003) and test 
whether venture capitalist is significant in a reduced form regression. I find, but not 
report, that the coefficient is negative but significant at 0.10 level only in the main 
market. These results are driven by the relatively higher proportion of IPOs backed 
by venture capitalists on the Main market (45 IPOs, representing 32%) relative to 
AIM (71 IPOs, accounting for 10%). Finally, the presence of institutional investors 
does not appear to affect the expiry date abnormal returns. Overall, my results 
provide support to Brav and Gompers (2003) and indicate that IPOs that have less 
information asymmetries have smaller price declines on the lockup expiry dates 
than other IPOs.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
This study analyses insider trading within lockup period using a unique sample of 
831 UK IPOs from 1999 to 2006. I find that, compared to the US, lockups are 
relatively longer in the UK, but significant insider buy and sell trades occur before 
the expiry dates. I document that the probability of both these early trades is higher 
in IPOs with prestigious underwriters and longer lockups. However, insiders are 
more likely to be released early from the lockup agreements if their IPOs are doing 
exceptionally well, while they increase their holdings in IPOs that underperformed 
about 40 days before their trades. In addition, I find that insiders are more likely to 
sell in large, and low institutional holding IPOs, but they buy in IPOs with lower 
underpricing and proportion of shares locked. On the lockup expiry dates, there is 
significant price drop for early buy but not for early sell IPOs. Overall, these results 
suggest that the early trading activity by corporate insiders is consistent with the 
commitment as well as the signalling quality hypothesis.  
However, the results highlight the relative discretion of underwriters in 
setting up and enforcing the relatively longer lockups in the UK, reflecting the 
power they are likely to exercise on insiders of newly released IPOs. Chambers and 
Dimson (2009) argue that in the post World War II, the increase in underpricing is 
likely to reflect the reduction in the levels of trust between managers and 
underwriters, and the increase in the power of investment banks relative to the 
IPO’s managers and shareholders. The results of current study are likely to provide 
support for these propositions. First, the results suggest that investment banks play 
a significant role in the setting up of the observed relatively longer lockups in the 
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UK, which, consistent with US evidence, serve as a commitment device to 
overcome potential adverse selection at the offering as well as signal firms’ quality. 
I find that IPOs with prestigious underwriters do not necessary have substantially 
lower lockup lengths. Although consistent with US evidence (e.g., Brav and 
Gompers (2003)), the variable prestigious underwriters is negatively related to 
lockup length, the median lockup of 365 days is independent of the quality of 
underwriters and it is significantly higher than the 180 days observed in the US. 
The average lockup length of 338 days is also not too far from the overall average 
of 391 days.  
Second, my results highlight the underwriters’ involvement in the lockup 
enforcements. They suggest that the early trades are likely to be pre-arranged with 
the underwriters rather than decided unilaterally by insiders. This study finds 
strong evidence that IPOs with early buy/sell trades are more likely to have 
prestigious underwriters. In addition, since the buy (sell) trades occur in under- 
(over-) performing IPOs, the results indicate that the underwriters appear to release 
insiders of over-performing IPOs from the lockup constraints but force those of 
under-performing ones to increase their holdings. This asymmetric impact on the 
lockup suggests that although lockups are relatively longer than in the US, 
underwriters enforce them and have the ability to amend them when necessary.  
The impact of underwriters through their effect on early trades expands to 
the lockup expiry dates. This study finds that early sell IPOs carry on performing 
better and their stock price drop on the lockup expiry date is relatively small. In 
contrast, IPOs subject to buy trades continue underperforming and decrease 
substantially on the lockup expiry dates. I show that, surprisingly, insiders of these 
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early buy/sell trades IPOs do not actually sell their shares on the lockup expiry 
dates. The question remains as to whether underwriters prevent insiders, 
particularly those of early buy IPOs, to sell on the lockup expiry dates and whether 
this impact extends to the post-lockup-expiry dates. Some of these issues are the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
 
6 Insider Trading and the Long-run Performance of 
IPOs64 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter re-examines IPO performance in the long-run and assesses whether 
insider trading can explain the documented pattern of underperformance. Insider 
trading cannot explain the documented IPO long-run underperformance. IPOs 
where insiders are net sellers generate positive and significantly higher returns than 
those where they are net buyers or not subject to insider trading. The results hold 
even after controlling for all previously documented factors. The main drivers of 
insider trading are the pre-trade share price performance, the presence of 
prestigious underwriters, and the takeover probability. Overall, the results suggest 
that insider trading mitigates information asymmetries, and leads to a more 
efficient long-term valuation of IPOs, but do not provide support to the agency 
conflict, the signalling, and trading on private information hypotheses. 
 
Key words: Long run IPO performance, insider trades, London Stock Exchange, 
market timing.  
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G24. 
                                                 
64 This paper was presented at Cass Business School. I gratefully acknowledge comments from 
seminar participants at Cass Business School. All remaining errors are my own responsibility. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
Long run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) has been a puzzle for last 
three decades in the empirical finance literature. A large number of studies show 
that IPOs underperform, or at least do not generate positive returns despite having a 
high beta, 3 to 5 years after listing. Studies provide various explanations for this 
underperformance, including extreme differences of opinion amongst investors 
(Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995)), costly short selling and small 
public floats on many IPOs (Miller (1977) and Morris (1996)), behavioural timing 
(Loughran and Ritter (2000)),  and pseudo market timing (Schultz (2003)). It is 
also possible that insiders knowingly sell overvalued equity at the time of IPO, and, 
as the mispricing get corrected through time, IPOs tend to underperform. On the 
other hand, insiders may be uninformed of this overvaluation. One way to gain 
insight into managerial motives for going public, as argued by Lee (1997) and 
Kahle (2000) in the context of secondary equity offerings (SEOs), is to examine 
trading by insiders on their own account. If insiders take advantage of windows of 
opportunity in selling new shares, then they might also sell on their own account in 
order to profit from their knowledge as soon as the lockup period is over. The 
motivation of this paper is to analyse insider trading activity over three years after 
IPO, to assess whether such trading activity explains the previously documented 
long run underperformance of IPOs. 
Particularly, this study conjectures that, the trading activity of insiders 
reduces the information asymmetries and the differences of opinions across 
investors, and leads to a more efficient long-term valuation of IPOs. Information 
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and non-information motives for insider trading are contrasted. I argue that since 
insiders, defined as board members, are closer to their firm, are able to have better 
forecasts of the future cash flows than the market, and they are likely to know its 
true value. From the viewpoint of information motivated trades, insiders are 
expected to convey information by buying shares if their company is undervalued, 
but selling if it is overvalued, resulting in a subsequent respective increase and 
decrease in share prices. Such post-trade share price behaviour will also be 
consistent with the agency theory, as an increase (decrease) in insider ownership is 
expected to lead to a mitigation (exacerbation) of the agency conflicts. On the other 
hand, if their trades are small and driven by non-information reasons, such as, 
liquidity, diversification and release from lockups, a weak relationship between 
insider trading and the long-term performance of IPOs is expected.  
The relationships between insider ownership and corporate performance 
have been the subject of much theoretical and empirical investigation. Theoretical 
works have shown that there is a undeniable case for the proposition that ownership 
of shares by corporate decision makers (i.e., board of directors) can have an 
important influence on the way in which the firm is managed and, therefore, on the 
firm’s observed market value (Baumol (1959), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Demsetz (1983), Stulz (1988)).  Empirical works by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) and others, document a statistically 
significant cross-sectional correlation between share ownership by corporate 
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insiders and corporate performance.65 The case of insider ownership changes and 
corporate performance has been extended in this chapter in context of IPOs. 
Though insider trading is heavily examined in the previous literature,66 there is no 
study to my knowledge which link insider trading activities to the long run 
performance of IPOs. 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on the following questions: can insiders 
affect the long-run performance of their IPOs through their trades? Is this effect 
consistent with the direction of their trades, and does it reflect changes in 
information asymmetries and agency conflicts? Are insiders contrarians or trend 
followers, and, more specifically, do they buy stocks to support the widely 
documented decline in stock prices in the post-IPO period, or to cash in IPOs with 
rising prices? Finally, in which IPOs are they likely to trade and adopt specific 
trading strategies? In order to address these questions, I construct a unique data set 
of 830 UK IPOs containing all of the information from prospectuses, insider 
trading events, and relevant accounting and stock price data over a three-year 
period following their IPOs, to answer these questions. 
                                                 
65The relationship is non-linear, maximised at 40% ownership in US and UK (McConnell and 
Servaes, 1995, Lasfer, 2006).  
66
Previous studies analyse insider trading activities around certain events such as earnings 
announcements (Penman, 1982), takeovers (Seyhun, 1990), or bankruptcies (Seyhun and Bradley, 
1997). There are studies which examine whether share buybacks and insider buying activity are 
driven by the undervaluation of the own company stocks (Lee, Mikkelson and Partch (1992)). Also, 
there are studies which examine whether insiders sell shares from their holdings and do SEOs at the 
same time and are they driven because the stocks are overvalued Kahle (2000). A recent study link 
insider trading activity with corporate events and have tested whether they time the market only on 
their personal transactions or they do it with the corporate transactions (Jenter, 2005). The timing 
skills of corporate insiders are already established in the corporate finance literature 
(e.g.,Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Some recent studies examine the insider trading behaviour under 
institutional constraint, i.e, lockup agreements in IPOs (e.g. Field and Hanka, 2001 and Brav and 
Gompers, 2003).  
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Consistent with Ritter (2003) and Eckbo et. al. (2007), this study finds that 
IPOs underperform over the three years after issuing equity. I further split the 
sample to check whether the underperformance originates from any particular time 
period. While in the first six months, the cumulative abnormal returns are not 
significant, they start becoming negative and significant mainly one year after the 
IPO, i.e., after the lock up expiry date, which, in the UK, is on average 365 days 
after the IPO (e.g., Hoque and Lasfer (2009)). Furthermore, when the sample are 
divided, conditional on insider trading, the IPOs where insider’s trade perform 
better than those where insiders do not trade. This might imply that insider trading 
increases stock price accuracy in IPOs and provides price discovery by moving 
stock prices significantly, which is consistent with Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and 
Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and Mcconnell (1997). When I split the companies 
where they trade, into companies where insiders are net buyers and where insiders 
are net sellers interesting results are obtained. This study shows that IPOs where 
insiders buy perform badly in the long run, but those where insiders are net buyers, 
perform slightly better than all IPOs in the sample and much better compared to the 
IPOs with no insider trading. The results may imply extended price support67 by 
the insiders in the case of companies which are performing badly. On the other 
hand, IPOs where insiders sell shares continue to perform well in the long run. I 
test for robustness using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.  I show 
that for the full sample, alpha is negative and significant. However, I find that 
                                                 
67 In general, underwriters can support prices by stimulating demand or by restricting supply in the 
aftermarket and in many countries temporary price support in IPOs is legal including the US (1934 
Securities Act, Rule 10b-7,since replaced by Regulation M)  and  UK (Securities and Investment 
Board Rules, chapter III, Part 10) 
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while alpha of No Trade IPOs is more negative, it becomes positive, but not 
significant, for IPOs with insider trading. Within this last sample, Net Sell IPOs 
generate positive alpha while Net Buy firms have negative alpha. My overall results 
suggest that the insider trading affects IPO performances.  
This study reports that, within three years after IPO, the average number of 
sell trades is 3.5 compared to 4.38 buy trades. The trade time after the IPO is 
similar for both trades and they occur roughly 1.5 years after IPO. These results 
imply most of the trades occur after the lockup expiration dates. I also show that, 
on average, the sell trades are 5 times larger than the buy trades. The mean 
(median) pre-trade cumulative abnormal return for the sell trades is 5.93% (4.57%) 
compared to -11.15%(-7.01%) for the buy trades. These results suggest that 
insiders are contrarians. The study finds that, the share price and prestigious 
underwriter are the driver of both the sell and buy trades.  
I test whether insiders trade before news announcements. I focus on two 
main news types, the takeover activity and raising additional capital through 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). I argue that insiders may buy stocks if their own 
company is likely to be subject to a takeover. This study finds that both this 
probability and the actual takeover dummy do not affect the long-term stock 
returns. Although this probability is higher in Net Buy, compared to Net Sell IPOs, 
it is the highest in No Trade IPOs. The probability of raising capital through SEOs 
is homogeneous across the sample IPOs and does not have any impact on the long-
run stock returns. Overall, it is not clear as to whether insiders trade when their 
company is likely to be subject to a takeover, and/or their company raises 
additional funds in the market.  
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This chapter is related to the enormous IPO literature which examined the 
price support, agency problems and adverse selection problems. The practice of the 
price support may well be consistent with both underpricing and poor long term 
returns (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001)). I find that IPOs which are underpriced 
more have performed badly in the long run and they are likely to be issued in the 
hot (bubble) market. This study also finds that, consistent with the agency cost of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), the greater the equity retained by the managers (proxy 
for agency costs) the better the long run performance. This evidence is also 
consistent with Mikkelson et al. (1997). The reputation of underwriters also 
increases this commitment and reduces the adverse selection, as Carter and 
Manaster (1990) find a negative correlation between investment banker reputation 
and IPO under-pricing. Brav and Gompers (1997) show that the underperformance 
is concentrated in non-venture backed IPOs. I relate the reputation of underwriters 
and VC backing with long run performance of IPOs. 
This study finds first day return is negatively related to long term returns, 
which is consistent with heterogeneous beliefs at the time of IPO and as time 
passes the valuation get corrected; hence IPOs which underprice more suffer in the 
long run (Morris (1996)). I also report that percent of equity retained to equity sold 
(overhang) is negatively related to long run IPO performance, which is consistent 
with agency explanation of long run performance. In addition, I show that the 
higher the lockup expiry returns the higher the underperformance. Higher drop in 
the lockup expiration may imply higher agency problem and it may contribute to 
the under-performance of the IPOs in the long run. Lockup length is negatively 
related to long term performance. The firms that go public with prestigious 
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underwriters and VC backed firms do not perform differently than other IPOs. Both 
bubble and hot dummy are statistically and economically significant, meaning that 
IPOs that are issued in the bubble (hot) period underperform.  
Finally, this study relates the results to the market timing ability of the 
insiders in their trades and in corporate events. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show 
that insiders are contrarians and simple contrarian strategy can be used to time the 
market.  Jenter (2005) find that managers try to actively time the market both in 
their private trades and corporate level decisions.  I provide new empirical evidence 
on trading by insiders in IPOs, and show that insiders in IPOs are also contrarians 
as they buy (sell) in stocks that under- (over-) perform, and they time the IPOs 
when the market sentiment is bullish. Though insiders time their trades and try to 
take advantage of temporary misvaluations in the market, I find that they do not 
trade opportunistically as the companies where insiders sell (buy) do not under- 
(over-)perform in the long run. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes reviews 
the literature and sets up the hypotheses. Section 3 presents a discussion of data and 
empirical methodology. Section 4 provides the empirical results, and the 
conclusions are in Section 5. 
6.2 Theoretical Background 
6.2.1 Review of Literature 
 
A number of previous studies report that IPOs generate surprisingly low returns 
after issuing shares over the holding period 3-5 years as first shown by Ibbotson 
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(1975) and then confirmed by Ritter (1991). This long run return performance 
challenges the efficient market hypothesis and motivates the behavioural asset 
pricing models. Acting in response to this challenge, some researchers show that 
the low post-issue return is consistent with the multi-factor asset pricing models 
and, since IPOs are small growth stocks, it is consistent with the expectations (Brav 
and Gompers (1997), Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000), Eckbo and Norli (2005)). 
Thus, the low post-issue returns may be a demonstration of the more general 
finding in Fama and French (1992) that small growth stocks show a poor 
performance. However, the issue of long run performance of IPOs is still 
controversial as Ritter (2003) states that “the long-run performance evidence shows 
that in general the market underreacts to the equity issue announcements” (p.262) .  
The empirical evidence provided to date is mixed. A number of studies 
report that IPOs underperform various benchmarks for the first few years after the 
offering.68 I classify the previous studies into two broad categories for comparative 
purpose: matching firm returns (BHR) and multifactor asset prices (α). It will 
facilitate the comparison across methodologies, and assess whether the findings of 
previous studies is only due to modelling the returns.  
 
 
 
                                                 
68 In the literature review section of chapter two, these studies are described in detail. There are 
many studies that document the negative long-run performance, including Ritter (1991), Loughran 
(1993), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Servaes and Rajan (1997), Brav and Gompers (1997), Gompers 
and Lerner (1999), Teo, Welch, and Wong (1998) for the US market, Uhlir (1989) for Germany, 
Finn & Higham's (1988) for Australia, Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) for Swiss and Keloharju (1993) 
for Finland. See Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Ritter and Welsh (2002), and Ritter (2003) for a 
review.   
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Table 6-1 Previous studies on long run IPO performance  
Study N Sample 
Period 
Holding 
period 
BHR α 
Brav and Gompers (1997) a 3,407 1972-1992 5 yrs 1.9% -0.49% 
Brav and Gompers (1997) b 934 1972-1992 5 yrs 16.5%  0.09% 
Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) 3,501 1975-1992 5 yrs 6.6% -0.19% 
Ritter and Welch (2002) 6,249 1980-2001 3 yrs -5.1% -0.21% 
Ritter (2003) 3,993 1970-2000 3 yrs -3.1%  
Eckbo and Norli (2005) 5,365 1972-1998 5 yrs -2.4% 0.40%c 
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) 5,018 1980-2000 5 yrs -18.0% -0.16%d 
Levis (2008)e 1,365 1992-2004 3 yrs 9.02% 0.04% 
Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks (2000) 562 1985-1992 5 yrs -42.77%f -0.0067%g 
The above table represents the major, large sample US and UK studies on Long run performance of 
IPOs. BHR is the matching firm buy-and-hold returns for the IPO firms α represents Fama-French 
alpha.  
a Sample of non-venture backed IPOs. 
b Sample of venture backed IPOs. 
c Pricing model with Fama-French, momentum and liquidity factors. 
d Pricing Model with Fama-French factors.  
e BHR is calculated relative to size matched firm and alpha is based on Fama-French three factor 
model. 
f CAR is calculated based on Fama-French three factor model. 
g Pricing model with Fama-French factors. 
   
Brav and Gompers (1997) find that venture backed IPOs appear to 
overperform relative to matched firms (by size and book-to-market), and Fama and 
French industry portfolios. For non-venture-backed IPOs, however, the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor regression model results in negative alphas. Brav, 
Geczy, and Gompers (2000) produce conflicting results based on the control firm 
approach and Fama-French alpha; while control firm approach yields over 
performance, Fama-French regressions provides negative alpha. Ritter and Welch 
(2002) show that IPOs underperform by applying matching firm and Fama-French 
alpha. Other studies also show that IPOs underperform (Ritter (2003), Eckbo and 
Norli (2005), Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007)). While Espenlaub, Gregory and 
Tonks (2000) reports underperformance by employing a number of techniques, 
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Levis (2008) reports overperformance based on matching (size) and Fama-French 
alpha.  
The event studies involving long run returns have numerous limitations. For 
example, expected returns unconditional on events may be high, cross-sectional 
and time series dependence is high, and variance of abnormal returns conditional 
on event is high (Kothari and Warner (2007)). On top of that, the abnormal returns 
are highly sensitive to sample size and firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, 
industry). While Fama (1998) relates the long-term returns to ‘methodological 
Illusions,’69 Loughran and Ritter (2000) assert that different methodologies have 
different power. Ritter and Welch (2002) relate conflicting findings in long run IPO 
performance to a number of factors. First, any computation of long-term returns 
may suffer from statistical inference as returns on each firm overlap. Second, IPOs 
tend to be small and high growth and the benchmark may not reflect fully these 
characteristics. Fama and French (1993) three-factor model can overcome these 
problems to a certain extent, but Brav and Gompers (1997) argue that small high 
growth firms tend to have negative alpha, independently of whether they are IPOs 
or established companies. The growth and size characteristics of  IPOs also affect 
the Fama and French factors, particularly SMB and HML, leading the intercept 
towards zero. The returns are also time specific, and, as a result, the 
underperformance is not likely to be homogeneous across sample periods. 
Furthermore, the long-term returns are noisy, resulting in difficulties in making any 
statistical interference. 
                                                 
69 Fama (1998) concluded that “the apparent (long run performance) anomalies are methodological 
illusions” (p 285). He argues that even little change to the methodology can change the empirical 
results. 
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Different authors try to explain the underperformance of IPOs from 
different perspectives. Of the asymmetric models, only signalling and book 
building theories have something to say about long run performance (Jenkinson 
and Ljungqvist (2001)). Rather than predicting that newly floated companies will 
underperform in the long run, the signalling theories seem to require positive after 
market returns, given that firms underprice in order to subsequently be able to sell 
further shares at a higher price than in the absence of a signal. If firms underprice 
to signal their quality, high-quality firms should perform better than low quality 
firms (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001)). Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model 
underpricing as a reward to better informed investors for truthfully revealing their 
information during the book-building phase. A noisy signal these investors reveal 
is the direction and extent of the revision in the offer price relative to the price 
range. Given that noisy signal, one might conjecture that subsequent performance 
will correlate positively with the initial price revision.   
Another explanation is given within the context of heterogeneous beliefs 
among investors. Miller (1977) and Morris (1996) argue that with costly short 
selling and heterogeneous beliefs among investors, the most optimistic investors 
will determine the price in the market.  As more information about a firm becomes 
available over time, the divergence of beliefs will decrease, and the marginal 
investor will no longer be overoptimistic. Others suggest that when excess returns 
are properly measured, the evidence for long-run underperformance following IPOs 
disappear. Eckbo et al. (2000) show that leverage and risk are significantly reduced 
following equity offerings, while liquidity is increased. They claim that as a result 
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of these changes in leverage and liquidity, firms that have recently issued equity are 
less risky than benchmark firms.   
Aggarwal and Rivioli (1990) argue that there are fads in the IPO market, 
with over-optimistic investors’ presence reflect the prospects of newly listed 
companies, which bids up initial trading prices away from fair value. Firms go 
public at the time when investors are over-optimistic about growth prospects of 
IPO companies (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). As a result, investors overpay initially 
but prices come down as more information becomes available. Hence, the expected 
long run returns decline with the change in initial investor sentiment. Another line 
of argument put forward by Ljungqvist (1996) is that the greater the fraction of 
equity capital initial owners retain at floatation, the lower their incentive to take 
advantage of over-optimistic investors, since the value of their retained shares 
would fall as and when new investors become less optimistic. Therefore, the 
expected long run returns increase with the retention rate. 
The operating performance literature has proposed explanations for poor 
long term performance based on Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency costs. The 
reduction in managerial ownership as insiders sell shares, the agency costs are 
likely to increase. There might be a conflict of interest for the managers to 
maximise the firm value as opposed to the private benefits. As a result, firm 
performance might suffer post-floatation. Jain and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson, 
Partch and Shah (1997) investigate the relationship between the long run 
performance and ownership. Jain and Kini (1994) report a significant positive 
relationship between the post-IPO operating performance and equity retention by 
the original shareholders. However, Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) find that 
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the long run performance both within one year and during the first ten years of 
public trading is unrelated to the ownership structure. Since previous studies find 
contrasting results, I re-examine the issue of IPO underperformance conditional on 
insider trading. Insiders trading after the IPO may provide some insight into why 
IPOs underperform in the long run.  
In another paper, Schultz (2003) coined the phenomenon of the ‘pseudo 
market timing’ and shows that it can explain the poor long-run performance of 
stocks that have recently issued equity. The assertion of the pseudo market timing 
hypothesis is that the higher amounts firms are able to receive for their equity, the 
more likely they are to issue stock even if the market is efficient and managers 
have no timing ability. In this case, equity sells will be concentrated at peak prices 
ex-post even though companies cannot determine market peaks ex-ante. As a result 
of this pseudo market timing, the probability of observing long-run 
underperformance ex-post may exceed 50 percent. Simulations using the 
distribution of market and IPO returns and the relation between the number of 
offerings and market levels over 1973-1997, reveal that underperformance of more 
than 25 percent in the five years following an offering is not surprising or unusual 
in an efficient market. 
 
6.2.2 Testable Hypotheses 
 
This study assesses whether the trading by insiders in their own IPOs affects the 
documented long-run underperformance. The focus of this study is on the 
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signalling and the agency conflicts explanations. In terms of signalling, previous 
studies suggest that IPO underperform because of information asymmetries (Ritter 
and Welch (2002)). At the same time the insider trading literature finds that 
insiders convey information about their company through their trades, implying 
that insider trading makes prices more efficient as they reflect publicly available as 
well as private information (e.g., Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and Sirri (1992) and 
Chakravarty and Mcconnell (1997)). I, thus, test the proposition that insider trading 
increases stock price accuracy and discovery by mitigating the relatively significant 
information asymmetries inherent in IPOs. This study also tests informed trading 
by insiders. Both the price-taking model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) and the 
imperfect competition model of Kyle (1985) predict higher information 
asymmetry, resulting in (i) greater abnormal returns following purchases, (ii) 
smaller (i.e., more negative) abnormal returns following sells, and (iii) greater 
insider profits. While the price-taking model predicts the value of trade increases 
with information asymmetry, the imperfect competition model predicts no 
relationship. I determine where insiders are net sellers (buyers) and relate the 
direction and the magnitude of their trades to the long run performance of IPOs.  
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) assert that insiders’ ability to time the market is 
partially explained by the fact that insiders act as contrarian investors and that 
simple contrarian strategies have been useful in market timing. Jenter (2005) links 
manager’s private portfolio decisions to change in corporate capital structures, 
suggesting that managers try to time actively the market both in their private trades 
and in corporate level decisions. This study tests the hypothesis whether insiders 
are contrarians and they time their trades in IPOs. It is also assessed whether 
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insiders act opportunistically and their trades do affect outside shareholders. 
Finally, this research assesses the drivers of insider trading and tests their 
predictability through IPO characteristics. The market reaction on the 
announcement dates are also analysed, as insiders in the UK are required to inform 
their company and the market within a maximum of five days of trading, and such 
announcements are immediately disclosed in the Regulatory News Service.70 Since 
insider trading has to be done through corporate brokers, i.e., the underwriters, I 
expect any such trades to occur after the lockup expiry dates. 
The agency theory literature (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) suggests that 
insider purchases lead to an increase in share prices as the agency costs are 
mitigated, while the sell trades will result in an exacerbation of the agency 
conflicts, and a decrease in stock prices. These predictions are consistent with the 
signalling hypotheses. These effects are controlled for by using insider ownership, 
underpricing, prestigious underwriters and venture-capitalists.  
6.3 Data and Methodology 
 
This study first gathers the list of IPOs that went public on London Main Market 
and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), a relatively less regulated market for 
smaller and younger companies, between January 1999 and 2006 from the London 
                                                 
70 The UK Model Code prescribes much faster reporting of directors’ dealings. The directors must 
inform their company as soon as possible after the transaction and no later than the fifth business 
day after a transaction for their own account or on behalf of their spouses and children (Hillier and 
Marshall (2002)). In turn, the firm must inform the LSE without delay and no later than the end of 
the business day following receipt of the information. This implies that the information reaches the 
market as late as 6 days after transaction. In contrast, in the US, during the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley 
period, insiders have to report their trades on the 10th of the month following the transaction, 
resulting in a maximum delay of between 10 and 42 days, depending on the trading date. As a 
result, most previous studies could not analyse insider-trading event on or before the lockup expiry 
date. 
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Stock Exchange (LSE) website, which amounts 1,117 IPOs. LSE database is used 
to collect data on the quotation market (AIM or Main market), admission date, 
country of incorporation, issue price, market value, money raised, name of the 
broker, and for AIM IPOs, the advisor. I then download all prospectuses from 
Perfect Filings database and hand-collect all information relating to lockup 
arrangements, including lockup dates, percentage of shares locked-up, fraction of 
insider shares locked up, directors’ ownership before and after IPO, percentage 
sold in the IPO, institutional ownership, and venture capital backing. This study 
extracts any delisting dates, other accounting, stock market data, which includes 
daily stock prices and indices to compute the stock returns, market capitalization, 
which is used as proxy for size, accounting return on assets to measure 
profitability, and price-to-book ratio to proxy for growth from DataStream. I 
exclude 77 IPOs for which I could not find the prospectuses, 15 with missing share 
price data, and 195 with no lockup date or ownership data from the prospectuses. 
Final sample includes 830 (74%) firms with complete data. I obtain information on 
subsequent raising capital in the form of seasoned equity issues (SEOs), from 
London stock exchange and then match it with my IPO sample and then determine 
how many IPO firms raise more capital within three years of IPOs. Takeover 
announcement information is obtained from Thomson One Banker database. Then 
the merger sample is matched with IPO data to determine how many of them occur 
during three years of IPOs. 
Finally, this study uses a Fifth database, Directors’ Deals, which records all 
the trades undertaken by insiders in the UK market. A number of observations  are 
excluded that are not likely to be driven by private information, such as exercise of 
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options or derivatives, script dividends, bonus shares, rights issues, awards made to 
directors under incentive plans or reinvestment plans. I also exclude all directors’ 
transactions in investment companies. After this screening, 36,943 insiders’ trades 
from the UK market are obtained. The data are checked for errors and exclude 
2,952 (8%) trades as the difference in announcement and transaction date is more 
than 5 days, the legal UK requirement (Korczak and Lasfer (2009)). Final sample 
includes 33,991 directors’ trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268 (77%) 
purchases and 7,723 (23%) sell trades. The database includes news items on 
directors’ trades disclosed by all UK firms to the Regulatory News Service (RNS), 
such as transaction price, amount, and value, post-transaction holding, change in 
holding, name and position of the insider, and announcement and transaction dates. 
I, then, match all insider trading event dates with the dates of the IPOs, and select 
all IPOs where insider trading occurs during the three year period of IPO. I find 
287 firms without insider trading (35%), and 543 (65%) firms with at least one 
insider trade during 36 months period after IPO insider trading. I identify 822 sell 
trades by 231 IPOs and 2102 buy trades by 480 IPOs. Finally, I follow Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001) and define the Net Purchases Ratio, as: 
TradesTotal
SellsPurchasesNPR   
This study finds 190 (35%) IPOs with negative NPR, referred to as Net 
Sells sub-sample, and 353 (65%) with positive NPR, classified as Net Buys sub-
sample. I use both number of transactions, NPR transaction, and value of the 
trades, NPR value. It is expected that insiders to buy in over-performing and sell in 
underperforming IPOs.  
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This study uses various methodologies to test various hypotheses. The 
standard market adjusted model event study methodology is used to compute the 
cumulative abnormal returns over 3 years after the first month of the IPO. The 
abnormal returns are the monthly returns on each IPO less the return on the 
Financial Times All Share Index, FTA, a more representative index that includes 
small as well as large companies. Both the equally- and value-weighted CARs, and 
the style-adjusted returns are computed, in line with Ritter and Welch (2002). I also 
use the AIM index for AIM IPOs, and FTA for IPOs on the main market. In 
addition, the market model is used to compute the abnormal returns over the event 
window [-40, +40] relative to the trading date and the lockup expiry date. The market 
model coefficients are obtained from the regression of the security returns against the 
corresponding market indices, the AIM all share price71 and FTA, for AIM and main 
market companies, respectively, over the period [-290, -41] trading days relative to 
each event date. I focus on the pre-event period abnormal returns, CAR-40,-2, to 
assess whether insiders adopt contrarian strategies in their trades. Finally, I 
estimate the abnormal performance based on the constant obtained from the Fama-
French (1993) calendar time regressions. By following Ritter and Welch (2002) the 
following approach is used: 
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( )pt ft t Mt ft t Mt ft t t t t
t t t t pt
R R R R R R SMB SMB
HML HML
                       
where Rpt – Rft is the excess return over the risk free rate on a portfolio in time 
period t, RMt – Rft is the market risk premium, with Rft proxied by FTA and Rft the 3 
                                                 
71 As an alternative to AIM all share price index, we used the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies 
(HGSC) Index as the market index. My results are qualitatively similar.  
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months Treasury Bill rate. SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on 
large firms, and HMLt is the return on high book-to-market return minus the return 
of the low book-to-market portfolio. To calculate SMBt, FTSE 100 index is used as 
index for large firms and FTSE Small Cap Index is used for small companies’ 
index. To calculate HMLt, FTSE 350 Index is used as a proxy for high book to 
market portfolio and FTSE 350 Growth is used as a proxy for low book to market 
portfolio. I compute ȕ of sample firms as the sum of ȕt and ȕt-1. I use similar 
method to assess my firm’s exposures to SMB and HML factors. Under the 
signalling and agency theory hypotheses, I expect αNet Buy IPOs to be higher than 
αNetSell IPOs.  
This study also relates the CARs over 36 months after IPO dates to NPR 
after controlling for other factors defined in the previous literature, such as first day 
return, size, insider ownership (overhang), the underwriter reputation, venture 
capitalist backing, abnormal returns on the lockup expiry dates, lockup length, 
SEOs offerings and period dummies. In addition, following Brar et al. (2008), this 
study define the probability of being taken over as follows. I first build a two-way 
matrix by size and growth in turnover. I consider that companies that are large and 
high growth are less likely to be subject to a takeover bid, and thus assigned a value 
of 0. In contrast, those in small and low growth quadrant have a higher probability 
of a takeover, and they take a value of 1. Companies in the remaining two 
quadrants are undetermined. In the second stage, these undetermined samples are 
classified by dividend yield. Firms with high yield have a higher probability, and, 
thus a value of 1, while those with low yield have a value of 0.  
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Finally, a set of logit regressions are estimated to determine the 
characteristics of the Net Sell and Net Buy subsamples. In the first regression, the 
dependent variable is equal to one if IPO is in Net Sell sub-sample, and zero if no 
insider trading. Then I compare Net Buy and no insider trading samples. The last 
regression compares the Net Sell and Net Buy sub-samples.  
 
6.4 Empirical Results 
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 6-1 provides the descriptive statistics of my sample firms. Panel A. reports 
the mean, median, and 10th and 90th percentiles of a set of fundamental variables. 
The results show that the average (median) length of the lockup is 391 (365) 
days,72 more than double that in the US, where, for example, Brav and Gompers 
(2003) and Field and Hanka (2001) find a median of 180 days. The sample IPOs 
offered 38.6% (32.9%) of their shares in the market, the mean (median) shares 
locked amounts to 29.5% (24%) of the shares outstanding, and the level of 
underpricing of 22.5%  (9.5%) is consistent with previous evidence (e.g., 
Chambers and Dimson, 2009). In terms of fundamentals, the results indicate that, 
while the average market value of equity of my firms is £140m (about $210m), my 
sample includes small as well as large firms. Consistent with US evidence (e.g., 
Brav and Gompers (2003)), the sample IPOs are high growth as the average 
market-to-book ratio is 3.88, close to the median of 3.01, suggesting that the mean 
                                                 
72 Espenlaub et al. (2001) find mean lockup of 561 days and median of 730 days. The lockup 
contracts were compulsory during their sample period (1992-2000) for mineral and scientific 
research based companies with trading records of less than three years.  
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is not driven by outliers. The companies are also loss making as the average 
(median) return on equity is -34.6% (-2.6%). 
 
Table 6-2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample includes 830 IPOs from January, 1 1999 to 31 December 2006, for which I have all 
necessary information. Days locked is the length of lockup period, Shares locked is the ratio of 
shares locked to shares outstanding. Underpricing is the percent return on the first day from the 
offering price to the closing price. Market value is the offering price times shares outstanding in 
2008 millions of Pound Sterling constant terms. Market-to-book is the ratio of market 
capitalization at the IPO divided by the book value of the equity in the first reporting period 
after IPO. Return on assets is the net income divided by total assets in the first reporting period 
after the IPO. Average Money Raised is the ratio of money raised in 2008 £ bn over the number 
of IPOs.  
 
 
In Panel B, I report the annual distribution of sample IPOs and the lockup 
lengths. Consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Chambers and Dimson (2009)), 
the volume of IPOs is relatively high in 2000, the ‘Bubble’ period, followed by a 
relatively quiet period 2001-2003, and then a heavy IPO activity period of 2004-
2006. The most interesting results relate to the annual distribution of my Net Sell 
and Net Buy sub-samples. The results show a relatively similar frequency of the 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics of the IPO fundamental characteristics    
           10th Percentile Median Mean 90th Percentile 
Days locked                                          306                  365               391         548 
Shares locked (%)                              1.50     24.00   29.40          68.00 
Underpricing (%)                             -1.50       9.90   22.50          51.30 
Market value of equity( 2008 £m)      3.20     21.60 140.20        204.10 
Market-to-book                              0.88       3.01     3.88          11.15 
Return on Assets                              -52.6      -2.60  -34.60          11.10 
 
Panel B. Annual distribution of the sample IPOs 
Year  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IPOs 39 144 59 44 39 159 201 146
% Net Buy  2 20 7 5 6 20 23 17 
% Net Sell 7 8 11 6 6 25 25 13 
Average money raised (£m) 187.2 253.5 106.8 84.1 100.0 51.6 73.6 138.4
Days Locked 427 374 410 437 404 392 388 375
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two samples throughout my sample period, with the vast majority of the trades 
occurring in the 2004 to 2006 period. I account for this time effect in my 
regressions. The next row reports the distribution of the amount of money raised. 
IPOs appear to be relatively larger in 1999 to 2000 period, with an average of 
£200m per issue, compared to £88m in the post-2001 period. In terms of the length 
of the lockup, the results show that the maximum of 437 days is in 2002 and the 
minimum of 374 is in 2000. However, I note that the distribution is relatively 
homogeneous, higher than the median of 365 days and in no single year is the 
average close to the 180 days documented in the US. Interestingly, these results 
suggest that neither the IPO waves nor the length of the lockup period drive the 
insider trading frequency.  
 
6.4.2 The long-run performance of IPOs 
 
Table 6-3 reports the long-run performance of my sample IPOs based on the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in the first month and then in the following 6, 
12, 24 and 36 months after the IPO. Panel A. reports the equal weighted CARs. 
The first row reports the results for the sample as a whole and indicates that while 
in the first months the CARs are positive but not significant, they subsequently 
become negative. Up to month 6, the abnormal returns are negative but not 
significant. In the remaining months, the CARs are negative and highly significant. 
On average, my sample IPOs generate -36.5% abnormal returns in the first 36 
months after their quotation. I split my sample IPOs into those with and without 
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insider trading. The IPOs with insider trades serve as the test sample, and IPOs 
without insider trading is the control sample. This was done to compare stock price 
efficiency in IPOs with insider trading, and IPOs without insider trading (see, 
Fishman and Hagerty (1992)). Further, I classify my test sample IPOs with insider 
trades into IPOs with net sell and IPOs with net buy trades. 
I find interesting trends when I split my sample into IPOs with and without 
insider trading. The results show that IPOs with insider trading also generate 
negative returns in month 36, however, they are significantly higher as they amount 
to -23.6%, and up to month 12, the CARs are positive, though not significant. In 
contrast, IPOs not subject to insider trading generate negative and significantly 
lower returns throughout the 36 months, reaching -67.9% in month 36. More 
interestingly, when I split my sample IPOs with insider trading into Net Sell and 
Net Buy sub-samples, I find contrasting and startling results:  The Net Sell IPOs 
generate positive CARs throughout, reaching 13.3% in month 36, while Net Buy 
IPOs generate negative and significant CARs after their first year of quotation, 
reaching -48.3% in month 36.  
Table 6-3, Panel B, reports the style adjusted returns. Previous studies using 
matching firm approach find that the underperformance disappears (for example, 
Brav and Gompers, 1997) or at least the abnormal performance shrinks (for 
example, Ritter and Welch, 2002). I, therefore, follow Ritter and Welch (2002) and 
compute Style-adjusted cumulative returns as the difference between the return on 
an IPO and a style-matched firm. For each IPO, a non-IPO matching firm that has 
been listed with the closest market capitalization and book-to-market ratio as the 
IPO is used. The control firm is selected only once, and if it is delisted prior to the 
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IPO return’s ending date, a replacement matching firm is spliced in on a point-
forward basis. My results indicate strong persistence in overperformance of Net 
Sell IPOs, and as in Panel A., the positive returns are concentrated mainly in 
months 2 to 17. Net Buy IPOs generate strong negative returns of -42% in the 36 
months period, and in both subsample periods, the CARs are negative.  
Table 6-3, Panel C, reports the results based on value-weighted returns. The 
trend in the CARs are relatively similar to the results in Panel A. In particular, 
while the CARs of the Net Sell sample are mostly not significant, those of all the 
remaining sub-samples are negative and significant. The underperformance is now 
much more pronounced for the Net Buy sample, as despite generating positive and 
significant returns in the first month after the IPO, they generate negative returns in 
the remaining periods, reaching -65.5% in month 36. The last two columns indicate 
that for the Net Sell sample, the CAR2-18 and CAR19-36 are both not significant, 
suggesting that insiders did not lose by selling. In contrast, for the Net Buy sample, 
both CARs are negative and significant, implying that even if the insiders trade to 
support the price of their firms, they do succeed in stopping the fall in stock prices. 
Figure 6-1, 6-2 and 6-3 portray the trend in the CARs of sample firms. 
Figure 6-1 clearly indicates that for the sample as a whole, IPOs underperform 
significantly. Similar trend are observed for IPOs without insider trading and Net 
Buy IPOs. In contrast Net Sell IPOs overperform throughout the post-IPO period. 
The results are similar in Figure 6-2 where the style adjusted returns are reported. 
Figure 6-3 charts the value weighted CARs for my sample firms. While the 
overperformance of my Net Sell IPOs is not well pronounced as in Figure 6-1, the 
results clearly indicate that they do much better than all the remaining IPOs and the 
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Net Buy IPOs are the worst performers. The difference in the excess performance 
between my sample firms is particularly observed after the first year of trading. 
Appendix A provides details of the monthly returns for each of my sample IPOs 
using both the equally and value weighted returns.  
 
Table 6-3 Long-run IPO Performance: CAR 
 Months Event windows 
 1 6 12 24 36 2-18 19-36 
 Panel A: Equal weighted 
All IPOs 0.005 
(0.36) 
-0.023 
(-0.71) 
-0.106**
(-2.33) 
-0.270***
(-4.22) 
-0.365***
(-4.66) 
-0.162*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.208*** 
(-3.75) 
IPOs with Insider Trade 0.013 
(1.00) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.059 
(-1.30) 
-0.165***
(-2.58) 
-0.236***
(-3.01) 
-0.089* 
(-1.71) 
-0.160*** 
(-2.89) 
No Trade -0.016 
(-1.19) 
-0.081***
(-2.52) 
-0.219***
(-4.85) 
-0.526***
(-8.22) 
-0.679***
(-8.66) 
-0.340*** 
(-6.50) 
-0.324*** 
(-5.84) 
Net sell 0.000 
(0.03) 
0.078***
(2.45) 
0.120***
(2.65) 
0.149***
(2.33) 
0.133*
(1.70) 
0.153*** 
(2.93) 
-0.020 
(-0.37) 
Net buy 0.022* 
(1.65) 
-0.051 
(-1.59) 
-0.179***
(-3.95) 
-0.375***
(-5.85) 
-0.483***
(-6.16) 
-0.251*** 
(-4.80) 
-0.254*** 
(-4.57) 
 Panel B. Style-adjusted  
All IPOs 0.022* 
(1.89) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
-0.056 
(-1.37) 
-0.175*** 
(3.05) 
-0.261*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.123** 
(-2.54) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.23) 
IPOs with Insider Trade 0.026** 
(2.24) 0.022 
(0.77) 
-0.006 
(-0.16) 
-0.073 
(-1.27) 
-0.157** 
(-2.23) 
-0.041 
(-0.84) 
  -0.143** 
(-2.87) 
No Trade 0.012 
(1.02) 
-0.058** 
(-2.04) 
-0.274** 
(-6.76) 
-0.420*** 
(-7.32) 
-0.513*** 
(-7.30) 
-0.321*** 
(-6.64) 
-0.204*** 
(-4.10) 
Net sell 0.027** 
(2.33) 
0.082** 
(2.85) 
0.145*** 
(3.45) 
0.239*** 
(4.17) 
0.239*** 
(3.40) 
0.187*** 
(3.88) 
0.024 
(0.49) 
Net buy 0.026** 
(2.19) 
-0.017 
(-0.61) 
-0.107** 
(-2.64) 
-0.280*** 
(-4.88) 
-0.420*** 
(-5.97) 
-0.192*** 
(-3.98) 
-0.253*** 
(-5.10) 
 Panel C: Value weighted 
All IPOs 0.028 
(1.16) 
-0.059 
(-0.99) 
-0.256***
(-3.05) 
-0.399***
(-3.37) 
-0.351**
(-2.41) 
-0.303*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.076 
(-0.74) 
IPOs with Insider Trade 0.037 
(1.53) 
-0.058 
(-0.98) 
-0.251***
(-2.99) 
-0.360***
(-3.03) 
-0.299**
(-2.06) 
-0.264** 
(-2.65) 
-0.072 
(-0.70) 
No Trade -0.003 
(-0.11) 
-0.061 
(-1.03) 
-0.274***
(-3.27) 
-0.537***
(-4.53) 
-0.530***
(-3.65) 
-0.436*** 
(-4.38) 
-0.092 
(-0.89) 
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Net sell 0.019 
(0.76) 
-0.081 
(-1.37) 
-0.159*
(-1.89) 
-0.081 
(-0.68) 
0.056 
(0.38) 
-0.041 
(-0.41) 
0.079 
(0.77) 
Net buy 0.056*** 
(2.29) 
-0.036 
(-0.60) 
-0.343***
(-4.09) 
-0.639***
(-5.39) 
-0.655***
(-4.51) 
-0.487*** 
(-4.89) 
-0.223** 
(-2.17) 
I compute the abnormal returns using the standard event study methodology of stock returns on the 
FTSE All Share Price Index for main market companies and AIM All Share Price Index for AIM 
companies. I obtain the monthly share price and indices data from DataStream. Panel A, B and C 
respectively reports equal weighted CARs, Style adjusted (M/B and size) CARs and Value weighted 
CARs. All IPOs includes 830 UK IPOs over the period 1999-2006.  IPOs with insider trades (543 
IPOs) includes any IPOs with at lease one insider trades during 36 months period after IPO. IPOs 
without insider trades (287 IPOs) include any IPOs without any insider trades during 36 months 
period after IPO. IPOs where insider are net buyers (sellers) are based on Net purchase ratio (NPR). 
If NPR is positive (negative) I define them as IPOs where insiders are net buyers (sellers). NPR is 
the difference between total value of purchases and sells divided by total value of shares traded over 
this 36 months period after IPO. I identify 190 Net Sell IPOs and 353 Net Buy IPOs. To remove the 
effect of first day return I compute the first month return without first day return. ***, **,* represent 
significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
 
This study first focuses on the timing of their trades. It is shown that the 
median number of years from the IPO date to the trading date is 1.45 years for both 
the Net Buy and Net Sell samples. I, therefore, split my sample period into two 
subsamples: months 2 to 17 and months 18 to 36, and analyse the CARs in each 
sub-period. I show that for the Net Sell IPOs, the CARs in the first sixteen months 
after the IPO of 0.165, are positive and significant (t = 3.06). In contrast, in the 
following nineteen months, the CARs of -0.032 are negative but not significantly 
different from zero (t = -0.56). I find similar results with style-adjusted returns of 
18.7% (t = 3.88) and 2.4% (t = 0.49), respectively. When value weighted returns 
are used, I find the CARs are not significant in both periods. These results suggest 
that insiders sell in IPOs that do well, but they time their trades, as they sell when 
they know that the price of their firm is stabilised and there are no more gains to 
achieve. 
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Figure 6-1 Equal weighted long-run IPO returns by insider trading categories 
 
Figure 6-2 Style-adjusted long-run IPO returns by insider trading categories 
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Figure 6-3 Value weighted long-run IPO returns by insider trading categories 
 
The findings are broadly similar when I use the Fama-French (1993) 
regressions. Table 6-3, Panel A, reports the results based on equally weighted 
returns. For the sample as a whole, α is negative and significant and amounts to 
about -0.9% per month, equivalent to CAR1, 36 of -36% reported in Panel A, Table 
2. Interesting, the ȕ of my IPOs is 1.01 in a simple CAPM model, but since the 
lagged value of ȕ is also significant, the correct ȕ is the sum of the two coefficients, 
i.e., 1.66, in line with Ritter and Welch (2002) findings of 1.73. This magnitude of 
ȕ is relatively homogeneous across all my sub-samples, ranging between 1.45 for 
Net Buy and 1.66 for Net Sell samples. These results suggest that IPOs have 
relatively higher risk and, as a result, they should generate positive long-term 
returns. This is the case for all IPOs with insider trading, although α is not 
significant, and Net Sell IPOs where α is positive and significant in all the 
specifications. In contrast, IPOs without insider trading, and Net Buy IPOs generate 
negative and significant α. Overall, my results provide support to the CAR findings 
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and suggest that IPOs where insiders are net sellers overperform all the remaining 
IPO categories.   
The other Fama-French factors reveal interesting findings. The coefficient 
for SMB shows that IPOs with insider trades have a higher Ȗ compared to the IPOs 
without insider trades. However, there is not much difference in Ȗ coefficient 
between Net Buy and Net Sell IPOs. The HML factor shows that the į coefficient is 
much smaller for IPOs with insider trades compared to IPOs without insider trades. 
More interestingly, it is even smaller for IPOs where insiders are net sellers 
compared to IPOs where they are net buyers. The coefficients of the lagged values 
of SMB and HML are predominantly non-significant. 
 
Table 6-4 Fama French Three-Factor Regressions on Calendar-Time Portfolio 
Returns (36 Months) ܴ௉௧ െ ௙ܴ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ௧൫ܴெ௧ െ ௙ܴ௧൯ ൅ ߚ௧ିଵ൫ܴெ௧ିଵ െ ௙ܴ௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ߛ௧ܵܯܤ௧൅ ߛ௧ିଵܵܯܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߜ௧ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߜ௧ିଵܪܯܮ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௣௧ 
Panel A. Equally Weighted Returns 
 
 ࢻ 
 
ࢼ࢚ ࢼ࢚ି૚ ࢽ࢚ ࢽ࢚ି૚ ࢾ࢚ ࢾ࢚ି૚ R2 
All IPOs -0.009** 
(-1.99) 
1.014*** 
(7.96) 
     0.41 
 -0.007* 
(-1.86) 
1.046*** 
(7.74) 
0.613*** 
(5.00) 
    0.56 
 -0.009** 
(-2.51) 
0.883*** 
(9.99) 
 1.044*** 
(9.38) 
 -0.437** 
(-1.99) 
 0.70 
 -0.009** 
(-2.56) 
0.925*** 
(9.93) 
0.317*** 
(3.68) 
0.902*** 
(8.13) 
 
0.175* 
(1.67) 
-0.415** 
(-2.08) 
0.170 
(1.18) 
0.75 
IPOs without 
Insider Trades 
-
0.021*** 
(-3.76) 
1.010*** 
(7.17) 
     0.36 
 -
0.017*** 
(-3.44) 
1.002*** 
(7.33) 
0.475*** 
(3.47) 
    0.44 
 -0.019*** 
(-3.79) 
0.909 *** 
(7.24) 
 0.991*** 
(6.86) 
 -0.495 ** 
(-2.17) 
 0.59 
 -
0.018*** 
(-3.75) 
0.906*** 
(7.09) 
0.203 
(1.56) 
0.868*** 
(5.65) 
0.257** 
(2.02) 
-0.499** 
(-2.30) 
-0.293 
(-
0.093) 
0.61 
 
IPOs with 0.002 1.145***      0.33 
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Insider Trades (0.36) (5.79) 
 0.005 
(0.85) 
1.144*** 
(5.95) 
0.470** 
(2.50) 
    0.38 
 0.003 
(0.57) 
1.012*** 
(6.62) 
 1.219*** 
(6.87) 
 -0.952** 
(-2.54) 
 0.61 
 0.007 
(1.09) 
1.021*** 
(6.39) 
0.156 
(0.956) 
1.125*** 
(6.65) 
0.162 
(0.76) 
-
0.957*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.525 
(-1.32) 
0.63 
IPOs where 
insider are net 
sellers 
0.017** 
(2.49) 
1.279*** 
(5.83) 
     0.35 
 0.020*** 
(2.84) 
1.286 
(5.88) 
0.378* 
(1.97) 
    0.39 
 0.021** 
(2.40) 
1.197*** 
(8.38) 
 1.071*** 
(4.18) 
 -1.286*** 
(-3.53) 
 0.58 
 0.024*** 
(2.93) 
1.193*** 
(6.11) 
0.122 
(0.716) 
0.975*** 
(5.01) 
0.157 
(0.702) 
-
1.278*** 
(-3.401) 
-0.474 
(-0.97) 
0.59 
IPOs where 
insider are Net 
Buyers 
0.009* 
(1.76) 
1.053*** 
(5.05) 
     0.32 
 0.011** 
(2.10) 
1.070*** 
(5.29) 
0.385** 
(1.95) 
    0.35 
 -0.015*** 
(-3.56) 
0.887*** 
(8.25) 
 1.101*** 
(7.50) 
 -0.448* 
(1.87) 
 0.61 
 -0.013** 
(-2.95) 
0.896*** 
(8.06) 
0.309*** 
(2.83) 
0.975*** 
(7.10) 
0.241 
(1.63) 
-0.532** 
(-2.44) 
-0.125 
(-0.38) 
0.65 
 
Panel B Value Weighted Returns 
         
 ࢻ 
 
ࢼ࢚ ࢼ࢚ି૚ ࢽ࢚ ࢽ࢚ି૚ ࢾ࢚ ࢾ࢚ି૚ R2 
All IPOs 0.000 
(0.16) 
1.678*** 
(12.30) 
     0.62 
 0.002 
(0.43) 
1.697 
(11.91) 
0.380** 
(1.92) 
    0.65 
 -0.000 
(-0.06) 
1.548*** 
(13.28) 
 1.009*** 
(4.90) 
 -0.23 
(-0.79) 
 0.75 
 0.003 
(0.72) 
1.550*** 
(14.86) 
0.173 
(1.27) 
0.936*** 
(5.51) 
-0.121 
(-1.00) 
-0.253 
(-0.85) 
-0.518* 
(-1.80) 
0.76 
 
IPOs without 
Insider Trades 
-0.015* 
(-1.72) 
1.603*** 
(5.05) 
     0.33 
 -0.011 
(-1.40) 
1.593*** 
(5.48) 
0.659* 
(1.68) 
    0.38 
 -0.008 
(-1.22) 
1.534*** 
(5.20) 
 1.168*** 
(4.83) 
 -1.457*** 
(-1.96) 
 0.50 
 -0.005 
(-0.68) 
1.547*** 
(5.45) 
0.409 
(1.22) 
0.963*** 
(3.85) 
0.153 
(0.43) 
-1.499** 
(-2.08) 
-0.088 
(-0.17) 
0.51 
IPOs with 
Insider Trades 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
1.833*** 
(8.92) 
     0.51 
 0.002 
(0.44) 
1.839*** 
(8.98) 
0.463* 
(1.80) 
    0.54 
 0.000 
(0.10) 
1.715*** 
(9.21) 
 1.212*** 
(4.84) 
 -0.770** 
(-1.92) 
 0.66 
 0.002 
(0.47) 
1.725*** 
(8.78) 
0.134 
(0.63) 
1.127*** 
(5.08) 
0.107 
(0.56) 
-0.769** 
(1.92) 
-0.195 
(-0.59) 
0.66 
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IPOs where 
insider are net 
sellers 
0.014* 
(1.73) 
1.787*** 
(6.22) 
     0.40 
0.017** 
(2.23) 
1.797*** 
(6.15) 
0.388 
(1.21) 
    0.43 
0.019** 
(2.39) 
1.732*** 
(6.16) 
 0.908*** 
(3.62) 
 -1.463*** 
(-2.92) 
 0.52 
 0.020** 
(2.69) 
1.761*** 
(5.95) 
0.156 
(0.56) 
0.824*** 
(3.66) 
0.149 
(0.63) 
-1.475*** 
(-2.99) 
0.231 
(0.408) 
0.52 
IPOs where 
insider are Net 
Buyers 
-0.011* 
(-1.65) 
1.910*** 
(8.08) 
     0.49 
-0.008 
(-1.40) 
1.912*** 
(7.85) 
0.489* 
(1.95) 
    0.52 
 -0.011** 
(-1.95) 
1.697*** 
(9.05) 
 1.382*** 
(4.41) 
 -0.031 
(-0.77) 
 0.65 
 -0.006 
(-0.98) 
1.681*** 
(9.72) 
0.215 
(1.11) 
1.279*** 
(4.61) 
-0.138 
(-0.780) 
-0.096 
(-0.24) 
-0.63** 
(-1.94) 
0.65 
 
The table reports Fama and French (1996) three-factor model to assess long term performance of 
IPOs. In the model, Rpt –rft is the excess return over the risk free rate on  a portfolio in time period t, 
RMt –Rft is the market risk premium in period t, SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return 
on large firms, and HMLt is the return on high book-to-market portfolio minus the return of the low 
book-to-market portfolio and  Rft  is the 3 months Treasury bill rate. I follow Ritter and Welch 
(2002) and include also the lagged factors. The return on FTSE All Share Price Index serves as 
return on market. To calculate SMBt, FTSE 100 index is used as index for large firms and FTSE 
Small Cap Index is used for small companies’ index. To calculate HMLt, FTSE 350 Index is used as 
a proxy for high book to market portfolio and FTSE 350 Growth is used as a proxy for low book to 
market portfolio. IPOs with insider trades (543 IPOs) includes any IPOs with at least one insider 
trades during 36 months period after IPO. IPOs without insider trades (287 IPOs) include any IPOs 
without any insider trades during 36 months period after IPO. IPOs where insider are net buyers 
(sellers) are based on Net purchase ratio (NPR). If NPR is positive (negative) I define them as IPOs 
where insiders are Net Buyers (sellers). NPR is the difference between total value of purchases and 
sells divided by total value of shares traded over this 36 months period after IPO. I identify 190 Net 
Sell IPOs and 353 Net Buy IPOs.  To remove the effect of first day return I compute the first month 
return without first day return. ***, **,* represent significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
 
The results based on value-weighted returns, reported in Panel B, are 
relatively similar. While α is not significant for the sample as a whole, IPOs with 
and without insider trading, it becomes positive and significant for Net Sell and 
negative and significant for Net Buy IPOs, even though their ȕ is relatively higher.  
The results are in direct contrast with the conventional wisdom that insider 
sell (buy) lead to stock price decline (increase) which is consistent with the moral 
hazard/ agency framework, which says that increase (decrease) of insider holdings 
mitigates (exacerbates) agency problems and hence affects the performance of the 
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firm. The share price behaviour of Net Sell IPOs is more consistent with the view 
that insider sells are driven by liquidity rather than information considerations. 
Since share price of Net Buy IPOs show that they underperform, the results are 
puzzling in the light of agency/moral hazard framework. 
 
6.4.3 The determinants of the long-run performance 
The results in the previous section indicate that insider trading affect significantly 
the long-run performance of IPOs. However, the impact is asymmetric as IPOs 
where insiders sell overperform, while those where they buy generate significant 
negative returns. My results indicate that, in the case of Net Sell sample, insiders 
may be able to time their trades as, after they sell, the returns are not significant. In 
contrast, in the Net Buy sample, they try to support the price, but without success as 
their firms carry on generating negative return throughout the sample period. This 
section expands these results by contrasting further the fundamental characteristics 
of the IPOs in different samples. I also run a set of regressions to assess whether 
this difference in performance holds after controlling for differences in 
fundamental factors, as defined in the previous literature.  
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Table 6-5 Univariate Analysis of IPOs Insider Trades (within 3-years of IPO) 
Panel A: Characteristics of IPOs with and without Insider Trades (within 3-years of IPO) 
 IPOs with insider trades No Trade P-value of differences in Means 
All 
(1) 
Net Sell 
(2) 
Net 
Buy 
(3) 
(4)  
(1)-(4) 
 
(2)-( 
3) 
 
(2)-( 4) 
 
(3)-(4) 
No of IPOs 543 190 353 287     
Underpricing 
(%) 
19.58 15.62 21.78 28.18 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.10 
Days locked 388.45 378.47 395.00 398.3 0.20 0.07 0.06 0.41 
Shares Locked 
(%) 
93.98 92.2 94.95 95.5 0.18 0.29 0.01 0.29 
Size (2008 £m) 149.23 175.33 135.53 123.25 0.27 0.20 0.13 0.40 
Overhang (%) 3.82 4.41 3.51 3.99 0.39 0.14 0.31 0.23 
Prestigious 
Underwriter (%) 
23.38 27.36 21.30 13.93 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Venture backed 
(%) 
15.83 17.89 14.77 10.45 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.05 
Institutional 
Holding (%) 
60.7 58.9 59.94 63.41 0.22 0.31 0.16 0.33 
CAR(-40,-2) (%) 1.01 5.88 -1.58 -3.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Lockup Expiry 
Returns (%) 
-1.59 -0.63 -2.10 -2.44 0.18 0.04 0.04 0.37 
High tech 
Dummy (%) 
11.23 10.00 11.89 8.34 0.09 0.21 0.27 0.07 
Bubble Dummy 
(%) 
19.33 14.70 21.18 27.18 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 
Hot Dummy (%) 80.29 76.84 82.15 87.80 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02 
Takeover 
Probability (%) 
23.38 18.94 25.77 41.46 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
SEO Dummy 
(%) 
16.60 13.68 17.56 13.93 0.21 0.12 0.47 0.11 
Panel B. Means [Medians]  underpricing, long run performance and Net Buy and Net Sell 
 N Underpricing 
(%) 
Equal 
weighted 
CARs (%) 
Net Sell Net Buy 
 
Market 
value>median 
 
416 
 
26.4[10.7]*** 
 
-61.9[-50.5]** 
 
334[138]*** 
 
261[60]*** 
Market 
value<median 
415 18.6[9.0] -45.1[-44.9] 16[13] 10[9] 
p-value  0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Prestigious 
underwriter  
166 9.1[6.7]*** -26.4[-0.002] 27.36*** 21.12 
Other underwriter 665 26.0[10.5] -38.7[-32.7] 17.96 19.28 
p-value  0.00 0.14 0.00 0.24 
Venture-backed 116 28.8[9.0] -46.4[-48.2] 17.89** 14.73 
Non-venture-
backed 
715 21.5[10.0] -34.5[23.2] 12.81 13.41 
p-value  0.13 0.18 0.03 0.29 
Main Market 141 18.6[7.7] -25.4[-0.002] 87.65*** 81.11** 
AIM  690 23.5[10.0] -38.4[-28.9] 68.42 86.11 
p-value  0.21 0.14 0.00 0.03 
Institutional 
holding  
504 22.8[9.2] -36.1[-20.8] 58.94 61.75 
No Institution 
holding  
327 22.1[10.5] -36.4[-30.3] 62.50 61.63 
p-value  0.28 0.48 0.19 0.48 
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Bubble period 183 32.1[9.7]*** -84.4[-79.1]*** 14.73*** 21.81 
Non-bubble period 648 16.4[10.0] -22.6[-13.7] 24.21 22.22 
p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 
Hot market 676 27.1[10.0] -44.3[-32.8]*** 76.84*** 82.15 
Cold market 155 18.9[7.1] 7.4[18.9] 84.68 83.43 
p-value  0.12 0.00 0.00 0.31 
      
 All IPOs with insider trade, Net Sell and Net Buy include 543, 190 and 353 IPOs, respectively. 
There are 287 IPOs without any insider trades. Underpricing is the percent return on the first day 
from the offering price to the closing price. Days locked is the length of lockup period, Shares 
locked is the ratio of shares locked to shares outstanding Size is the market value of equity in 2008 
constant terms. Overhang is the ratio of proportion retained to proportion sold. Prestigious 
underwriter is defined if the global investment bank has underwritten the issue. Venture-backed is 
the proportion of IPOs backed by venture capitalist. Institutional Holding is the proportion of 
companies where institutions hold more than 3%. CAR(-40,-2) are the cumulative abnormal return 
over pre-event window. For the no trade sample, I measure the 39-day abnormal return as the 
abnormal return over the whole lockup period standardised to 39 days.  Lockup expiry returns is the 
Cumulative abnormal return over -2 to+2 around lockup expiration. High-tech Dummy is equal to 
one if the IPO is in computer manufacturing, electronic equipment, computer and data processing 
services, and optical, medical and scientific equipment. Bubble period is defined as 1999-2000 
period following Levis (2008). Hot market is when the IPO volume increases significantly and 
includes two periods January 1999 to March 2001 and January 2004 to end of 2006. Cold market is 
the remaining sample period.  Takeover Probability is a Dummy constructed by following Brar et 
al. (2008). I first build a two-way matrix by size and growth in turnover. I consider that companies 
that are large and high growth are less likely to be subject to a takeover bid, and thus assigned a 
value of 0. In contrast, those in small and low growth quadrant have a higher probability of a 
takeover, and they take a value of 1. Companies in the remaining two quadrants are undetermined. 
In the second stage, I classify these undetermined samples by dividend yield. Firms with high yield 
have a higher probability, and, thus a value of 1, while those with low yield have a value of 0.  SEO 
Dummy takes value of one if the IPO raised further Equity within 3-years of IPO.  I report p-values 
for the mean difference test between different subsamples. ***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6-4 reports the univariate analysis. I focus on differences between Net 
Sell, Net Buy, and no insider trading, No Trade, samples. The results indicate that 
Net Sell IPOs have lower lockup lengths, more likely to be underwritten by 
prestigious underwriters, higher pre-trade returns, less likely to be issued in bubble 
and hot periods and less likely to be taken over than the remaining IPOs. In 
addition, they have lower underpricing, lower fraction of shares locked, less likely 
to be backed by venture capitalists, and higher returns on the lockup expiry dates 
than IPOs in No Trade sample. The Net Buy IPOs are more likely to be 
underwritten by prestigious underwriters and backed by venture capitalists, more 
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likely to be high tech but less likely to be issued in hot period, or to be taken over, 
and they generate relatively higher returns before the trades, CAR(-40,-2).  
Panel B reports the distribution of the underpricing, the 36 months CARs, 
and the proportion of Net Buy and Net Sell IPOs by size, the presence of prestigious 
underwriters73 and venture capitalists, market of quotation, institutional holdings, 
and market conditions.74 In line with previous evidence (e.g., Brav and Gompers 
(2003)) the results indicate that the underpricing is higher in large firms, but the 
magnitude is larger, and it is not a function of the presence of venture capitalists. 
However, my results show that the underpricing is lower in IPOs underwritten by 
prestigious underwriters, and in non-bubble periods. Furthermore, while the long-
term returns are not affected by prestigious underwriters, venture capitalists and the 
market of quotation, they are much lower in large firms and in IPOs issued in the 
bubble period. The size effect on the long-term returns is consistent with Levis 
(2008). The last two columns provide additional analysis of my IPOs in the Net 
Buy and Net Sell subsamples. The results indicate that insider trading in both the 
Net Buy and Net Sell IPOs occur mainly in larger firms. The results also indicate 
that Net Sell IPOs are likely to be underwritten by prestigious underwriters, backed 
by venture capitalists, and quoted in the main market, but less likely to be issued in 
bubble period and in cold market conditions. In contrast, the Net Buy IPOs are 
relatively homogeneously distributed across these characteristics, but unlike Net 
                                                 
73 We follow Derrien and Kecskes (2007) and include in prestigious underwriters global investment 
banks such as ABN AMRO (including Hoare Govett), Cazenove  & Co., Credit Lynnais Securities, 
Dresdner Kleinwort Wassertein, HSBC Securities, Credit Suisse, Investec Hendersen Crosthwaite 
securities, KBC Securities, Peel Hunt, Lehman brothers, Nomura International, Schroder Salomon 
Smith Barney, SG securities, UBS, West LB, Merrill Lynch International, Goldman Sachs.  
74 We split these conditions into bubble and non-bubble period and hot and cold market. We define 
bubble period as 1999-2000 period following Levis (2008). Hot market is when the IPO volume 
increases significantly and includes two periods 2000 and 2004 to 2006. 
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Sell IPOs, they appear to occur more in IPOs quoted on AIM than on the Main 
Market.  
Table 6-5 reports the correlation matrix across variables. The results 
indicate a strong negative relationship between equally weighted CARs 36 months 
after IPO and first day returns, Underpricing, high tech, bubble and hot market 
dummies, and net purchase ratio as measured by transaction, NPR_Trans, or value, 
NPR_Val. are negatively related to underpricing. In contrast, the correlation with 
lockup expiry date returns is positive, suggesting that IPOs with low decrease in 
share prices on the lockup expiry date generate high returns. This positive 
correlation provides support to Brav and Gompers (2003) and Field and Hanka 
(2001) who suggest that lockup expiry dates are likely to increase the agency 
conflicts between managers and outside investors and opens up ways for trading on 
insider information. Since part of the negative returns on the lockup expiry dates is 
driven by the sell trades by insiders (Hoque and Lasfer (2009)), my results suggest 
that IPOs where insiders keep their holdings after the lockup expiry dates suffer 
less agency conflicts and, thus generate higher long-term returns.  
Interestingly, the correlation between underpricing and the remaining 
explanatory variables is weak, as shown in column 2. Column 3 reports a positive 
correlation between size and prestigious underwriters, suggesting that large IPOs 
are more likely to be underwritten by prestigious investment banks. Large firms are 
also likely to be issued in bubble periods, but less likely to have longer lockup 
lengths. Column 4 shows that overhang is lower in hot markets. Column 5 shows a 
positive correlation between prestigious underwriters, venture capitalist, and bubble 
period, but negative relationship with lockup lengths, in line with venture 
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capitalists in Column 6. The remaining columns indicate a negative correlation 
between takeover probability and returns on the lockup length (Column 7), and 
bubble period (Column 10). I account for these correlations in my regression 
results by including only one factor at a time and assess the impact on the standard 
error, and thus, t-statistics.    
Table 6-6 shows the cross sectional regressions of 36 months IPO returns on 
several variables. I have estimated regressions (1-3) with bubble and hot market 
dummies and regressions (4-6) with year dummies to avoid multicollinearity 
problem. As a measure of insider trading activity in the IPOs I use net purchase 
ratio (based on number of transactions and value) and a dummy variable for no 
insider trading. The last three columns replicate Regression (1) for Net Buy, Net 
Sell and No Trade subsamples. 
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Table 6-6 Correlation Matrix 
 
Correlation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
 
14 
 
15 
1.CAR36  1.00   
2.Underpricing -0.13 1.00   
3.Size -0.01 -0.02 1.00   
4.Overhang  -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 1.00   
5.Prestigous underwriters 0.03 -0.08 0.34 -0.01 1.00   
6.VC-backing  0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.20 1.00   
7.Lockup expiry returns 0.14 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.02 1.00   
8.Lockup length  -0.07 -0.03 -0.13 0.05 -0.20 -0.15 0.09 1.00   
9.High tech dummy  -0.13 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.15 -0.05 -0.08 1.00   
10.Bubble dummy  -0.20 0.08 0.10 -0.05 0.13 0.09 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 1.00   
11.Hot dummy  -0.14 0.06 0.01 -0.10 0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.24 1.00   
12.NPR_Trans  -0.22 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.10 0.05 1.00   
13.NPR_Val  -0.27 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.90 1.00   
14.NO_IT_Dum -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 1.00  
15. Takeover Probability 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.12 0.02 -0.06 -0.11 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 1.00 
16.SEO Dummy 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.06 -0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.14 -0.10 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.00 
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Table 6-7 OLS Regressions of 36 Months IPO Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Net Buy Net Sell No IT 
Constant 2.35*** 
(2.86) 
2.25*** 
(2.82) 
1.79*** 
(2.69) 
1.86** 
(-2.33) 
1.78** 
(2.27) 
1.22* 
(1.92) 
2.94** 
(2.42) 
0.84 
(0.54) 
0.146 
(0.09) 
Underpricing -0.002** 
(-2.31) 
-0.002** 
(-2.11) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.002** 
(-1.97) 
-0.002* 
(-1.83) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.48) 
-0.002* 
(-1.87) 
-0.002 
(-1.53) 
-0.003** 
(-2.11) 
Log(Size) -0.026 
(-0.79) 
-0.042 
(-1.23) 
-0.011 
(-0.37) 
-0.007 
(-0.23) 
-0.006 
(-0.18) 
-0.017 
(-0.65) 
-0.038 
(-0.81) 
-0.048 
(-0.67) 
-0.011 
(-0.17) 
Overhang -0.009* 
(-1.67) 
-0.010* 
(-1.71) 
-0.011** 
(-2.17) 
-0.011** 
(-1.97) 
-0.011** 
(-1.97) 
-0.011 
(-2.25) 
-0.007 
(-1.02) 
-0.012 
(-1.51) 
-0.016 
(-1.58) 
Prestigious Underwriter 0.13 
(1.12) 
0.16 
(1.37) 
0.16 
(1.41) 
0.04 
(0.41) 
0.07 
(0.66) 
0.09 
(0.88) 
0.11 
(0.68) 
0.25 
(1.01) 
0.15 
(0.55) 
VC baking 0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.012 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(-0.65) 
-0.13 
(-1.04) 
-0.13 
(-1.11) 
-0.15 
(-1.46) 
-0.074 
(-0.41) 
0.16 
(0.65) 
-0.37 
(-1.35) 
Lockup expiry return 1.26*** 
(3.10) 
1.23*** 
(3.05) 
1.02** 
(2.15) 
1.48*** 
(3.80) 
1.45*** 
(3.76) 
1.01** 
(2.12) 
1.19** 
(2.08) 
1.63 
(1.56) 
0.56 
(0.97) 
Log(Lockup length) -0.31** 
(-2.45) 
-0.30** 
(-2.43) 
-0.29** 
(-2.42) 
-0.39*** 
(-3.09) 
-0.37*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.30*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.46** 
(-2.39) 
-0.03 
(-0.13) 
-0.012 
(-0.05) 
High tech dummy -0.55*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.50*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.57*** 
(-4.00) 
-0.59*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.55*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.60*** 
(-4.10) 
-0.58*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.37 
(-1.25) 
-0.58* 
(-1.92) 
Bubble dummy -0.49*** 
(-3.47) 
-0.48*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.52*** 
(-4.75) 
-- -- -- -0.46** 
(-2.81) 
-0.58** 
(-2.19) 
-0.39* 
(-1.86) 
Hot Dummy -0.32*** 
(-2.62) 
-031*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.38*** 
(-3.34) 
-- -- -- -0.37** 
(-2.22) 
-0.21 
(-0.97) 
-0.54** 
(-1.98) 
Takeover Probability 0.007 
(0.06) 
0.022 
(0.19) 
0.13 
(1.25) 
0.06 
(0.50) 
0.07 
(0.62) 
0.16 
(1.57) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.32* 
(1.67) 
SEO Dummy 0.18 
(1.17) 
0.16 
(1.10) 
0.09 
(0.69) 
0.04 
(0.32) 
0.04 
(0.28) 
-0.007 
(-0.06) 
0.11 
(0.63) 
0.25 
(0.93) 
-0.12 
(-0.47) 
NPR_trans -0.33*** 
(-4.20) 
  -0.28*** 
(-3.79) 
     
NPR_val 
 
-0.34*** 
(-5.42) 
  -0.27*** 
(-4.77) 
    
No IT Dum 
 
 -0.39***   -0.33***    
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(-3.78) (-3.36) 
Year Dummies -- -- -- Yes Yes Yes -- -- -- 
 
 
        
Adjusted R2 12.8% 14.5% 10.9% 19.7% 20.6% 15.5% 8.4% 3.1% 6.5% 
Dependent variable for all regressions is 36 months cumulative abnormal returns for 830 IPOs that went public in London stock exchange from 1999 to 2006. 
Underpricing is the percent return on the first day from the offering price to the closing price.  Overhang is the ratio of proportion retained to proportion sold. 
Size is defined as market value which is the offering price times shares outstanding in 2008 millions of Pound Sterling constant terms. Prestigious underwriters 
are the global underwriters defined in Derrien and Kecskes (2007). Venture-backed is dummy equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists.  Bubble 
period is defined as 1999-2000 period following Levis (2008). High-tech Dummy is equal to one if the IPO is in computer manufacturing, electronic equipment, 
computer and data processing services, and optical, medical and scientific equipment. Hot market is when the IPO volume increases significantly and includes 
two periods January 1999 to March 2001 and January 2004 to end of 2006. Cold market is the remaining sample period. Takeover Probability is a Dummy 
constructed by following Brar et al. (2008). I first build a two-way matrix by size and growth in turnover. I consider that companies that are large and high 
growth are less likely to be subject to a takeover bid, and thus assigned a value of 0. In contrast, those in small and low growth quadrant have a higher probability 
of a takeover, and they take a value of 1. Companies in the remaining two quadrants are undetermined. In the second stage, I classify these undetermined samples 
by dividend yield. Firms with high yield have a higher probability, and, thus a value of 1, while those with low yield have a value of 0.  SEO Dummy takes value 
of one if the IPO raised further Equity within 3-years of IPO. Lockup exp ret is the cumulative abnormal return from -2 to +2 days around the lockup expiration 
date. Lockup length is the number of days of lockup. NPR_trans is the number of insider purchases minus the number of insider sells divided by the total number 
of insider transactions over 36 months after IPO.  NPR_val is the pound sterling value of insider purchases minus insider sells divided by the total value of insider 
transactions over 36 months after IPO. No IT dum is a dummy variable if the IPO does not have any insider trades within 36 months of IPO.  ***, **, * 
significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
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The results indicate a strong negative relationship between CARs and 
underpricing in all my specifications, with the Net Sell subsample where this 
variable is negative but not significant. The negative relationship between the long-
term returns and underpricing is consistent with previous empirical evidence (e.g., 
Levis (2008)) and suggest that IPOs with high undepricing generate lower long-
term returns. My results do not provide support to the signalling models (Jenkinson 
and Ljungqvist (2001)). The variable overhang is significant in (3) to (5), but not in 
(6) and in the subsample IPOs. The results also indicate that the CARs are not 
affected by the presence of prestigious underwriters and the venture capitalists, in 
line with Levis (2008). The variable size is negatively related to long term 
performance but the coefficient is not statistically significant. These results are in 
contrast with Brav and Gompers (1997) who document that underperformance is 
concentrated in small, non-venture capitalists-backed firms. The results also 
indicate a positive relationship between long-term returns and stock price 
behaviour on the lockup expiry dates, suggesting that IPOs with high lockup expiry 
returns dates, are more likely to have higher long-term returns as insider are 
unlikely to have sold their holdings after the lockup, and, thus lower agency 
conflicts. In addition, the lockup length is negatively related to long term 
performance, implying higher agency conflicts. High-tech dummy is negatively 
related to long run underperformance. Bubble dummy is statistically and 
economically significant, suggesting IPO issued in the bubble period generate more 
negative long term performance. Levis (2008) reports a negative coefficient for 
bubble dummy, but it is not significant. Also, hot market dummy is negative and 
259 
 
statistically and economically significant. The three insider trading variables are 
negatively related to IPO performance. All of them are economically and 
statistically significant. The variable NPR_trans and NPR_val have similar 
coefficients (-0.34) in the first set of regressions and -0.28 and -0.27 in the second 
set of regressions. The negative coefficients imply that if insiders are net buyers the 
IPO performs badly, which is consistent with the univariate results. No IT Dum 
coefficient is -0.41 and -0.30 respectively, both significant at 1% level of 
significance. The negative sign of this coefficient imply that when IPOs are not 
subject to insider trading, they underperform.  
It is worth mentioning that the R2 obtained varies between 10.9-14.5%, and 
15.5-20.6%, respectively for first and second set of regressions. Similar studies 
using the standard variables like underpricing, size, overhang, prestigious 
underwriter, VC baking obtained R2 of 4-6%. For example, Levis (2008) reports R2 
of 1.5%,75 and Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi (2007) 8.45%.76 The additional 
explanatory powers in my regressions seem to come partly from the insider trading 
based measures and partially from the time effects. The insider trading activity 
explains a significant proportion of IPO long run performance. This may be due to 
the information production by the insider’s trading activity or through the increase 
in liquidity by their trades. It seems that underwriters/managers time the market 
very well. When the market is doing well (hot market) many companies issue 
                                                 
75 Levis (2008) obtained an R2 of 1.4% for Non-private equity backed, 7.5% for venture capitalists-
backed and 0.05% for boyout IPOs. 
76  Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi (2007) report R2 for all firms of 8.45%. However, they report 
R2 of 6.38% and 13.58% for small firms and large firms respectively. 
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shares, and subsequently they underperform, which is consistent with Schultz’s 
(2003) ‘pseudo market timing’ phenomenon.    
6.4.4 Determinants of Insider Trading in IPOs  
 
If insiders believe that the stock is overvalued and expect prices to revert quickly to 
fundamental values, managers try to sell a larger proportion of the company to the 
public.  At the same time on individual account, the insider sell trades should 
increase on the lock-up expiration dates. But if they do not cash out of their 
holdings at either of the two stages, that would be evidence against insiders using 
their private information to take advantage of outside investors. The latter finding 
would be consistent with the idea that insiders truly believe that their stock is fairly 
priced, and take their firm public to raise the capital necessary to invest in what 
they believe are investment opportunities with positive net present value (NPV). 
On the other hand, buy trades by insiders suggest that their shares are undervalued.  
If the buy trades occur for the falling share prices, two cases are possible: first, the 
IPO is a good company, but the share is temporarily mis-valued, and insiders want 
to increase their holdings, and secondly, the company is doing badly and insiders 
buy to support the price, and to increase the commitment and signalling effects. In 
the first case, the test is consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis put 
forward in the context of the trading literature. For example, Brennan and Cao 
(1996) argue that informed investors are contrarians while uniformed investors are 
trend followers. To my knowledge, there are no studies which looked at such 
insider trades in the context of IPOs. 
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Table 6-8 Summary Statistics of Insider trading (within 3-years of IPO) 
I obtain insider holdings data for the period January 1999 to December 2007 from the Directors 
Deals and match it with my constructed IPO dataset. The sells (buys) are trades that occurred within 
3 years of IPO. The sample includes 822 sell trades by 231 IPOs (Panel A) and 2102 buy trades by 
480 IPOs (Panel B). Percentage Holding is the percent of total shares traded which is owned by the 
director. Market capitalization is at the time of trade. CAR
-42,-2 is the cumulative abnormal return 40 
day pre-event window. I use the standard event study methodology to compute the abnormal returns 
with α and ȕ based on regression of stock returns on the FTSE All Share Price Index for main 
market companies and AIM All Share Price Index for AIM companies. 
 
Table 6-7 provides the descriptive statistics of the insider trading sample 
(within 3-years of IPO). The results indicate that, on an average 3.5 insiders sell 
trades compared to 4.38 buy trades. The trade time after the IPO is similar for sell 
(buy) trades and they occur roughly after 1.5 years after IPO. The results imply that 
most of the trades occur after the lockup expiration, as the average lockup period is 
one year. The number of shares sold and the value of shares are quite large 
compared to shares bought. Trade size as a percentage of market capitalisation 
10th percentile Median Mean 90th percentile
Panel A: Sell Trades 
Number of trades 1.00 2.00 3.56 8.00
Number  of Shares         19,510       200,000         858,945      1,590,000 
Value of shares (£)        24,242       298,569      2,334,453     2,940,683
Percentage Holding  0.04 1.35 7.14 22.44
Trade as % of market cap  0.02 0.29 1.01 2.37
Market capitalization (mil) 9.00 112.35 537.60 1244.42
CAR(-40,-2) -12.80% 4.57% 5.93% 24.72%
Trade time after IPO(yr) 0.52 1.45 1.52 2.63
 Panel B: Buy Trades      
Number  of trades 1.00 3.00 4.38 9.10
Number  of Shares          5,000         27,000         172,885         250,000 
Value of shares(£)            2,808         13,300         231,605           99,139 
Percentage Holding  0.01 0.63 5.27 15.65
Trade as % of market cap  0.005 0.05 0.21 0.41
Market capitalization (mil) 3.84 26.48 248.14 352.89
CAR(-40,-2) -44.44% -7.01% -11.15% 15.64%
Trade time after IPO(yr) 0.41 1.45 1.46 2.61
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shows that the sell trades are much larger compared to the buy trades. On average, 
the sell trades are 5 times larger than the buy trades. The average market 
capitalization for sell trades is also much larger compared to that of buy trades. The 
mean (median) pre-trade share price runnup for sell trades is 5.93% (4.57%) and 
the mean (median) share price decline for buy trades is -11.15%(-7.01%), implying 
that insiders are contrarians. 
Table 6-8 reports the results of the logit regressions to assess the probability 
of insider trading in the IPOs. I have estimated three separate regressions. In Panel 
A I estimate a model for Net Sell IPOs relative no insider trading, No Trade, IPOs. 
I find that the share price run-up drive insiders’ decision to sell stakes in their own 
IPO. The coefficient of CAR(-40,-2) of 4.204 is statistically and economically 
significant. The results also indicate that insiders sell in IPOs underwritten by 
prestigious underwriter, backed by venture capitalists and when the probability of a 
takeover is low.  
 
Table 6-9 Logit Analysis of Insider Trades within 36 Months of IPO 
 Coefficient Standard Error Prob. 
Panel A: Net Sell     
Constant 0.218 0.847 0.79 
CAR (-40,-2) 4.204
*** 1.266 0.00 
Underpricing -0.002 0.002 0.43 
Shares Locked -0.003 0.007 0.68 
Days locked -0.001 0.001 0.08 
Overhang 0.010 0.013 0.43 
Prestigious Underwriter 0.967*** 0.302 0.00 
VC baking 0.777** 0.340 0.02 
Institutional presence?  -0.340 0.239 0.16 
Takeover Probability  -1.210*** 0.256 0.00 
SEO Dummy -0.032 -0.054 0.58 
Year Dummies 
 
 Yes  
Pseudo R2  19.60%  
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Panel B:Net Buy     
Constant 0.356 0.718 0.61 
CAR (-40,-2) 1.215 0.830 0.14 
Underpricing -0.001 0.001 0.67 
Shares Locked 0.001 0.006 0.85 
Days locked -0.001 0.001 0.49 
Overhang -0.016 0.010 0.11 
Prestigious Underwriter 0.566** 0.232 0.01 
VC baking 0.378 0.268 0.15 
Institutional presence?  -0.099 0.181 0.58 
Takeover Probability  -0.740*** 0.184 0.00 
SEO Dummy 0.066 0.053 0.21 
Year Dummies 
 
 Yes  
Pseudo R2  5.97%  
Panel C: Buy Vs Sell    
Constant -0.698 0.695 0.31 
CAR (-40,-2) -2.942
*** 0.971 0.00 
Underpricing 0.001 0.002 0.64 
Shares Locked 0.009 0.005 0.13 
Days locked 0.002** 0.001 0.04 
Overhang -0.012 0.015 0.41 
Prestigious Underwriter -0.234 0.240 0.32 
VC baking -0.229 0.290 0.43 
Institutional presence?  0.297 0.210 0.16 
Takeover Probability  0.406* 0.237 0.08 
SEO Dummy 0.064 0.055 0.24 
Year Dummies 
 
 Yes  
Pseudo R2  8.55%  
    
The dependent variable in Panel A is a dummy equal to one for IPOs if  insiders are net sellers and 
zero for no trade IPOs. In Panel B dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for IPOs if insiders 
are net buyers, and zero for no trades. In Panel C, the dependent is dummy variable equal to one for 
IPOs if insiders are net buyers and zero for IPOs if insider sellers. Insider Net Sell sample includes 
190 IPOs and Insider Net Buy sample includes 353 IPOs and 287 IPOs with no trades. CAR(-40,-2) are 
the cumulative abnormal return over pre-event window. For the no trade sample, I measure the 39-
day abnormal return as the abnormal return over the whole lockup period standardised to 39 days.  
Underpricing is the percent return on the first day from the offering price to the closing price. 
Venture backed is dummy variable equal to one venture capitalist is present. Prestigious 
underwriter is defined if the global investment bank has underwritten the issue. Days locked is the 
log of the lockup period. Size is the log of market value of equity in 2008 constant terms. Shares 
locked is the number of shares locked over the holdings of insiders. Overhang is the ratio of shares 
retained to shares sold. Institutional Holding is the proportion of companies where institutions hold 
more than 3%. Takeover Probability is a Dummy constructed by following Brar et al. (2008). I first 
build a two-way matrix by size and growth in turnover. I consider that companies that are large and 
high growth are less likely to be subject to a takeover bid, and thus assigned a value of 0. In 
contrast, those in small and low growth quadrant have a higher probability of a takeover, and they 
take a value of 1. Companies in the remaining two quadrants are undetermined. In the second stage, 
I classify these undetermined samples by dividend yield. Firms with high yield have a higher 
probability, and, thus a value of 1, while those with low yield have a value of 0.  SEO Dummy takes 
value of one if the IPO raised further Equity within 3-years of IPO.  ***, **, * significant at 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.  
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Panel B, reports the results for the Net Buy versus No Trade IPOs. The 
results indicate that IPOs with prestigious underwriters and a lower probability of 
takeover are more likely to be subject to Net Buy trades by insiders. Finally, in 
Panel C, I model the probability of Net Buy vs. Net Sell IPOs. The results indicate 
that the decision to buy rather than to sell is affected by share price performance, 
days locked, and takeover probability. 
6.5 Robustness Checks 
6.5.1 Long run underperformance 
 
In this section, I first check whether IPOs underperform in the long run by using 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). BHARs are easy to interpret as it means   
buying the issuing firm’s stock in the month following the issue, and holding the 
stock for time T. The time frame used for calculating BHARs is 3 years to make it 
comparable with the CARs and Fama-French alphas.  In a sample of N issues, the 
average return over a holding period of T months is computed as the average 
cumulative returns, also referred to as ܤܪܴതതതതതതത : 
ܤܪܴതതതതതത ؠ ͳܰ ෍ ൥ෑሺͳ ൅ ܴ௜௧ሻ െ ͳ்௧ୀଵ ൩ே௜ୀଵ  
Where Rit denotes the return of stock i over month t. The effective holding period 
for stock i is from t to T, which is 36 months. Kothari and Warner (1997), Barber 
and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) provide simulation based 
analysis of test statistics based on long run return metrics such as BHR.  
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 The matching firm technique generates return to issuing firms compared to 
the non-issuing firm, usually matched on firm characteristics such as industry, size 
and market-to-book ratio. In this paper, the matching is done using size and market 
to book. The abnormal return BHAR is then: ܤܪܣܴூ௉ை ൌ ܤܪܴூ௉ை െ ܤܪܴெ௔௧௖௛௘ௗ ி௜௥௠ 
 To test the null hypothesis that the mean BHAR is equal to zero for sample 
of N firms, the conventional t-statistic method is employed: 
ݐ ൌ ܤܪܣܴതതതതതതതതሺ௧,்ሻߪොሺܤܪܣܴሺ௧,்ሻ/√ܰ 
Where, ࡮ࡴ࡭ࡾതതതതതതതതതሺ࢚,ࢀሻ is the sample mean of ࡮ࡴ࡭ࡾሺ࢚,ࢀሻ and ࣌ෝሺ࡮ࡴ࡭ࡾሺ࢚,ࢀሻ is the 
cross-sectional sample standard deviation of BHAR for the sample of N firms. 
Table 6-9 reports the long-run performance of my sample IPOs based on 
the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) in the first month and then in the 
following 6, 12, 24 and 36 months after the IPO to compare my results with the 
CARs in Table 6-3. The results of BHARs are broadly similar to the CARs. The 
results show that all IPOs start underperforming in month 12, and they 
underperform significantly in the 36 months holding period. While the insider 
trade sample does not show significant underperformance, the sample with No 
insider trade shows significant underperformance. Interestingly, the Net Sell 
sample starts over-performing from 6 months and overperforms for the 3-year 
holding period. On the contrary, the Net Buy sample starts underperforming from 6 
months and continues underperforming during the 3-year holding period. 
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Table 6-10 Long-run IPO Performance: BHAR  
  Months Event window 
1 6 12 24 36        2-18       19-36 
All IPOs -0.002 -0.016 -0.076** -0.139*** -0.183*** -0.055 -0.226*** 
(-0.27) (-0.50) (-2.02) (-3.15) (-3.43) (-1.36) (-2.62) 
No trade -0.023 -0.024 -0.133** -0.340*** -0.361*** -0.229*** -0.438* 
(-1.46) (-0.34) (-2.38) (-5.55) (-5.26) (-3.96) (-1.89) 
Insider trade 0.009 -0.011 -0.046 -0.033 -0.088 0.038 -0.113** 
(0.88) (-0.38) (-0.93) (-0.55) (-1.22) (0.71) (-2.39) 
Net Sell 0.001 0.127*** 0.212*** 0.421*** 0.371** 0.390*** 0.055 
(0.11) (2.89) (2.75) (4.08) (2.49) (3.95) (0.70) 
Net buy 0.012 -0.086** -0.185*** -0.277*** -0.336*** -0.152*** -0.204*** 
(0.93) (-2.28) (-2.95) (-4.09) (-4.50) (-2.55) (-3.49) 
I compute BHAR of stock returns on the FTSE All Share Price Index for main market companies 
and AIM All Share Price Index for AIM companies. I obtain the monthly share price and indices 
data from DataStream. All IPOs includes 830 UK IPOs over the period 1999-2006.  IPOs with 
insider trades (543 IPOs) includes any IPOs with at lease one insider trades during 36 months period 
after IPO. IPOs without insider trades (287 IPOs) include any IPOs without any insider trades 
during 36 months period after IPO. IPOs where insider are net buyers (sellers) are based on Net 
purchase ratio (NPR). If NPR is positive (negative) I define them as IPOs where insiders are Net 
Buyers (sellers). NPR is the difference between total value of purchases and sells divided by total 
value of shares traded over this 36 months period after IPO. I identify 190 Net Sell IPOs and 353 
Net Buy IPOs. To remove the effect of first day return I compute the first month return without first 
day return. ***, **,* represent significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
 
6.5.2 Regression analysis of BHAR 
 
I did the regressions of BHARs using the same set of variables for CARs. The 
results are in Table 6-10. The findings are broadly similar to the CAR regressions. 
All the insider trading measures are economically and statistically significant, 
suggesting that if insiders are net sellers the IPOs performance is better. Lockup 
expiry returns are positively related to IPO performance, and lockup length is 
negatively related to the 36-month BHAR. 
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Table 6-11 Regression Analysis for BHAR 
 
 
 
Dependent variable for all regressions is 36 months BHAR for 830 IPOs that went public in London stock exchange from 1999 to 2006. Underpricing is the 
percent return on the first day from the offering price to the closing price.  Overhang is the ratio of proportion retained to proportion sold. Size is defined as 
market value which is the offering price times shares outstanding in 2008 millions of Pound Sterling constant terms. Prestigious underwriters are the global 
underwriters defined in Derrien and Kecskes (2007). Venture-backed is dummy equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists.  Bubble period is defined 
as 1999-2000 period following Levis (2008). High-tech Dummy is equal to one if the IPO is in computer manufacturing, electronic equipment, computer and data 
processing services, and optical, medical and scientific equipment. Hot market is when the IPO volume increases significantly and includes two periods January 
1999 to March 2001 and January 2004 to end of 2006. Cold market is the remaining sample period. Takeover Probability is a Dummy constructed by following 
Brar et al. (2008). I first build a two-way matrix by size and growth in turnover. I consider that companies that are large and high growth are less likely to be 
subject to a takeover bid, and thus assigned a value of 0. In contrast, those in small and low growth quadrant have a higher probability of a takeover, and they 
take a value of 1. Companies in the remaining two quadrants are undetermined. In the second stage, I classify these undetermined samples by dividend yield. 
Firms with high yield have a higher probability, and, thus a value of 1, while those with low yield have a value of 0.  SEO Dummy takes value of one if the IPO 
 (1) t (2) t (3) t (4) t (5) t (6) t Net Buy t Net Sell t No IT t 
Constant 2.307 2.05 2.179 1.98 1.121 1.30 1.902 1.95 1.782 1.87 0.96 0.21 2.180 1.84 2.230 0.98 -1.245 -1.32 
Underpricing 0.000 0.21 0.000 0.50 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.45 0.000 0.68 0.000 0.30 0.000 0.60 0.000 -0.19 0.000 0.04 
Log(Size) -0.033 -0.59 -0.052 -0.91 0.002 0.06 -0.019 -0.33 -0.040 -0.68 0.013 0.34 -0.016 -0.31 -0.149 -1.07 -0.023 -0.52 
Overhang -0.013 -2.21 -0.014 -2.25 -0.007 -1.82 -0.015 -2.33 -0.016 -2.33 -0.008 -2.00 -0.014 -1.29 -0.013 -2.21 0.004 0.72 
Prestigious Underwriter -0.229 -1.41 -0.195 -1.21 -0.129 -0.93 -0.252 -1.57 -0.210 -1.33 -0.143 -1.05 -0.184 -0.90 -0.090 -0.34 0.259 1.18 
VC baking -0.046 -0.33 -0.062 -0.45 -0.100 -0.85 -0.113 -0.83 -0.119 -0.88 -0.142 -1.19 -0.100 -0.60 0.272 1.30 -0.371 -1.59 
Lockup expiry return 2.299 3.41 2.255 3.37 1.227 2.22 2.308 3.59 2.241 3.54 1.206 2.16 1.937 2.83 3.285 1.88 -0.022 -0.03 
Log(Lockup length) -0.304 -1.95 -0.288 -1.89 -0.164 -1.33 -0.318 -2.06 -0.294 -1.96 -0.183 -1.50 -0.371 -2.03 -0.186 -0.64 0.174 1.22 
High tech dummy -0.310 -2.04 -0.250 -1.64 -0.286 -2.11 -0.338 -2.28 -0.279 -1.88 -0.280 -2.09 -0.188 -1.05 -0.652 -2.38 -0.131 -0.54 
Bubble dummy 0.093 0.63 0.099 0.69 0.090 0.87       0.309 2.17 -0.549 -1.85 0.224 1.63 
Hot Dummy -0.240 -0.98 -0.221 -0.90 -0.194 -0.89       -0.287 -1.33 -0.096 -0.19 -0.105 -0.34 
Takeover Probability 0.268 1.33 0.288 1.42 0.192 1.35 0.312 1.47 0.331 1.56 0.215 1.48 0.301 1.78 0.370 0.64 0.050 0.30 
SEO Dummy -0.025 -0.11 -0.039 -0.18 -0.201 -1.13 -0.083 -0.41 -0.087 -0.43 -0.225 -1.36   0.094 0.18 -0.533 -1.90 
NPR_trans -0.395 -3.12     -0.379 -2.86           
NPR_val   -0.410 -4.46     -0.397 -4.07         
No IT Dum 
    -0.313 -2.91     -0.313 -2.96       
Year Dummies NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO  
 
       
           
Adjusted R2 0.073  0.09  0.03  0.087  0.101  0.043  0.064  0.066  0.039  
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raised further Equity within 3-years of IPO. Lockup exp ret is the cumulative abnormal return from -2 to +2 days around the lockup expiration date. Lockup 
length is the number of days of lockup. NPR_trans is the number of insider purchases minus the number of insider sells divided by the total number of insider 
transactions over 36 months after IPO.  NPR_val is the pound sterling value of insider purchases minus insider sells divided by the total value of insider 
transactions over 36 months after IPO. No IT dum is a dummy variable if the IPO does not have any insider trades within 36 months of IPO.  ***, **, * 
significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.  
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
This study analyses the impact of insider trading on the long run performance of 
IPOs. First the previous finding is confirmed that IPOs underperform in the long 
run, using event studies and Fama-French regressions. This study partitions the 
IPOs into firms with insider trading and without Insider trading. I find that IPOs 
with insider trades underperform less than IPOs without insider trades. Also, this 
study finds that IPOs with Net Sell is the only group which overperform the 
benchmark index. Overall, the results show that IPOs where insiders sell (buy) 
over-(under-)perform relative to various benchmarks. The results are in direct 
contrast with the signalling, moral hazard/agency theories, which state that insiders 
buy (sell) aligns (misaligns) the interests of the managers with the interests of other 
shareholders. The results for Net Sell IPOs are more consistent with the view that 
the sells trades of insiders are driven by liquidity or other considerations, while the 
Net Buy IPOs are more consistent with the price support, though insiders do not 
achieve their targets. 
This study examines the cross sectional variation of long run IPO 
performance by using several insiders trading measures. I use two measures based 
on net purchase ratio and another dummy for no trades. All the insider trading 
measures are highly significant and negatively related to IPO performance.  No 
insider trading dummy is negative meaning that if there is no insider trade the IPO 
perform badly. Underpricing is negatively related to long-run performance, 
suggesting that the higher the underpricing the worst performance in the long run. 
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The higher drop at lock up expiry return is positively related to performance. If the 
shares are issued at bubble/hot market they perform badly, which is consistent with 
pseudo market timing of Schultz (2003). Finally, this study analyses the insider 
trading behaviour in the IPOs. It is found that there are more buy trades compared 
to sells. However, the sell trades involve more shares in terms of number of shares 
and value. The sell trades are larger in terms of trades as percentage of market 
capitalization at the time of trade. The pre-trade cumulative abnormal returns show 
that insiders are contrarians. The logit regression results show that the major driver 
of insider trading activity is the share price performance. Prestigious underwriter 
presence is related to insider trading activity, both for sell and buy. I find venture 
capitalist presence is only related to buy but not sell.  
The analysis in this study is motivated by the presence in the UK companies 
of corporate brokers who are usually their underwriters, as a pre-condition of their 
listing on the London Stock Exchange, who may require insiders to buy shares 
when the IPO is underperforming. I find that IPOs with insider trading are more 
likely to be underwritten by prestigious underwriters.  
As far as I am aware, this study is unique as it focuses mainly on insider 
trading behaviour for three years from IPO date in the UK market, which is 
different from the US. For example, it is shown that the relationship between IPOs 
and their underwriters is likely to be long-term in the UK, since all quoted firms 
need to have a corporate broker, usually the IPO underwriter, as an interface with 
the London Stock Exchange and the shareholders, and arranges insider trades, 
seasoned equity offerings and share buybacks. This requirement implies that it is 
possible for the underwriters to provide an extended price support through the 
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insiders. Chambers and Dimson (2009) also argue that in the UK, investment 
bankers have increased their market power through time, because of the erosion of 
trust. Thus, I test whether UK underwriters provide an extended price support for 
the failing IPOs by analysing the IPOs where insiders buy shares. Moreover, the 
relatively stricter disclosure rules in the UK (e.g., Korczak and Lasfer (2009)) 
allows us to analyse the trading behaviour of insiders who are limited to directors, 
rather than in the US where officers, directors and shareholders holding more than 
10% shares are included. These institutional differences between UK and US allow 
us to expand previous evidence in various ways.  
Overall, the results in this study suggests that insider trading increases stock 
price accuracy and discovery by mitigating the relatively significant information 
asymmetries inherent in IPOs, and provide support to Meulbroek (1992), Cornell 
and Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and Mcconnell (1997) proposition that insider 
trading is beneficial to the stock markets. The results are also consistent with 
Leland and Pyle (1977) who suggests that retaining insider shares signal quality of 
the firm, Brau and Fawcett (2006) who show that selling insider shares convey 
negative signal to the market, the agency theory arguments that stipulate that 
insider trading is affected by ownership (e.g., Ofek and Yermack (2000)), and the 
signaling models that predict that underpriced IPOs generate high long-run returns 
(Ljungqvist (2007)). Instead, we find that insiders sell when their IPO reaches it 
optimal pricing, and buy to support the prices of their falling IPOs, but their signal 
is weak. However, the data is not available to consider fully the trading of insiders 
just before news announcements, as in Korczak et al. (2010), the direct link 
between corporate brokers in the UK and trading by insiders, and the trading by 
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insiders in the derivatives market to avoid the potential scrutiny by the regulators. 
The extent to which these factors will alter the results is subject of further research.  
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Appendix A. Monthly distribution of long-run IPO performance 
Panel A. Equal weighted CARs 
Months  All IPOs t-stat 
IPOs with 
Insider 
Trade t-stat 
IPOs with 
No 
Insider 
Trade t-stat 
IPOs 
where 
insiders 
are Net 
sellers t-stat 
IPOs 
where 
insiders 
are Net 
Buyers t-stat 
1 0.005 0.36 0.013 1.00 -0.016 -1.19 0.000 0.03 0.022 1.65 
2 -0.005 -0.26 0.006 0.35 -0.032 -1.74 0.012 0.63 0.003 0.16 
3 -0.001 -0.02 0.017 0.73 -0.042 -1.86 0.039 1.74 0.001 0.05 
4 -0.004 -0.13 0.012 0.46 -0.041 -1.58 0.056 2.16 -0.018 -0.67 
5 -0.008 -0.28 0.010 0.35 -0.054 -1.83 0.064 2.18 -0.025 -0.87 
6 -0.023 -0.71 0.001 0.03 -0.081 -2.52 0.078 2.45 -0.051 -1.59 
7 -0.024 -0.69 0.006 0.17 -0.096 -2.78 0.111 3.21 -0.065 -1.87 
8 -0.042 -1.12 -0.015 -0.42 -0.105 -2.85 0.106 2.88 -0.097 -2.62 
9 -0.046 -1.18 -0.018 -0.45 -0.116 -2.95 0.108 2.76 -0.102 -2.60 
10 -0.058 -1.40 -0.021 -0.51 -0.147 -3.55 0.131 3.16 -0.123 -2.96 
11 -0.077 -1.77 -0.038 -0.87 -0.173 -3.98 0.124 2.86 -0.146 -3.36 
12 -0.106 -2.33 -0.059 -1.30 -0.219 -4.85 0.120 2.65 -0.179 -3.95 
13 -0.114 -2.42 -0.065 -1.37 -0.235 -4.98 0.131 2.77 -0.195 -4.14 
14 -0.116 -2.37 -0.066 -1.35 -0.238 -4.86 0.135 2.76 -0.201 -4.11 
15 -0.122 -2.40 -0.061 -1.20 -0.271 -5.35 0.152 2.99 -0.202 -4.00 
16 -0.128 -2.45 -0.058 -1.11 -0.300 -5.74 0.151 2.89 -0.197 -3.78 
17 -0.147 -2.72 -0.066 -1.23 -0.343 -6.36 0.165 3.06 -0.221 -4.10 
18 -0.157 -2.83 -0.076 -1.37 -0.355 -6.40 0.154 2.77 -0.230 -4.14 
19 -0.188 -3.29 -0.102 -1.79 -0.398 -6.98 0.137 2.40 -0.261 -4.58 
20 -0.196 -3.35 -0.108 -1.84 -0.411 -7.04 0.156 2.68 -0.284 -4.85 
21 -0.211 -3.53 -0.117 -1.95 -0.442 -7.38 0.147 2.46 -0.294 -4.90 
22 -0.246 -4.02 -0.147 -2.39 -0.490 -7.99 0.131 2.14 -0.332 -5.41 
23 -0.260 -4.15 -0.158 -2.52 -0.509 -8.11 0.126 2.01 -0.348 -5.55 
24 -0.270 -4.22 -0.165 -2.58 -0.526 -8.22 0.149 2.33 -0.375 -5.85 
25 -0.295 -4.51 -0.184 -2.81 -0.564 -8.63 0.144 2.20 -0.403 -6.16 
26 -0.322 -4.83 -0.203 -3.05 -0.611 -9.16 0.123 1.85 -0.421 -6.32 
27 -0.331 -4.87 -0.211 -3.11 -0.624 -9.18 0.129 1.90 -0.438 -6.45 
28 -0.348 -5.04 -0.227 -3.27 -0.645 -9.33 0.125 1.81 -0.461 -6.67 
29 -0.350 -4.97 -0.226 -3.21 -0.653 -9.28 0.119 1.70 -0.456 -6.48 
30 -0.359 -5.01 -0.236 -3.30 -0.659 -9.20 0.118 1.65 -0.473 -6.60 
31 -0.367 -5.04 -0.236 -3.24 -0.687 -9.44 0.127 1.75 -0.478 -6.57 
32 -0.347 -4.70 -0.221 -2.99 -0.655 -8.86 0.147 1.98 -0.466 -6.31 
33 -0.353 -4.71 -0.227 -3.02 -0.662 -8.81 0.159 2.12 -0.485 -6.46 
34 -0.360 -4.72 -0.229 -3.01 -0.678 -8.89 0.151 1.97 -0.483 -6.34 
35 -0.360 -4.66 -0.230 -2.98 -0.677 -8.75 0.134 1.74 -0.474 -6.12 
36 -0.365 -4.66 -0.236 -3.01 -0.679 -8.66 0.133 1.70 -0.483 -6.16 
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Panel B. Style-adjusted 
Months  
All 
IPOs t-stat 
IPOs 
with 
Insider 
Trade t-stat 
IPOs 
with 
No 
Insider 
Trade t-stat 
IPOs 
with 
Net sell t-stat 
IPOs 
with 
Net buy t-stat 
1 0.022 1.89 0.026 2.24 0.012 1.02 0.027 2.33 0.026 2.19 
2 0.019 1.13 0.032 1.92 -0.012 -0.75 0.023 1.36 0.038 2.29 
3 0.007 0.36 0.023 1.11 -0.030 -1.46 0.016 0.79 0.027 1.33 
4 0.005 0.23 0.031 1.31 -0.055 -2.37 0.039 1.68 0.025 1.06 
5 -0.002 -0.08 0.018 0.70 -0.051 -1.96 0.064 2.43 -0.012 -0.44 
6 -0.002 -0.05 0.022 0.77 -0.058 -2.04 0.082 2.85 -0.017 -0.61 
7 -0.020 -0.64 0.005 0.17 -0.080 -2.60 0.096 3.10 -0.055 -1.78 
8 -0.028 -0.84 0.005 0.15 -0.107 -3.22 0.118 3.55 -0.070 -2.11 
9 -0.038 -1.08 -0.009 -0.26 -0.108 -3.06 0.121 3.43 -0.095 -2.72 
10 -0.038 -1.03 -0.002 -0.05 -0.125 -3.38 0.117 3.16 -0.081 -2.19 
11 -0.042 -1.08 -0.001 -0.01 -0.141 -3.63 0.140 3.60 -0.094 -2.42 
12 -0.056 -1.37 -0.006 -0.16 -0.174 -4.28 0.145 3.58 -0.107 -2.64 
13 -0.082 -1.94 -0.030 -0.71 -0.207 -4.89 0.142 3.37 -0.144 -3.42 
14 -0.089 -2.04 -0.038 -0.87 -0.212 -4.84 0.150 3.43 -0.163 -3.73 
15 -0.087 -1.91 -0.034 -0.75 -0.213 -4.70 0.140 3.08 -0.149 -3.29 
16 -0.086 -1.84 -0.020 -0.44 -0.244 -5.20 0.173 3.70 -0.149 -3.19 
17 -0.089 -1.84 -0.015 -0.32 -0.265 -5.50 0.197 4.08 -0.157 -3.24 
18 -0.101 -2.03 -0.014 -0.29 -0.309 -6.21 0.215 4.32 -0.166 -3.35 
19 -0.102 -1.99 -0.015 -0.29 -0.309 -6.06 0.226 4.44 -0.176 -3.44 
20 -0.130 -2.47 -0.043 -0.82 -0.338 -6.45 0.195 3.72 -0.201 -3.84 
21 -0.137 -2.56 -0.049 -0.92 -0.349 -6.50 0.221 4.11 -0.229 -4.27 
22 -0.141 -2.56 -0.046 -0.84 -0.367 -6.69 0.229 4.17 -0.229 -4.17 
23 -0.180 -3.21 -0.076 -1.35 -0.430 -7.65 0.228 4.06 -0.278 -4.95 
24 -0.175 -3.05 -0.073 -1.27 -0.420 -7.32 0.239 4.17 -0.280 -4.88 
25 -0.190 -3.25 -0.087 -1.48 -0.438 -7.48 0.273 4.66 -0.326 -5.57 
26 -0.210 -3.52 -0.103 -1.72 -0.468 -7.83 0.269 4.51 -0.351 -5.87 
27 -0.229 -3.77 -0.123 -2.02 -0.485 -7.96 0.253 4.16 -0.373 -6.13 
28 -0.247 -3.99 -0.142 -2.29 -0.500 -8.07 0.230 3.71 -0.388 -6.27 
29 -0.261 -4.14 -0.150 -2.38 -0.528 -8.38 0.249 3.96 -0.415 -6.59 
30 -0.266 -4.15 -0.155 -2.42 -0.533 -8.31 0.238 3.71 -0.416 -6.49 
31 -0.275 -4.22 -0.171 -2.63 -0.525 -8.05 0.226 3.46 -0.435 -6.67 
32 -0.275 -4.16 -0.167 -2.52 -0.536 -8.08 0.249 3.76 -0.444 -6.70 
33 -0.260 -3.86 -0.162 -2.40 -0.496 -7.38 0.258 3.84 -0.441 -6.55 
34 -0.261 -3.83 -0.166 -2.43 -0.490 -7.18 0.256 3.75 -0.447 -6.54 
35 -0.268 -3.87 -0.162 -2.33 -0.525 -7.58 0.246 3.55 -0.432 -6.24 
36 -0.261 -3.72 -0.157 -2.23 -0.513 -7.30 0.239 3.40 -0.420 -5.97 
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Panel C. Value weighted CARs 
Months  All IPOs t-stat 
IPOs 
with 
Insider 
Trade t-stat 
IPOs 
with No 
Insider 
Trade t-stat 
IPOs 
with Net 
sell t-stat 
IPOs 
with Net 
buy t-stat 
1 0.028 1.16 0.037 1.53 -0.003 -0.11 0.019 0.77 0.056 2.30 
2 0.004 0.11 0.033 0.97 -0.099 -2.89 0.033 0.96 0.034 0.99 
3 0.015 0.37 0.039 0.92 -0.065 -1.55 0.013 0.32 0.064 1.53 
4 -0.014 -0.30 -0.019 -0.39 0.001 0.03 -0.037 -0.76 -0.001 -0.03 
5 -0.041 -0.76 -0.054 -1.00 0.003 0.06 -0.072 -1.34 -0.035 -0.65 
6 -0.059 -1.00 -0.058 -0.99 -0.061 -1.04 -0.081 -1.37 -0.036 -0.60 
7 -0.092 -1.44 -0.079 -1.23 -0.140 -2.19 -0.079 -1.24 -0.078 -1.22 
8 -0.152 -2.22 -0.145 -2.13 -0.174 -2.54 -0.135 -1.98 -0.156 -2.28 
9 -0.155 -2.14 -0.154 -2.13 -0.160 -2.21 -0.175 -2.41 -0.133 -1.84 
10 -0.187 -2.44 -0.177 -2.32 -0.220 -2.87 -0.191 -2.50 -0.163 -2.14 
11 -0.214 -2.67 -0.203 -2.53 -0.253 -3.15 -0.174 -2.18 -0.231 -2.88 
12 -0.256 -3.06 -0.251 -3.00 -0.274 -3.27 -0.159 -1.90 -0.343 -4.10 
13 -0.257 -2.95 -0.245 -2.81 -0.299 -3.44 -0.101 -1.16 -0.390 -4.48 
14 -0.300 -3.32 -0.282 -3.12 -0.363 -4.02 -0.093 -1.03 -0.472 -5.22 
15 -0.290 -3.09 -0.263 -2.81 -0.383 -4.09 -0.087 -0.93 -0.438 -4.68 
16 -0.277 -2.86 -0.230 -2.38 -0.437 -4.53 -0.073 -0.75 -0.388 -4.01 
17 -0.265 -2.66 -0.215 -2.15 -0.438 -4.40 -0.025 -0.26 -0.404 -4.06 
18 -0.274 -2.68 -0.227 -2.21 -0.439 -4.28 -0.022 -0.22 -0.432 -4.21 
19 -0.332 -3.15 -0.292 -2.77 -0.471 -4.48 -0.066 -0.62 -0.519 -4.92 
20 -0.358 -3.31 -0.339 -3.14 -0.423 -3.91 -0.117 -1.08 -0.563 -5.21 
21 -0.368 -3.33 -0.350 -3.16 -0.433 -3.91 -0.168 -1.52 -0.532 -4.80 
22 -0.408 -3.60 -0.387 -3.41 -0.483 -4.26 -0.217 -1.92 -0.556 -4.91 
23 -0.412 -3.55 -0.386 -3.33 -0.499 -4.31 -0.166 -1.43 -0.608 -5.24 
24 -0.399 -3.37 -0.360 -3.04 -0.537 -4.53 -0.081 -0.69 -0.639 -5.40 
25 -0.431 -3.57 -0.396 -3.28 -0.552 -4.57 -0.115 -0.95 -0.678 -5.61 
26 -0.468 -3.80 -0.439 -3.56 -0.568 -4.61 -0.130 -1.05 -0.749 -6.08 
27 -0.415 -3.31 -0.373 -2.97 -0.561 -4.46 -0.055 -0.44 -0.693 -5.52 
28 -0.402 -3.14 -0.361 -2.82 -0.544 -4.25 -0.015 -0.11 -0.708 -5.54 
29 -0.405 -3.12 -0.359 -2.76 -0.566 -4.35 -0.030 -0.23 -0.690 -5.30 
30 -0.381 -2.88 -0.342 -2.59 -0.517 -3.91 0.034 0.26 -0.719 -5.44 
31 -0.396 -2.94 -0.361 -2.68 -0.518 -3.85 0.038 0.28 -0.761 -5.66 
32 -0.409 -2.99 -0.376 -2.75 -0.526 -3.85 0.055 0.40 -0.808 -5.91 
33 -0.423 -3.04 -0.391 -2.81 -0.533 -3.84 0.056 0.41 -0.839 -6.04 
34 -0.377 -2.67 -0.332 -2.36 -0.530 -3.76 0.085 0.60 -0.751 -5.33 
35 -0.357 -2.50 -0.306 -2.14 -0.534 -3.73 0.097 0.68 -0.711 -4.97 
36 -0.351 -2.42 -0.299 -2.06 -0.530 -3.66 0.056 0.39 -0.655 -4.52 
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I compute the abnormal returns using the standard event study methodology of stock returns on the 
FTSE All Share Price Index for main market companies and AIM All Share Price Index for AIM 
companies. I obtain the monthly share price and indices data from DataStream. All IPOs includes 
830 UK IPOs over the period 1999-2006.  IPOs with insider trades (543 IPOs) includes any IPOs 
with at least one insider trades during 36 months period after IPO. IPOs without insider trades (287 
IPOs) include any IPOs without any insider trades during 36 months period after IPO. IPOs where 
insider are net buyers (sellers) are based on Net purchase ratio (NPR). If NPR is positive (negative) 
I define them as IPOs where insiders are Net Buyers (sellers). NPR is the difference between total 
value of purchases and sells divided by total value of shares traded over this 36 months period after 
IPO. I identify 190 IPOs with Net Buy and 353 IPOs with Net Buy. To remove the effect of first day 
return I compute the first month return without first day return. 
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Chapter 7 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
This thesis addresses the information content of insider trading in the UK. 
Particularly, I address the following: aggregate insider trading and market reaction 
to trades by insiders, insider trading within the lockup agreements, and the impact 
of insider trading on the long run performance of IPOs. I test various hypotheses 
from the insider trading literature, namely, information asymmetry, agency theory, 
market timing and trading on insider information theories. I apply these concepts to 
individual insider trades, aggregate insider trading and to IPOs as they are likely to 
have specific characteristics to shed some further lights on these issues.     
This study finds that insider purchases are informative in the short run, 
which is consistent with Fidrmuc et al. (2006). However, insider sells are not 
information driven; suggesting that the sell trades may be carried out for 
diversification or liquidity considerations. The results on the sell trades are 
consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who report that market basically 
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ignores insider information when it is reported. The market reaction of insider buy 
trades in the UK is much higher than the US (for example, see Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001)). This study further relates the higher information content of buy trades to 
the differences in regulatory environment in the US and the UK. The faster 
reporting practice, the narrow definition of insiders in the UK may contribute to the 
higher market reaction of insider trades. The trading bans around the corporate 
earnings announcements in the UK also suggest that corporate insiders are 
expected to trade less frequently and likely to trade based on more information.  
The immediate market reactions of insider trades depend on the firm’s 
market-to-book, which implies that insider’s trade on misvaluations. This result is 
in direct contrast to Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who report that market reaction in 
the short run does not vary with book-to-market. These results could also imply 
that insiders trade based on ‘value’ and ‘growth’ strategies, which is in line with 
Rozeff and Zaman (1998). Size is also an important factor as the market reaction 
varies with the size of the company, which is consistent with Gregory et al. (1994, 
1997).   However, a two-way sorting by M/B and size shows that after controlling 
for these factors the signal that insiders convey to the market is weaker than what 
has been documented in the previous literature. These results are consistent with 
Jenter (2005) who document that after controlling for B/M insider trades hardly 
convey any information. 
 After analysing the signals that insiders send to the market through their 
trades, this study examines the signalling in initial public offerings (IPOs). Under 
the signalling and the agency framework, I analyse the trading behaviour of 
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insiders before the lockup expirations and in the 36 months after quotations. This 
thesis assesses whether insiders trade under the lockup constraints and whether the 
trades affect IPO performance during the lockup periods and in the long run. The 
lockup is interesting event as this is the opportunity for insiders to sell their shares 
after the IPO for the first time and diversify their holdings. The buy trades are also 
fascinating to analyse: why insiders increase their holdings while their IPO 
allocations are locked up. Finally, this study analyses insider trades within three 
years of IPOs, to examine the impact of insider trading on performance of IPOs. 
Here, I consider the possibility that, for short period of time, insiders can trade in 
the wrong direction to maintain information superiority, and, at a later period, trade 
in the right direction to achieve higher profit (see John and Narayanan (1997) for 
such a model). 
 This thesis documents that insider’s do trade during the lockup period. In 
particular, I show that in some IPOs they buy, while in others, they sell their 
holdings. Their trading activity suggests that lockups may not be binding. They 
could also imply that insiders get permission from the underwriters to sell their 
holdings, while others are made to increase their stake, probably to support the 
prices. This study, therefore, assesses further the characteristics of these two sets of 
IPOs. I also relate the results with IPO characteristics (e.g., Underwriters, VC 
presence etc). The results suggest that this early trading activity is likely to be pre-
arranged with the underwriters, and that, while the sell trades can be considered as 
an early release following good performance, the buy trades are likely to be 
undertaken to support the price of underperforming IPOs. However, I do not have 
280 
 
data to test the price support hypothesis directly. This issue is subject to further 
research. The IPOs with insider trades are more likely to have longer lockup 
periods, larger proportion of shares locked up, and more likely to be backed by 
venture capitalists. The documented negative price reaction on lockup expiry dates 
is positively related to the probability of early buys of insiders, not early sells. 
The information content of sell and buy trades are statistically and 
economically significant and much higher compared to a seasoned company. It 
means insiders trading under institutional constraint (e.g. lockup) provide strong 
signal compared to insider trading in existing company. These results are consistent 
with the view that information asymmetry is higher for newly floated companies 
and they trigger a higher market reaction (Huddart and Ke (2006)). Insiders selling 
(buying) after a significant price rise (decline) imply the contrarian strategy 
adopted by insiders, which, in turn, is consistent with the short run market timing 
by the insiders, in line with Friedrich et al. (2002).   
 While the insider trades under lockup agreement produce some interesting 
results, I expand the analysis of the impact of the insider trading on the long run 
performance of IPOs. Net purchase ratio (NPR) is used to classify the firm as either 
net buyer or net seller. If NPR is positive (negative), the IPO is classified as Net 
Buy (sell) firm.  I find, overall, IPOs underperform in three years after issuing 
shares. Interestingly, this study reports that IPOs where insider trades perform 
better compared to where insiders do not trade. Furthermore, by splitting insider 
trading IPOs into Net Buy and Net Sell, I find, while Net Sell IPOs overperform, 
Net Buy IPOs underperform. These results hold for a wide spectrum of tests: 
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market adjusted CARs (equal and value weighted), style adjusted BHARs, and 
Fama-French three factor models. Insider sell shares when they feel that their IPOs 
have reached optimal value and not much gain can be achieved by holding the 
shares. Insider purchases in the failing IPOs suggest that their trades may be 
undertaken to support price. However, the evidence suggests that insiders do not 
achieve their target by purchasing their own company shares.  
I find that IPOs with insider trades perform better than IPOs without insider 
trades, which is in line with Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and 
Mcconnell (1999) proposition that insider trading is beneficial for price discovery. 
The results are consistent with the disposition hypothesis put forward in 
behavioural finance that there is a tendency to sell winners too early and holding on 
to losers for too long. Although the immediate market reaction is positive and 
statistically significant for insider buy trades, abnormal returns are negative in the 
long run. The results imply that, the signals insiders send in the financial markets 
by purchasing shares in IPOs is not credible, thus, share price keep on falling after 
insiders buy, in the long run.  
More work is needed in the future to fully understand the role of insiders in 
the context of IPOs. I do not have data to test further hypothesis of price support by 
insiders in long run, because price support, essentially, is a short term concept. As 
such, the legality of insider trades before lockup expirations could not be 
determined, because there is no legal requirement for the existence of the lockup 
agreements. Also, in some instances the lockup agreements are not binding and I 
don’t have data regarding those instances to determine whether insiders trade if the 
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lockup becomes redundant.  A recent paper show that insiders trade strategically 
before material news announcements (Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer, forthcoming). 
However, it is outside the scope of this thesis to determine whether insiders trade 
around material news announcements. I assume that insiders follow the rules which 
stipulate that they are not allowed to trade around the corporate earnings 
announcements. Further, the connection between corporate brokers in the UK and 
trading by insiders is not possible to analyse due to data availability. All these 
issues are subject to further research. 
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Appendix I 
 
 
Insider trading, in the UK, is regulated by the 1977 Model Code of the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) and the 1985 Companies Act. In the US, insider trading is 
regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). The 1934 Securities and 
Exchange Act and its amendments impose restrictions on insider trading. The main 
differences between the two countries are: (i) the definition of an insider (ii) the 
definition of (illegal) insider trading, (iii) the essence of the regulation, (iv) the time 
within which insiders have to report their trades and (v) the level of enforcement of 
the regulation. 
In the US, insiders are defined as officers, directors, other key employees 
and shareholders holding more than 10% of any equity class (Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001)). The term ‘officer’ covers the company president, principal financial 
officer, principal accounting officer, any vice president, or any other employees 
who performs policy making functions in the company (Bettis et al. (2000)). All of 
these are prohibited from trading on undisclosed ‘material’ information. The UK 
definition of insiders is much confined. Insiders include the members of the board 
of directors (both executives and non-executives), but exclude other key employees 
and large shareholders. 
The definitions of insider trading (in US) and directors’ share dealings (in 
UK) often cause confusion. According to the UK Misuse of Information Act, 
insider information is defined as ‘material, current, reliable and not available to the 
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market’ and is legally qualified as ‘new and fresh’. The Criminal Justice Act makes 
trading on insider information (information not regularly available and obtained 
through insiders) a legal offence. This study does not deal with illegal insider 
trading because of data unavailability. Instead I will focus on legal trading by 
directors as defined in the listing rules of the London Stock Exchange (Source 
Book August 2002, Chapter 16). Unlike US legislation, UK laws distinguish 
between (illegal) insider trading and (legal) directors’ dealings, the US regulation 
does not make such a distinction. In this study, I use the term directors’ dealings to 
refer to the (legal) insider trading or share transactions by directors in UK. I adopt 
the UK definition of a director. In the UK, the term director covers both non-
executives and executives. On the other hand, in the US, executives are normally 
referred to as officers and non-executives directors. 
In general, the spirit of US rules on insider trading is that insiders must 
either abstain from trading on undisclosed information or release this information 
to the public before they trade (Hu and Noe (1997)). The UK approach is different. 
UK regulation contained in the 1977 Model Code of the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) – which became effective in April 1979 – and the 1985 Companies Act is 
stricter than the US regulation (Hillier and Marshall (1998)). The directors of 
companies traded on the LSE cannot trade during the two months preceding a 
preliminary, final or interim earnings announcement and one month prior to a 
quarterly earnings announcement. Outside the trading ban periods, directors still 
require clearance to trade from the board’s chairman. In general, there are no such 
restrictions in the US system which favours frequent disclosure to remove possible 
insider advantages rather than trading bans during price-sensitive periods.  
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There are also strong differences between US and UK in the reporting rules. 
The UK Model Code prescribes much faster reporting of directors’ dealings. The 
directors must inform their company as soon as possible after the transaction and 
no later than the fifth business day after a transaction for their own account or on 
behalf of their spouses and children (Hillier and Marshall (2002)). In turn, a 
company must inform the LSE without delay and no later than the end of the 
business day following receipt of the information. This implies that the information 
about insider transaction reach market as late as 6 days after transaction. However, 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) document that for 85% of the directors’ dealings the 
announcement date coincides with the transaction day or is the following day. The 
LSE then disseminates this information immediately to data vendors by means of 
its Regulatory News Service (RNS). The company is also required to enter this 
information into its Register, which is available for public inspection, within three 
days of the reporting by the director. In contrast, in the US, insiders only have to 
report their holdings within the first ten days77 of the month following the month of 
the trade (Persons (1997)). The capital gains US insiders make on short-term 
swings in prices (formally within six months) must be repaid to the company. 
Insider transactions are published in the SEC’s online Insider Trading Report. 
Chang and Suk (1998) write that trades normally appear in the online report within 
the same day that the SEC is informed. Shortly afterwards, the information is 
                                                 
77 After the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Act the reporting environment has changed. The definition of 
insider covered under Section 16 of the Exchange Act, and the types of transactions which are 
reportable, have not changed. What has changed is the filing deadline for Forms 4 has been 
dramatically shortened. It has changed from within 10 days after the close of the calendar month in 
which a reportable transaction occurred to within two business days after the day the transaction 
took place. However, most of the insider trading studies in US is done before the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. 
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published in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and other newspapers. Chang and Suk 
(1998) find that there is a significant share price reaction even after the 
announcement in the WSJ that the SEC online report is only read by a small 
number of investors, whereas the WSJ is read by a larger number of investors. This 
implies that not only is the reporting process in the US slower, but it also takes time 
for the information contained in the insider trades to be reflected in the share price. 
The difference in the speed of reporting is also likely to have major 
implications for the magnitude of the abnormal returns calculated around the 
announcement of insider trading. Given that the period between the trading day and 
the announcement in the UK covers a maximum of 6 days compared to up to 40 
days in the US, I expect insider trades in the UK to be highly informative whereas 
those in the US to be more likely based on stale information. Still, although the 
regulation in the UK may be stricter than in the US, what matters is its 
enforcement. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) showed that cost of equity declines 
after successful prosecution. According to Hillier and Marshall (1998), the UK 
regulation is well enforced as insider trading is virtually non-existent during the 
two-month period prior to the final and interim earnings announcements. Similarly, 
the regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), argues that past and present 
regulation has been sufficiently strict and that there have only been few violations 
to the trading bans. In addition, the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) of 
2000 (effective from 1 December 2001) further refines the definitions of illegal 
insider trading and specifies a dual prosecution track which facilitates the 
procedures to bring insider trading violations to court. The lack of disclosure, 
violation of trading bans, or misuse of inside information can be prosecuted under 
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the Misuse of Information Act using a civil law or a criminal law procedure. Given 
that the new procedures have only recently been introduced and that investigations 
take time, there has only been one conviction since 2001 (via a civil court 
procedure), namely that of the Company Secretary of Middlemiss who traded 
equity prior to earnings announcements.  
In the US, the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 
(ITSFEA) of 1988 raised the maximum fine for insider trading to $1 million and 10 
years of imprisonment as a reaction to frequent violations of existing insider 
regulation. The Act also placed the liability for illegal insider trading by any of the 
company’s employees with the top management. Garfinkel (1997) documents that 
the Act has changed the timing of trading by US insiders. After the Act was passed 
by Congress, insider trading – especially selling – tended to happen after, rather 
than before earnings announcements. He also finds that the earnings surprise – 
defined as the difference between the actual earnings and the median analysts’ 
forecast – increased after the Act. He states that this ‘is consistent with less 
informed trading prior to earnings announcements during the post-Act period and 
the notion that informed trading encourages price discovery’. 
To sum up, there are considerable differences between the UK and US 
regulation on insider trading. The differences pertain to the definition of an insider, 
the fundamental nature of the regulation, the enforcement and the delay within 
which trades have to be reported. I conclude that UK insider trades are likely to be 
more informative than US trades for the following reasons: (i) A trade must be 
made public within at most 6 business days in the UK, compared to up to 40 days 
in the US (Fidrmuc et al. (2006)). (ii) Both Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and 
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McConnell et al. (2005) report that the information on insiders’ trades enters the 
public domain in the US only several days after it is released by the SEC. Fidrmuc 
et al. (2006) show that no such delay occurs in the UK. (iii) In the UK, mandatory 
reporting by insiders is limited to top management and to the non-executive 
directors only. In contrast, US insiders (legally) comprise a much larger group: 
insiders are large shareholders, (non-executive) directors and managers (officers). 
Officers include not only the top management with board seats, but also a wider 
group of managers (e.g. any vice president in charge of any principal business unit, 
division, or function such as sells, administration, or finance), who may de facto 
possess less information about their firm’s prospects (iv) The UK regulator has 
opted for trading bans in price-sensitive periods whereas the US regulator favours 
more frequent disclosure. All these elements suggest that directors’ trades in the 
UK are more informative. Since, UK insiders (directors) possess superior 
information their timing ability will be superior to what has been documented in 
context of US. 
 
